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2Abstract
This study is motivated by the observation that countries in adverse external financial 
situations have to make larger use of more expensive trade financing and payment 
arrangements. It attempts to contribute to the understanding of the channels through which 
the external financial situation of debtor countries affects their trade financing, and to 
identify the determinants of the costs associated with such financing. These costs reflect 
the higher risk of default associated with credits extended to them and include, for 
example, interest rate spreads and credit insurance premia. For the purpose of 
demonstrating the channels through which the perception of such a risk influences these 
costs, the study adopts the perspective of a "small" creditor or credit insurer, meaning that 
the risk is exogenous to the creditor/insurer. This leaves the problem of incorporating 
these risks in the credit insurance premia and interest rate spreads. For this purpose, a 
theoretical concept of the determination of credit insurance premia is established. Based 
on the idea that export credit insurance, viewed as a security, is similar to a contingent 
claim, such as a European put option, the concept uses tools from option pricing theory. 
Some of its implications are compared with observations and found to be consistent with 
them, i.e. there is some support for the following hypotheses. The less favourable a 
country's solvency and liquidity indicators, the higher are the insurance premium rates 
applying to it, the latter indicators appearing to be relatively more important than the 
former ones. Moreover, they are higher the greater the volatility of the rates of change in 
these indicators. The impact of the share of public (and publicly guaranteed) debt in total 
foreign debt on the costs of external financing is discussed within the same theoretical 
framework. It is shown that these costs may be a non-monotonic function of that share.
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Addendum
The pages (i) to (xi) after the bibliography contain an addendum. It refers to the text 
on pages 73, 95, 215, and 218, and the table 6.4 on page 221. It also contains another 
table (Table 6.5: Data on net claims, premium income and amount of insured 
contracts, 1981-1990).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation and perspective of the study
It can be observed that the indebtedness and creditworthiness of a country 
determine the trade financing and payment arrangements available to it and that countries 
in adverse external financial situations have to make larger use of more expensive 
arrangements. Consequently, the trade of such countries is saddled with higher transaction 
costs than that of countries with a favourable external financial position. This study 
attempts to contribute to the understanding of the channels through which the external 
financial indicators of a debtor country affect its trade financing costs, and to identify 
determinants of additional transaction costs. It is not concerned with the moral judgements 
concerning these additional costs.
The additional costs reflect the higher risk associated with credits extended to these 
countries. International trade is not generally based on payment in cash, but usually 
involves a credit from the exporter or his bank to the importer, that is an export credit. 
Consequently, a credit risk arises. The typical responses to such a risk include the 
charging by the creditor of a risk premium - a spread  ^ - on the interest rate or the 
provision to the exporter of insurance cover from an export credit insurance agency. For 
such credit insurance cover, the export credit insurance agency charges a premium rate 
per amount of credit insured. Like the spread in interest rates on international credits (or 
in the yield to maturity of international bonds), this premium rate is influenced by the 
perception of the risk that the debtor country's government cannot or will not meet its 
country's debt-servicing obligations (political risk).  ^ In this connection the present study 
places particular emphasis on the identification of the determinants of these risk premiums 
that are specific to each debtor country, e.g. its liquidity and solvency indicators.^
‘ The spread is defined in chapter 3, section 3.2.
* Pohtical risk is defined in the next section.
 ^ Clearly, it cannot be expected that such country-specific factors will explain fully the additional costs in trade 
financing of a country. Other important influences include supply factors and group or regional contagion effects. Siq)ply 
factors include the extent to which banks have made loan-loss reserves, the business cycle in the creditor/insurer
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For the purpose of demonstrating the channels through which the perception of the 
political risk influences additional trade financing costs, the present study adopts the 
perspective of a "small" creditor or insurer. By small we mean that the creditor/insurer can 
influence neither the economic and political situation in the debtor country nor the 
occurrence of default and the mechanism of the debt rescheduling process in default. 
Thus, the probability of default is taken as exogenous. This simplifies the analysis, i.e. it 
leaves the problem of incorporating these risks in the insurance premia and interest rate 
spreads.
1.2 Basic concepts and methods
The study is concerned with the additional cost of trade financing faced by those 
countries which are perceived as susceptible to a notable probability of default on their 
external financial obligations. Trade financing is interpreted here in a broad sense, i.e. 
including not only export credits - credits extended by the exporter or his bank to the 
importer - but also other, more indirect, forms of external financing, such as the issuance 
by the debtor (importer) of bonds on international markets.'  ^The second chapter discusses 
several forms of external financing and gives special attention to the costs and conditions 
associated with the insurance of export credits by an export credit guarantee agency. The 
fourth and the sixth chapter are concerned with the premium rates for export credit 
insurance while the third and the fifth ones are concerned with the risk premia in external 
bonds.
country, and the competition both in markets for exports and for credits. The importance of the group effects was 
evident in the case of Latin American debtors after the outbreak of the debt crisis in the beginning of the 1980s and, 
as our discussion of the experience of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) suggests, for the latter during 
the late 1980s.
'* External financing by the means of issuing bonds is also referred to as general-purpose financing because of die 
absence of a link between the issue and specific trade transaction. Clearly, such a form of external hnancing can be used 
by the debtor not only for the financing of its international transactions but also for purchases of domestically produced 
consumption or investment goods.
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By default we mean any failure on the part of the debtor to meet its debt-servicing 
obligations as specified in the debt contract/ This can take on different forms/ In 
general, the following categories can be distinguished. The debtor may declare that it can 
not or does not want to pay its debt or that it does not recognise the debt obligation 
(repudiation). The latter is rarely observed/ and it is more common that the debtor and 
creditor either renegotiate or reschedule the debt or that a moratorium is either agreed 
upon or declared unilaterally by the debtor. Only foreign currency borrowing is considered 
here, that is borrowing and repayment are effected in currencies whose issue is not 
controlled by the debtor country. Consequently, default by means of currency debasement 
is not feasible.*
In lending where the debtor is a resident in a different country than the creditor 
(cross-border lending) one often uses another term related to the default risk, i.e. the 
country risk. There is no generally accepted definition for it but the following one by 
Nagy (1979) is widely used. It is the "exposure to a loss in cross-border lending caused 
by events which are, at least to some extent, under the control of the government of the 
borrowing country."^ This is a narrower concept than default risk since it does not cover 
the loss due to bankruptcy of a private debtor without any influence of its government. 
It is similar to the concept in the export credit insurance literature of political risk, which 
is in practice distinguished from the commercial risk. The distinction between the two
’ In fact, default is called by the creditors rather than the borrower. With the view to simplifying the verbal
exposition there are no further references to this distinction in the discussion.
® An illustrative hst of examples is provided by Winkler (1933, p.l6f): "A default may fall under any of the 
following classifications. 1. Reduction in the rate of interest. 2. Reduction in the amount of sinking fund or principal. 
3. Delay in payment of interest. 4. Delay in the payment of sinking fund or principal. 5. Suspension of payment of 
interest. 6. Suspension of payment of sinking fund or principal. 7. Reduction in the rate of interest through the levy of 
taxes subsequent to the flotation of loans içon the interest. 8. Payment of interest in depreciated currency where the 
contract designates 'gold' payment. 9. Payment of sinking funds or principal in depreciated currency where the contract 
calls for 'gold' payment. 10. Payment of interest and/or principal in so-called blocked native currencies. 11. Payment 
of interest and/or principal in so-called scrip, that is interest or non-interest bearing certificates. 12. Forced conversion
of loans. 13. Repudiation of interest. 14. Repudiation of sinking funds or principal. 15. Any number or all of the
preceding categories together."
 ^ This form of default has sometimes occurred after a new government has taken power. The exponent par 
excellence is Russia in 1918; Spain, Portugal France and Mexico afford earher examples of this type of default.
* In ancient times the favourite form of default was through such currency debasement (Winkler, 1933, p.21).
’ This is a broader concept than sovereign risk which is the risk associated with lending directly to the government 
of a sovereign nation.
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types of risks is conventionally made with reference to the event causing the loss (Dunn 
and Knight (1982)). Either this is of a commercial nature or a political nature. 
Commercial loss arises through the inability of the private debtor to repay the debt 
because of insolvency. Political loss arises through the occurrence of some event in the 
debtor's country which prevents it from repaying the debt. The events leading to such a 
political loss can include a wide spectrum, from changes in government policy and 
restrictions on the availability of foreign exchange to civil war." Chapters 2, 5 and 6 
distinguish between the political and commercial risk; elsewhere the term default risk is 
used.
The literature concerned with the default risk in international debt can be broadly 
divided into two groups: the traditional ability-to-pay approach (A?A) and the modem 
willingness-to-pay approach (WPA). The controversy between these two approaches is 
about whether a sovereign debtor's default is attributable to the debtor country 
government's inability to mobilize the resources (Avramovic (1964)) or to its mere 
reluctance to adhere to the terms of the debt contract (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)). The 
former view essentially claims that a country honours its obligations as long as it can 
direct sufficient foreign exchange away from other uses and towards debt servicing. On 
the other hand, the latter view considers explicitly strategic behaviour on the part of the 
debtor and shows that a country meets its contractual debt service obligations only as long 
as it deems it in its interest to do so. In other words, the debtor weighs the costs and 
benefits of honouring its contractual obligation and repays as long as the benefits 
outweigh the costs. These approaches have been reviewed extensively elsewhere (recently 
by Ciarrapico (1992)). Therefore, they will not be surveyed here; however, aspects of the 
discussion are present throughout this study. The general picture that emerges from 
surveys of this controversy is not always an illuminating one. In practice, it appears to be 
impossible to distinguish whether a default has occurred because of the debtor's 
unwillingness or its inability to meet its debt-service demands. As Simonsen (1985, p. 121)
When the debt is either sovereign, pubhc or pubUcly guaranteed debt, a commercial risk does not exist and the 
default risk is identical to the pohtical risk.
" A clearcut distinction between these two risks is generally not possible, since they are interrelated. For example, 
the business cycle in a country - being influenced by the government - affects the economic and financial situation of 
each individual firm and thus the commercial risk as well. See chapter 6, subsection 6.2.1.
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puts it in a paper presented in the 1984 World Bank Symposium on the debt of 
developing countries, "there is a cloudy zone between ability to pay and willingness to 
pay". This debate cannot be resolved here but it appears useful to draw the attention to 
one specific aspect that was stressed by Klein (1991a, 1994); namely, that a sufficiently 
small investor, whose behaviour does not affect the probability of default, is virtually 
indifferent as to whether default occurs because the default penalty is too low to force a 
reluctant debtor to pay or because the debtor's ability to do so is too low. He claims that 
the relevant concept viewed from the "small" creditor/investor is the debt-servicing 
capacity which he defines as "the maximum debt service that can be extracted from the 
debtor country." This maximum (debt-servicing capacity) may be influenced by aspects 
of both willingness and ability of the debtor but is always exogenous to the small 
creditor/insurer. Given the amount of total debt the probability of default is exogenous as 
well. A similar perspective is adopted by other recent studies concerned with the valuation 
of debt instruments, although their justification is a different one. Their valuation concept 
rests on two key assumptions about the resources and the behaviour of the debtor country. 
They assume that there is an exogenously given but uncertain flow of resources available 
to make debt-service payments, and that the debtor meets all of its contractual debt-service 
obligations, subject only to this resource constraint.’^  These assumptions provide another 
justification for taking default risk to be exogenous. The present study adopts this 
perspective (i.e. exogenous default risk) for the purpose of analytical simplification;’^  it 
makes the derivation of explicit formulae for the valuation of debt, the interest-rate 
spreads and insurance premia tractable.
Examples are Bartolini and Dixit (1991), Claessens and v. Wijnbergen (1990), Cohen (1985, 1990), Klein (1991a, 
1991b, 1994), Nocera (1989), and Scott (1990).
" An exception is chapter 3 in which we use a standard model of the WPA in which the probabihty of default is 
endogenous.
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1.3 Structure and results of the study
The individual chapters of this study deal with different questions related to the 
issue of the costs of trade financing and use different approaches to answer them. For 
example, the second chapter examines the link between a country's external financial 
situation and the financing and payment arrangements available to that country, using the 
example of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) during the second half of 
the 1980s. It shows that, when private banks reduced their exposure to the region, a 
liquidity squeeze ensued and these countries made greater use of expensive financing and 
payment arrangements, including countertrade. Also, qualitative changes occurred in the 
financing and payment arrangements used under the broad heading of countertrade, in the 
sense that the techniques used tended to be associated with higher costs, including legal 
ones. The rise in transaction costs was particularly evident in the tightening of conditions 
and increases in the price of official insurance cover for export credits to buyers from 
these countries. The findings support the hypothesis that all forms of external financing, 
including those that are officially supported, become more difficult to obtain and more 
costly for a country as its external financial position deteriorates, and thus add to the 
external financial stringency the respective country is confronted with. According to our 
estimates, the increase in transaction costs in trade financing, due to increases in the risk 
premiums, amounted to roughly one per cent for several CEECs and to 5 per cent for 
Bulgaria during 1991. Bulgaria had declared a suspension of payments of principal 
coming due on its medium- and long-term debt.
In order to better understand how export credit insurance premia are determined 
in practice, we investigate in the third chapter into the spreads in international bond issues 
which in many respects are similar to such premia and have been widely studied. 
Unlike in previous empirical studies of the spread, the hypotheses about the direction of 
influence of the included explanatory variable^ are derived from an underlying theoretical 
model of the spread. The model is a variation of the well-known Cohen and Sachs (1984) 
two-period model of international lending in the presence of a default threat. It implies
The appendix 4.5.6, of chapter 4, illustrates a situation in which the two risk premia are similar.
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that there exists a specific debt ceiling which is determined among other factors by the 
creditor's assessment of the debtor's future resource transfer potential. The closer the 
actual debt level to this debt ceiling - i.e. the smaller the external financial margin -, the 
higher is the spread. This hypothesis is tested with observations using pooled time-series 
and cross-country observations of the spread on the one hand and liquidity and solvency 
indicators of the debtor countries - as proxies for their resource transfer potentials - on the 
other. It appears that the model parameters are different depending on whether or not a 
country had a rescheduling of its commercial bank debt in the past. Therefore a regression 
model is used which allows for different estimates of both the intercept and the slope 
coefficients, depending on a country's rescheduling record. The results provide some 
support for the hypothesis that the liquidity and solvency situation of a country with a 
rescheduling history determines its spread. The liquidity situation appears to be a more 
important determinant than the solvency situation, the estimated coefficient of the liquidity 
indicator being greater and significant at higher levels than the one estimated for the 
solvency indicator.
The fourth chapter investigates in more detail a hypothesis that arises from the 
analysis of the second chapter, namely that the costs associated with the insurance of 
export credits are relatively high for countries in adverse external financial situations. For 
this purpose a theoretical model of international trade finance involving export credit 
insurance (ECI) is developed and some of its implications are tested empirically. The 
central idea of the model is that export credit insurance is similar to a contingent claim 
such as a put option. Thus, tools from option pricing theory are used to calculate the price 
of export credit insurance. Two concepts are used, the Black-Scholes concept and a 
valuation procedure under the assumption that the insurer is risk-neutral.'^ This is - to 
the author's knowledge - the first application of such concepts to export credit insurance. 
They imply that not only the current external financial position but also the volatility of 
the changes in that position determine the costs of export credit insurance. The empirical 
results of a cross-country statistical analysis of the premium rates actually applied by a 
private export credit insurer provide some support for these hypotheses. In particular, the
" The latter method impUes that the price of export credit insurance is equal to the present value o f expected net 
losses associated with that insurance.
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reserves-over-imports ratio of a debtor country and the volatility of the rates of change 
of this ratio appear to contribute significantly to the premium rates which apply to that 
country. Thus, the results lend support to the hypothesis that countries with an 
unfavourable external financial position and a high volatility of indicators associated with 
that position incur higher costs in their trade. Another finding is that the ranking of 
countries implied by these premium rates is consistent with the rankings implied by the 
(published) credit ratings of those countries. However, the relationship between those two 
rankings appears to be less close than those between another risk premium, i.e. the spread, 
and the credit ratings. The root-mean-square-percentage-error'^ between the rankings 
implied by the premium rates and the creditworthiness ratings is significantly higher than 
the one between the rankings implied by the spread and these ratings.
The fifth chapter extends the theoretical analysis of the fourth chapter and 
discusses the valuation of public and private foreign debt when public debt is senior to 
private debt. By senior we mean that servicing of the former is given priority vis-à-vis the 
latter in cases when not all foreign debt can be serviced. The perception of such seniority 
is reflected in the rating practice of debt rating agencies, and in the fact that in most 
countries the average annual spread on private issues without enhancements exceeds the 
one on similar public issues. Based on the conceptual analysis of the fourth chapter, a 
model of spread determination is developed that is able to capture the effects of seniority, 
and that agrees with these observations. Its major implications are as follows. The private 
(junior) debt is more expensive than the public (senior) debt. The cost of issuing private 
debt rises with an increasing relative share of public debt. Another result of the model is 
that the weighted average spread in the country's external debt issues has its minimum 
if the relative public share in total external debt is either 0 or 100 %. Intermediate shares 
of public debt lead to higher spreads. The basic model is then extended to include 
inefficiency losses in public debt and private debt default sunk costs. Under these 
circumstances, the disbursement that the country obtains from issuing debt instruments, 
or equivalently the value of its debt, may be a non-monotonic function of the relative 
share of public foreign debt. The allocation between private and public foreign debt which
This criterion measures the deviation of two vectors, with the same number of observations, from each other. It 
allows to compare the relative deviation among one pair of vectors with that among another pair of vectors.
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maximizes the weighted average value of the foreign debt (or its disbursement obtained 
from issuing bonds) may be a non-monotonic and non-continuous function of that 
country's debt-servicing capacity.
The sixth chapter discusses the issue of subsidies in publicly provided export credit 
insurance. More specifically it asks what the justifications are for public insurance and 
for subsidizes in such insurance. In an attempt to answer these questions, selected relevant 
articles from the literature on the economics of insurance and the one on international 
trade under imperfect competition are interpreted in the specific context of export credit 
insurance. The following tentative answers are suggested. As for any insurance there is 
some theoretical support for public provision of export credit insurance, but not for the 
provision of subsidized ECI. As to the second goal, there are two theoretical lines of 
argument in favour of export subsidies (from the national point of view). However, they 
rely on rather specific assumptions which may not be appropriate for the description of 
the practice of ECI. As to the third goal, if imperfect competition is considered and 
account is taken of the institutional circumstances under which export credit insurance 
cover is provided, subsidization through export credit insurance agencies (ECAs) may 
harm rather than benefit the importing countries, the reason being that it could relax price 
competition between exporters on the market of the importing countries. This means that 
the two goals of export promotion and development aid may be in fact conflicting. The 
chapter concludes with an attempt to measure the extent of the subsidies provided through 
ECAs in 16 countries during the period from 1981 to 1990. According to these estimates 
all major agencies, except four, provide significant subsidies.
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Chapter 2: Indebtedness and the Financing of Trade - The Example of 
Central and Eastern European Countries between 1985 and 1991
2.1 Introduction
The growth and pattern of a country's international trade are inseparably linked 
to its financing and its payment arrangements. This becomes particularly obvious when 
a country is experiencing financial stringency on the international capital markets. Thus, 
the difficulties experienced by developing countries subsequent to the outbreak of the debt 
crisis in 1982 have demonstrated some key relationships between the (general) availability 
of external financing and the growth of trade, on the one hand, and among types of 
international lending and payment arrangements, on the other. Countries in adverse 
financial situations generally have to make greater use of more expensive financing and 
payment arrangements in their trade. Little attention has been devoted to the channels 
through which external financial stringency hampers a country's ability to engage in 
international trade - via its effect on the country's costs of doing business.’ External 
financial stringency depicts a situation where a country has great difficulties in obtaining 
external finance because the country is perceived as susceptible to a high probability of 
default on its external obligations.
In the light of the recent experience of Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs), this chapter investigates the channels through which external financial 
stringency has affected their modes of trade financing and payment arrangements. In 
particular, the terms and availability of official insurance for export credits to buyers from 
CEECs are analyzed.^
‘ cf. UNCTAD: "Consideration of the present situation and current problems in the field of trade financing - Trade 
financing for developing countries: Some aspects of current difficulties and pohcy responses", study by the UNCTAD 
secretariat (TD/B/C.3/212), 11 July 1986.
 ^This chapter is a revised and shortened version of a discussion paper by the author (1992b). The section 2.4 and 
the appendices of the present chapter are not contained in that discussion paper.
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A major hypothesis of this chapter is that the (perceived) default risk of a country 
is closely related to its transaction costs in international trade. The transmission 
mechanism between this and the transaction cost are the trade financing and payment 
arrangements that are available to a country. Take, for example, very simple payment 
arrangements where imports are purchased on an open-account basis and goods are 
shipped but payment is delayed for some weeks or months.^ The exporter loses control 
of the goods at the time of their despatch and has no way of enforcing payment. Clearly, 
reliance on such an arrangement presupposes confidence in the importer's willingness and 
ability to meet its payment obligations. Hence this form of purchase arrangement is 
unlikely to be available to importers whose creditworthiness is doubtful.
This analysis finds support for the hypothesis that high indebtedness and 
deteriorating creditworthiness had saddled the imports of the great majority of CEECs 
with increased transaction costs. When banks reduced their exposure towards the region, 
a liquidity squeeze ensued in these countries, and the cost of financing and payment 
arrangements for their imports increased, as greater use was made of more expensive 
financing and payment arrangements, including counter-trade. Also, qualitative changes 
occurred in the financing and payment techniques used under the broad heading of 
"counter-trade", in the sense that the required loan-financing period accompanying the 
counter-trade transaction was shorter, while the techniques used tended to have higher 
costs attached, including legal ones. This rise in transaction costs was also evident in the 
tightening of the conditions on which official insurance cover was available for credits 
which exporters granted to buyers from these countries, i.e. export credits, the example 
of the ECGD of the United Kingdom being singled out for special attention. This shows 
that, like private international lending, the terms and conditions of officially supported 
export credits are responsive to a country's economic situation.
 ^The open-account transaction is the easiest and cheapest payment arrangement. The exporter, having received a 
purchase order from the importer, ships the goods with an invoice to the importer who is allowed (deferred) payment 
at a predetermined future date. Thus the exporter bears all risks related to that trade transaction. Since no intermediary 
is involved the costs associated with this arrangement are minimum; it is commonly used in domestic trade in developed 
countries.
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The analysis in this chapter also provides some support for the hypothesis that one 
penalty of default consists of an increase in the trade financing costs of the defaulting 
country. For example, according to our estimates, following its declaration of a 
moratorium on its debt-servicing, Bulgaria experienced an increase in its trade financing 
costs of an equivalent of almost 5% of total convertible currency imports.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 deals with the development of 
CEECs' indebtedness, creditworthiness and liquidity situation at the end of the 1980s. In 
detail, subsection one of section 2.2 reviews the development of indebtedness from the 
beginning of the 1970s until that time. Then subsection 2.2.2 considers the burden that the 
indebtedness represents and looks at the creditors' perception of these countries' debt 
situation, i.e. their creditworthiness. Subsequently subsection 2.2.3 briefly discusses the 
liquidity situation of the CEECs. Section 2.3 analyses the changes in the financing and 
payment arrangements that have occurred in CEECs' trade in convertible currencies. 
Subsection 2.3.1 explains the most commonly used trade-financing and payment 
arrangements, such as, for example, officially guaranteed export credits which represent 
a traditional form of East-West trade financing. Subsection 2.3.2.1 takes a closer look at 
the terms and conditions of insurance cover from official export credit guarantee agencies 
(ECAs). The general points are then investigated in greater detail in subsection 2.3.2.2, 
the example of the practice of the United Kingdom's Export Credit Guarantee Department 
(ECGD) towards CEECs in the second half of the 1980s being singled out for particular 
attention. Subsequently, in section 2.4 some aspects on the likely effects on trade of these 
countries are briefly discussed.
2.2 Central and Eastern European countries' (CEECs) indebtedness
2.2.1 Development of CEECs' indebtedness
Prior to 1970 trade between Western countries and CEECs was generally balanced 
and represented a comparatively low share of total trade of both country groups. In the 
face of slowing growth. Eastern European countries increased their imports of goods with
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a high-technology content from Western countries during 1971 to 1975, the volume of 
imports of investment goods from OECD countries rising by 50% over the previous 
period/ In addition, imports of consumption goods were expanded to improve the 
consumption standards. Imports from the hard-currency area rose faster than exports which 
caused widening convertible currency trade-balance deficits. Western banks were willing 
to finance the deficit by extending convertible currency credits. The Eastern European 
countries' indebtedness was low, the economic prospects seemed to be favourable and 
Western bankers appreciated that the authorities of the centrally planned economies could, 
by issuing commands, directly control the key economic variables affecting the hard 
currency balance of payments. The former Soviet Union with its abundant natural 
resources appeared to be a first-class borrower and a potential source of support for the 
credit standing of the smaller CEECs - it was believed that the former Soviet Union 
would assist other CMEA  ^countries which might experience financial difficulties in order 
to protect the credit standing of the group as a whole ("umbrella theory").^
Initially the bulk of lending was guaranteed by Western Governments eager to 
promote exports. As a result, banks were able to earn income with only limited or no risk. 
Western banks developed correspondent banking relationships with the foreign trade banks 
and the National Bank of Hungary, which provided a base for short-term bank-to-bank 
financing by means of letters of credit.  ^ Throughout the 1970s the East-West financial 
relations became increasingly emancipated from East-West trade. The lending business to 
Central and Eastern European countries exhibited endogenous dynamics in the sense that 
banks with only a minor interest in East-West trade began seeking to acquire non-trade 
related claims on the region. Competition among banks intensified and banks became 
increasingly willing to lend without guarantees.
* United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Bulletin for Europe, 1989, p. 80.
’ As of 26 September 1991, the Governments concerned dissolved the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA).
* See e.g. Schroder (1983, 1985) and Delamaide (1984, therein chapter 4: The Umbrella Myth).
’ The irrevocable letter of credit (ILC) subsequently became the most common method of payment in East-West 
trade, whether for sight payment (cash) or time payment (credit). This payment arrangement consisted of an eastern 
bank issuing a letter of credit in favour of the western exporter which was advised and payable through the Western 
exporter's bank. For definitions of this and other investments of trade financing see also subsection 2.3.2.1.
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This tendency found expression in the rising scale of Eastern European borrowing 
in the syndicated Eurocurrency market and Eurobond market towards the end of the 
1970s, where funds not tied to particular transactions could be raised for general purposes. 
The margins over LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) that Eastern European countries 
were charged in these markets contracted.* Thus the lending to Eastern European 
countries developed in parallel with the boom in worldwide sovereign lending. It must, 
however, be noted that Eastern European countries were enjoying above-average market 
confidence due to the alleged advantages of centrally planned economic systems in 
maintaining debt service and the belief in the Soviet "umbrella". Throughout the 1970s, 
the net and gross debt continued to rise steadily; the total indebtedness of the CEECs in 
1981 amounted to more than 66 billion US dollars - a more than ten-fold increase 
compared to the debt at the beginning 1970s. As a result, the Eastern European countries 
were confronted with an increasing debt-service burden. By the end of 1979, Poland's 
debt service was already swallowing up more than 90% of its export revenues. Poland was 
facing increasing difficulty in obtaining the needed hard currency, and in March 1981 
Poland was obliged to ask its official and private creditors to reschedule its debt. Initially 
Western investors held Poland to be an exceptional case and the credit-standing of the rest 
of the region was hardly affected. However, the Polish crisis shook the belief in a Soviet 
"umbrella" considerably.^ Indeed, the emergence of developing countries' liquidity crisis 
and the Romanian demand for rescheduling its external debt induced a general change in 
view. As part of the general worldwide credit contraction, banks sought to reduce 
exposure to Eastern European countries. The immediate consequence was that general 
purpose credits practically ceased to be available for Eastern European countries. The 
Eastern European countries - with the exception of Hungary - were no longer able to 
borrow on the Euromarket; the share of borrowing of the group of Eastern European 
countries as a percentage of total Euromarket volume dropped to 0.4% in 1982 from 7.4% 
at the peak in 1977. Credits from international institutions, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank, were only available to the member countries Hungary and Romania, and thus
* The average margin, expressed in basis points over LIBOR, gradually fell from 134 basis points in 1975 to 70 
basis points in 1979. At the same time the average maturity increased. OECD, Financial Market Trends, 1987, p.30.
’ See for a detailed description of the crisis Delamaide (1984).
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Eastern European countries had, in general, to rely on other methods of 
financing and payments.
For example, the demand for counter-trade increased and Eastern European 
countries came to rely more heavily on supplier credits.*' They could obtain only two- 
or three-year financing and then only with export credit guarantees. These trade-related 
credits bore interest rates of 1 to 1.5% above LIBOR and thus were much more expensive 
than the trade credits of the 1970s. In fact, these rates of interest would have been even 
higher if the exporters had not offered lower interest rates and then factored the "hidden" 
subsidies into their prices for goods.*  ^ Allowing for these effects, the effective yield of 
the credits would have amounted to 3% above LIBOR. Thus transactions involved 
higher financing costs either openly, in the form of higher interest rate margins, or 
concealed by higher export prices or transaction costs associated with distress counter­
trade operations.
The imports of CEECs were cut drastically. The current account of Eastern Europe, 
which was in deficit throughout the 1970s, moved into strong surplus after 1982. Between 
1981 and 1984 the net hard currency debt of the six Eastern and Central European 
countries fell by roughly 20%.*'* This significant successful adjustment effort reinforced 
the view held by Western bankers that central administration of an economy facilitated 
debt servicing. By mid-1984 all countries, except Poland and Romania, could obtain 
medium-term trade-related credits at margins of no more than 1% above LIBOR, and 
"hidden" exporter subsidies - as explained above - were no longer needed.
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria did not obtain any funds fix>m the IMF until they joined tiiis institution in
1990.
" The trade financing and payment arrangements used in East-West trade will be explained in subsection 2.3.1.
It was common that the exporter charged a higher price to compensate itself or its bank for a relatively low 
interest rate in the trade-related credits. Case studies are discussed in Bolz (1976), Fuss (1979), and Schich (1986).
" Estimates from the OECD, Financial Market Trends^  March 1985, p. 25.
As a result of exchange rate movements, the "nominal" decline expressed in US dollars appears to be greater 
than the "real" decline. This is due to the fact that in 1984 between 42% and 85% of individual countries' hard 
currency debt was denoted in currencies other than the US dollar. Therefore an increase in the US dollar exchange rate 
against other major currencies meant that the "nominal" debt denoted in US dollars declined wdthout any "real" reduction 
taking place. OECD, Financial Market Trends^  February 1991, p.21.
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From 1984 until the end of the decade most CEECs were able to use the private 
markets, which were often willing to offer terms as favourable as those available on 
officially guaranteed credits. The adjustment process between 1981 and 1984 was 
characterized by investment and import cuts. After 1985 the emphasis in these countries 
shifted more towards fostering growth by means of investment acceleration. As a 
consequence, import growth resumed, even though the problems of exporting to 
non-socialist markets persisted. There was another surge in lending to CEECs and, as a 
result, the net hard currency debt more than doubled between 1984 and 1989 (see 
table 2.1). Part of the increase in the nominal debt was attributable to the devaluation of 
the US dollar, that is exchange rate movements over-stated the "real" increase in debt.'^
During this time, the markets for syndicated Eurocurrency credits were 
characterized by a general contraction of margins, because the competition among banks 
for allegedly good credit risks increased while the total market volume was shrinking. The 
CEECs profited more than most borrowers from the increased competition. The average 
margins above LIBOR for the region declined from 118 basis points in 1983 (representing 
almost double the margin for the average borrower from the OECD) to 55 basis points 
in 1984 - a margin almost as low as that for the average borrower from an OECD 
country. Although CEECs increasingly used the Euromarket once again for raising funds 
for general purposes, with the exception of Hungary, the Euromarket remained a relatively 
minor source of external finance for CEECs. The bulk of lending was provided by banks 
in the form of buyer and supplier credits.'^
See "Debt at Constant Exchange Rates", OECD, Financial Market Trends, Februaiy 1991, table 5, p.21.
** A supplier credit is an arrangement under which the supplier allows for deferred payment by his customer of 
the financed amount of the commercial contract. By contrast, under a buyer credit, a specific loan is arranged between 
the creditor and the buyer, and the obhgations associated with this credit contract are independent of the obligations 
of the parties to the commercial contract.
Table 2.1; Debt in convertible currencies of CEECs^ ^^
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Gross debt
Bulgaria 3162 2977 2482 2165 3739 4955 6218 7915 9133 10400
Czechoslovakia 4598 3998 3612 3135 4608 5567 6657 7281 7915 7900
Hungary 8699 7952 8250 8836 13804 16914 19592 19625 20605 21700
Poland 25869 26460 26550 26908 29806 33587 38800 37746 41400 48200
Romania 10159 9766 8880 7198 6861 6984 6515 2799 582 2300
Total Five 52487 51153 49774 48242 58819 68008 77783 75367 79636 90500
Former USSR 26534 26737 23587 22513 28900 31400 39200 43000 54000 52000
Total Six 79021 77890 73361 70755 87719 99408 116983 118367 133636 142500
Net debt^^
Bulgaria 2352 2017 1312 737 1648 3574 5132 6137 7957 9800
Czechoslovakia 3528 3268 2672 2132 3597 4350 5059 5609 5724 6300
Hungary 7799 7222 6920 7303 11527 14726 18089 18246 19440 20300
Poland 25109 25490 25280 25361 28211 31866 35806 34122 37469 41800
Romania 9859 9466 8370 6557 6492 6349 5129 1990 -1254 1300
Total Five 48647 47463 44554 42090 51476 60866 69216 66105 69337 79600
Former USSR 18084 16707 12547 11172 15838 16631 25065 27745 39319 43400
Total Six 66731 64170 57101 53262 67314 77497 94281 93850 108656 122900
K)
Os
Source: OECD (a) Millions of dollars. (b) Gross debt less deposits in BlS-area banks.
27
As a result of the rapid increase in debt and increasing economic and political 
uncertainty, Western bankers downgraded their perception of the CEECs' creditworthiness. 
A marked shift in banks' attitudes vis-à-vis Eastern Europe became apparent when the 
arrears of payments by the former Soviet Union surfaced in March 1990 and the Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank announced the suspension of repayments of principal. As a result, the 
group as a whole experienced a net capital outflow vis-à-vis private banks. The bulk of 
the contraction was borne by the former Soviet Union and Hungary. Except in the case 
of Czechoslovakia, private banks were extremely reluctant to extend any new credits at 
their own risk and, when granting export credits, banks were generally unwilling to lend 
without official export credit guarantees. As a consequence, 1990 was characterized by 
a decrease of claims of more than 10% - a decline that followed an increase of claims of 
banks vis-à-vis this region of more than 40% over the previous five years.
2.2.2 Relative indebtedness and the perception of default risk
The relative size of the external debt varies widely among the individual countries 
of the region. Poland had the largest external debt, amounting to almost $50 billion in 
1990. But Hungary, with half Poland's debt but a quarter of its population, had the highest 
external debt per capita. With a per capita debt of almost $2,000, Hungary has found itself 
in a position similar to that of Argentina, the forerunner in Latin America in terms of 
relative indebtedness.
There are various ways of measuring the relative indebtedness of a country. For 
example, Cohen (1991) has suggested to use debt-per-capita.'^ According to this 
indicator, Hungary appears to be the most heavily indebted because of its small and slow- 
growing population. Conversely, the former Soviet Union's debt burden appears to be 
relatively modest - as a consequence of its large population. The relative debts of Bulgaria 
and Poland lie between those of the two countries, i.e. Hungary and the former Soviet 
Union, and the relative debt of Romania is only marginal. Although these figures convey 
an idea of the magnitude of external debt, there is a further measure of relative debt that
He uses a modification of the standard debt-per-capita indicator; namely, gross debt-over-population.
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is more closely related to solvency, i.e. the debt-service ratio.
The servicing of the external debt requires foreign exchange. Hence the capacity 
to service debt ultimately depends on the willingness and ability to earn foreign exchange. 
The debt service ratio is thus often referred to as the single best indicator of the relative 
indebtedness of a country. It expresses the debt service, i.e. both interest payment and 
repayments of principal as a percentage of annual exports. Its economic meaning is 
discussed in appendix 2,5.1 of this chapter. According to this indicator, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Poland were forced to devote almost three-quarters of their export earnings to the 
servicing of debt in 1990 as being shown in table 2.2. Czechoslovakia and the former 
Soviet Union showed lower debt burdens but their position was tending to deteriorate.^*
Table 2.2: Debt-service ratios of CEECs(a)
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Bulgaria 27 27 24 20 14 31 30 35 48 77
Czechosl. 21 20 21 18 20 20 21 18 23 25
Hungary 43 38 36 47 58 67 52 57 49 65
Poland 169 180 138 103 96 63 79 68 76 71
Romania 37 48 37 27 28 28 26 20 19 10
Former
USSR
24 20 14 16 20 23 24 22 26 29
Source: OECD
(a) All interest and amortisation on medium- and long-term debt as a percent of one year's exports.
Since this ratio is widely used, one would expect that it has a significant impact 
on the perception of the sovereign risk associated with lending to a country. In fact, the 
market's perception of the creditworthiness of most countries of the region deteriorated 
during the second half of the 1980s. This is illustrated in the country risk-rating published
** Another prominent indicator of relative indebtedness relates the net interest payments (the difference between 
interest paid and interest received) to annual exports. It suggests that the relative debt burdens o f Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Poland had been very high indeed and that the burden for the former Soviet Union was increasing.
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in Euromoney (see table 2.3). This rating is based on the answers of a cross-section of 
bankers invited to give their views on each country with particular reference to certain 
criteria, e.g. the country's economic and political situation, its payment record, its access 
to international capital markets, etc.'^
Table 13: Country ranks of CEECs
Country 1987 1989 1991
Former USSR 19 23 111
Czechoslovakia 41 38 35
Hungary 28 39 44
Bulgaria 40 51 114
Romania 63 66 89
Poland 70 75 57
Source: Euromoney^ September 1987, 1989, 1991.
The reasons mostly cited for the deterioration of creditworthiness are rapid increase 
in indebtedness, poor economic performance, and uncertain prospects in the light of 
accelerating reforms. In particular, decentralization of the foreign exchange regime has 
been assessed negatively with regard to the countries' creditworthiness.^® In the case of 
the former Soviet Union, national disintegration had a very unfavourable effect on its 
creditworthiness. The broad picture emerging is one of a significant deterioration of the 
region's creditworthiness ranking with the exception of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
2.2.3 The liquidity situation of CEECs at the end of the 1980s
The financing and payment arrangements available to a country depend on its 
creditworthiness and its current liquidity position. Clearly these two aspects are 
interrelated. For example, the deterioration in the credit standing of most of the countries
" Some of the potential economic determinants of these ratings are discussed in subsection 4.4.2, o f chapter 4. 
“ The chapter 5 includes a discussion of situations where borrowing is either centralized or decentralized.
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in the region induced private banks to reduce their exposure towards the region, and 
indeed at the end of the 1980s the CEECs were experiencing a net outflow of funds with 
respect to banks.^’ Such a reduction squeezes the liquidity of borrowers. In general, 
whether a country facing an outflow of private funds will encounter a liquidity crisis 
depends on how long the net outflows continue and the extent to which the individual 
country is able to finance these flows with trade surpluses or recourse to undisbursed 
credit commitments, official funds or foreign exchange reserves.
The external financial management might be rendered more difficult by the fact 
that the burden of debt itself renders more difficult the successful management of external 
payments and financing. The high amount of debt at variable interest rates works as a 
channel for the transmission of higher international interest rates to the external accounts 
of CEECs. The share of private bank debt - which can be assumed to represent the 
amount of such debt on a variable interest rate basis - was indeed considerable (as table 
2.4 shows) and has been partly responsible for the increasing interest burden between 
1986 and 1989.^  ^ This transmission process has been experienced by debtors from 
developing countries between 1979 and 1982,^  ^ the relative increase in their interest 
burden being more significant during that time period than for the CEECs between 1986 
and 1989. This increase in the interest burden, as a part of a complex of shocks such as 
export volume decline and terms of trade deterioration, was responsible for the subsequent 
debt servicing difficulties of many developing countries.^ "^
UN ECE, Economic Survey o f Europe in 1990-9], p. 5.
“ Clearly, the increase in the net interest payment obligations is not only the result o f the increase in the interest 
rate level but is also due to the increase in the stock of debt.
23 See Fishlow (1984) and UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1985.
^ Official debt, unlike private bank debt is generally agreed upon at fixed interest rates so that subsequent interest 
rate changes do not induce any change in the burden associated with existing debt.
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Table 2.4: Shares of private bank debt and increases in interest burdens
Share of private bank 
debt (percentage)
Net interest payments 
(millions of dollars)
Country 1986 1989 1986 1989
Bulgaria 66 72 164 615
Czechoslovakia 39 53 265 485
Hungary 49 47 840 1,676
Romania 34 43 465 45
Poland 25 20 2,351 3,479
Former USSR 45 62 1,026 2,875
Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends.
The need to earn foreign exchange increased as a consequence of both higher 
interest rates and a higher stock of debt. At the same time, exporting to Western markets 
became more difficult because overall demand was lower, likewise lowering demand for 
CEECs' goods. The effect was exacerbated by the inability of the respective countries to 
provide internationally competitive trade financing.^  ^ All these effects led to accelerated 
deterioration of the external financial position of CEECs.
For example, at the beginning of 1990, Bulgaria was forced into a liquidity crisis, 
whereas the other countries of the region were able to meet their immediate external 
financing requirements with increased official funding throughout 1990. Bulgaria declared 
a moratorium on repayments of principal in March 1990 and subsequently also on its 
interest obligations. Before that, reserves had been falling significantly, undisbursed credit 
commitments had been halved and the hard-currency trade balance continued to 
deteriorate. Maturing debt was not rolled over and consequently the maturity structure of
The lack o f internationally competitive export credit systems in Central and Eastern European countries had 
stimulated a discussion about the establishment and appropriate structure of credit guarantee agencies in these countries 
(see Financial Times  ^ 1 June 1989).
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outstanding debt had significantly shortened.^  ^ Furthermore, Bulgaria exhibited a 
"classical" phenomenon that also preceded the liquidity crisis experienced by Latin 
American countries at the beginning of the 1980s: a rise in "excess" short-term debt, 
defined as that part of short-term debt which appears to be in excess of strict trade 
needs/^ A rise in the ratio of "excess" short-term debt to reserves indicates that a 
country draws down on credit lines established previously against a liquidity crisis. It 
appears to be a good indicator of the liquidity squeeze which a country might be 
experiencing. According to this indicator, Bulgaria experienced a liquidity squeeze in 1990 
which was more severe than that of Mexico prior to its first declaration of default in 
1982.2*
The former Soviet Union's external financial position deteriorated drastically in
1990. The reserves/imports indicator which measures reserves as a percentage of imports 
fell back significantly, representing the equivalent of only 22% of imports (see table 2.5) - 
below the level of 25 which is generally considered as critical. This was partly the result 
of the collapse of central control over international payments which led to imports and 
payments being initiated by independent enterprises without authorization. Reports of 
widespread delays in Soviet enterprises' repayments of short-term supplier credits began 
to surface in March 1990,^  ^ although Vneshekonombank continued to service its 
obligations punctually.^® However, as a consequence, banks began to reduce their 
exposure vis-à-vis the country by not rolling over debt which became due. In addition.
“ Debt with a maturity of up to one and including one year accounted for 54.2% (47.4%) of total debt at the end 
of 1990 (end-1989). BIS (b), August 1991.
"Excess" short-term debt is that part of debt which appears not to be related directly to imports, but to the need 
to maintain the debt service. It emerges because the country draws down on hquidity lines (for example, short-term 
credit lines from banks) which have been estabhshed earher against a hquidity crisis. The "excess" short-term debt is 
calculated as that part o f short-term debt in excess of six months' equivalent of merchandise imports and is expressed 
as a percentage of the nominal import volume. Euromoney, April 1984, pp. 37.
“ The ratio of "excess" short-term debt to reserves was less than 200% for Mexico in both 1981 and 1982 (see 
AMEX, 1984, p. 1187) and amounted to 400% for Bulgaria in 1990 (own calculations from BIS (b), August 1991 and 
Economic Survey o f Europe in 1990-1991. An apphcation of this concept to the other Central and Eastern European 
countries did not generate satisfactory results.
^ At the end o f 1990 Soviet enterprises were estimated to owe already DM 1 bilhon in arrears to German exporters 
alone. East West, 28 January 1991, p. 8.
Financial Times, 5 June 1990.
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short-term credit lines were cancelled, thus leading to a decrease in unused credits (see 
table 2.6). As a result of these various factors, the liquidity of the country came to 
essentially depend on OECD Governments' financial support because, in contrast to the 
other countries in the region, the former Soviet Union had no access to multilateral 
financing.
Romania, at the end of the 1980s, has incurred a large convertible currency trade 
debt, after large surpluses in earlier years. The foreign exchange reserves built up by 
means of a draconian trade policy in the previous decade fell steeply, representing the 
equivalent of only 18% of imports by the end of 1990 (see table 2.5).
Table 2.5: Reserves-over-imports ratios(a)
Country 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Bulgaria 57 40 26 39 27 20
Czechoslovakia 30 30 34 33 43 28
Hungary 56 47 30 27 20 28
Poland 35 37 55 53 47 91
Romania 8 16 31 18 53 18
Former USSR 50 60 58 44 38 22
Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends.
(a) Reserves measured by "deposits in BIS-area banks" as of June 1990.
In 1990, Hungary had achieved a record convertible currency trade surplus, but its 
liquidity position was threatened by a large withdrawal of short-term credits by banks and 
unplanned repayments to the IMF. Obligations were met by drawing upon foreign 
currency reserves as well as making recourse to bilateral and multilateral financial 
assistance.^  ^ The reserves-over-imports ratio slightly improved during 1990, although it 
remained at a critical level of 25% (see table 2.5).
Hungary and Poland were the major recipients of official financial assistance to Central and Eastern European 
countries.
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Czechoslovakia was also faced with the failure of foreign banks to roll over debt. 
Debt repayment and the convertible currency trade deficit were financed chiefly by the 
drawing down of reserves. However, Czechoslovakia was also able, albeit to a limited 
extent, to tap the Eurobond market for the first time, thus obtaining new private funds. 
Czechoslovakia has been characterized in 1990 by a reserves-over-import ratio that is near 
a critical level (see table 2.5).
In contrast to other CEECs, Poland was able to strengthen its liquidity position. 
The rescheduling of official and some commercial obligations, drawing upon various 
bilateral and multilateral credit facilities and deferrals in meeting interest payments 
represented the equivalent of a large inflow of finance. This enabled Poland to add to its 
foreign currency reserves and the reserves over imports ratio improved considerably (see 
table 2.5).
Table 2.6: Unused credits of CEECs^*^^
Country 1989 1990
Bulgaria 1,115(") (14.3%)(") 547 ( 6.9%)
Czechoslovakia 1,109 (20.6%) 1,003 ( 8.9%)
Hungary 1,268 (10.6%) 1,003 ( 8.9%)
Poland 426 ( 4.2%) 853 ( 7.9%)
Former USSR 7,249 (16.7%) 5,781 (14.0%)
Source: Bank for International Settlements, The Maturity Distribution.
(a) Undisbursed credit commitments of bank vis-à-vis CEECs.
(b) No data available for Romania.
(c) In millions of US dollars (figure in brackets denotes unused credits as a percentage o f the country's
total debt vis-à-vis banks).
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2.3 Changes in CEECs trade financing and payment arrangements
2.3.1 Financing in East-West trade at the end of the 1980s
As noted in section 2.2, a country's external debt position will determine its 
creditworthiness, which in turn has a considerable influence on the financing and payment 
arrangements available for its international trade, thus being a factor which determines the 
day-to-day costs of importing. In this section recent changes in the East-West trade 
financing and payment arrangements will be discussed. East-West trade financing takes 
various forms. In addition to such traditional forms as buyers and suppliers credits and 
counter-trade, other forms of financing have been used, such as forfeiting, factoring, 
syndicated Eurocurrency credits, Eurobonds and loans from Western governments and 
multinational institutions.^^
Supplier and buyer credit are customary financing techniques in East-West trade. 
A supplier credit is an arrangement under which the supplier - the exporter - agrees to 
allow deferred payment by the buyer - the importer. The exporter, in general, refinances 
the supplier credit by means of a separate loan arrangement with a bank domiciled in his 
country. If the bank extends the credit directly to the buyer, the credit will be classified 
as a buyer credit.^  ^ According to the maturity of the credit, a distinction is usually made 
between short-term (up to 360 days) and medium- and long-term (more than 360 days) 
credits. The payment arrangement under a supplier credit most favourable to the importer 
is that of open-account trading where the exporter receives payment at agreed intervals 
after the buyer has received the goods. This payment arrangement has essentially ceased
The Western and Eastern partner involved in the trade financing arrangements were generally a firm or a bank 
on the Western side and a government department or a (state) foreign trade organisation (FTO) on the Eastern side. 
In addition, a Western government was involved when directly granting a credit or guaranteeing private credits to 
Eastern state organisations, and in certain countertrade arrangements. The foreign trade system in most CEECs had been 
hberalized between 1989 and 1991, as being described in section 2.4.
The basic legal difference between a buyer and a supplier credit is that under a buyer credit a specific loan is 
arranged between the bank and the buyer. This is documented by a direct loan agreement between the bank and the 
buyer/borrower, which specifies the obhgations of the parties independently of the obhgations o f the parties to the 
commercial contract.
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to be used in East-West trade at the end of the 1980s, however. '^' Under a much more 
common payment arrangement, the Western exporter asks the importer for a promissory 
note or to accept a bill of exchange - drawn on the importer - in exchange for the receipt 
of the documents relating to the goods. Clearly the latter arrangements induce higher 
transaction costs than open-account trading.^^
For both supplier and buyer credits, the lender can apply for credit insurance. It 
appears that insurance cover from private insurers had only been scarcely available for 
export credits to buyers from CEECs and, if available, was considerably more expensive 
than official cover.^  ^ Export credit insurance represents "the insurance against 
non-payment by an overseas buyer due under a properly carried out contract, for a 
premium paid by the seller" As one might expect from this definition, concern about 
the ability and willingness of an importer to meet his payment obligations has an 
influence on the terms and availability of insurance cover provided by ECAs.^*
Another frequently used form of financing trade between Western and Eastern 
European countries is that of counter-trade. Basically, two primary forms may be 
differentiated: buy-back arrangements and compensation deals.^  ^ Buy-back arrangements 
include that the Western exporter supplies machines, manufacturing plants, or licences and 
commits himself to accept goods produced by the Eastern importer through these
^ According to an informal communication (September, 1991) from a specialist working in the EGA of a major 
European country. It should be noted that it is generally used within associated companies, which are rare in East-West 
trade.
” See Waxman (1985, p.l25).
“ In general, comprehensive information about the premium rates of private insurers are not available.
Waxman (1985).
This idea is formalized in chapter 4.
This follows the German-Austrian tradition of research into East-West trade: counter-trade is defined primarily 
according to its microeconomic financing aspect. It distinguishes itself from other trade transactions by the fact that 
there exists a more or less close linkage between delivery and counter-delivery. Accordingly, co-operation arrangements 
- often subsumed under counter-trade - might or might not coincide with a counter-trade transaction. Altmaim and 
Clement (1977).
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machines, etc. as a means of payment.'^ A long-term relationship between the Western 
and the Eastern partner is involved. Buy-back arrangements may be differentiated into 
traditional buy-back deals and compensation-financed equipment leasing."^ ’ These two 
forms are explained later in this subsection. Compensation deals are similar to standard 
commercial transactions except that delivery of goods is tied to the counter-deliveiy of 
other goods. They are mostly of a short-term nature. Compensation deals include barter, 
simple compensation deals and counter-purchase."^^
The two single most important counter-trade techniques are buy-back arrangements 
and counter-purchases. Estimates of the quantitative magnitude in the mid-1980s indicated 
that all forms of counter-trade accounted for 15 to 20% of total East-West trade;"^  ^ more 
recently this figure was around 50%."  ^ Although these figures are not produced on a 
consistent basis, it is evident that the relative importance of counter-trade within 
East-West trade had increased significantly. Such a feature appears to be a common 
pattern of trade for a country experiencing an external liquidity crisis."^ ^
The costs of counter-trade vary with the type of transaction and the chosen method 
of financing. In general conventional methods of financing international trade can be used 
in association with counter-trade transactions. However, compared with conventional 
methods of financing and payments, counter-trade typically involves additional
^ This arrangement might involve a third party such as a western public institution. Typical examples were the gas- 
pipeline deals between the then-Federal Republic of Germany and the former Soviet Union, where Western firms 
supplied the gas pipelines and Western communities received the natural gas.
The compensation-financed equipment leasing is not classified as a compensation deal, but instead as a buy-back 
arrangement, because its main characteristic is a long-term, cooperation-like relationship between the western and the 
eastern partner. As a general rule, buy-back arrangements are characterized by a strong element of cooperation, whereas 
compensation deals involve the exchange of products and, mostly, a relatively short-term contractual relationship. See 
Gabrisch (1986, p. 172).
Both barter and simple compensation deals require only one contract, the distinguishing feature between these 
two being that simple compensation deals include the drawing up o f an invoice. Counter-purchases involve the 
conclusion of two contracts. An invoice is drawn up, and payments in the forms o f counter-dehveries are delayed by 
up to two years.
Gabrisch (1986).
^ Gwiazda (1990).
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1986.
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non-financing costs such as discounts and commissions to intermediaries of some 5 to 
15% of the value of the transaction,"^ thus rendering it a more costly alternative.
Among the techniques under the broad heading counter-trade, qualitative changes 
have recently occurred. The required loan financing periods accompanying the counter­
trade transactions have shortened, the risk exposure of the Western partners has been 
reduced and the techniques used have more frequently exhibited higher transaction costs. 
For example, under a traditional buy-back arrangement, the importer receives licences, 
equipment or manufacturing plants and pays the exporter by means of goods produced 
through these licences or manufacturing plants."^  ^ The repayment by means of goods 
normally takes up to seven to 12 years, so that a long-term credit is needed for financing 
the arrangement."^* Banks have become more and more reluctant to extend long-term 
credits without a guarantee from an export credit agency. In the absence of such 
guarantees, this traditional form of buy-back arrangements has become less frequent.
With the deterioration in the Eastern European countries' hard-currency position, 
another form of buy-back arrangement has emerged: the compensation-based financing 
of leased, imported industrial equipment."*^  Increasingly used - in particular in the context 
of joint ventures - this trade financing technique has not yet been adequately discussed 
in the literature on East-West trade financing. Compensation-based financing of leased 
imported industrial equipment consists of a leasing of imported Western capital 
equipment, where the payment of leasing fees is made by means of counter-deliveries of 
the resultant products. The Western and Eastern partners usually open an escrow account, 
into which all sales income will be deposited and then transferred to the Western partner 
(the lessor) according to a pre-arranged payment schedule. Under compensation-based
^ UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1986, p. 79.
The value of the counter-dehvery by the Eastern partner does not have to match exactly the contractual value of 
the Western dehveries, but it can be either higher or lower. Gabrisch (1986).
^ Zloch (1986).
^ See United Nations, Committee on the Development of Trade, Non-traditionaJ financing o f equipment leasing 
in East-West trade: The role o f compensation-based financing (Trade/Sem.9/R.3), 3 July 1989, p. 9. However, it 
should be mentioned that the agreements can in principle be renewed.
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financing of equipment leases, several additional contracts (unlike the traditional buy-back 
arrangements) must be negotiated between the parties involved - the lessee (Eastern 
partner), the lessor (Western partner), the Western end-user, and the trading company. The 
required negotiations and the associated drafting of contracts increase the legal costs of 
the transaction, as compared to the simpler traditional buy-back arrangements. Another 
factor contributing to higher transaction costs is the absence of export credit guarantees 
for leasing arrangements. Their non-availability may necessitate the purchase of a private 
insurance policy which is, in general, more costly than an official insurance policy. 
Usually such a leasing arrangement lasts for four or five years and thus has a shorter 
duration than traditional buy-back arrangements. The recent shortening of the duration of 
counter-trade arrangements has also manifested itself in an increase in the share of 
counter-purchases within total counter-trade with CEECs. These counter-purchase deals 
typically involve a short-term agreement, where delivery and counter-delivery differ by 
12 to 18 months.^ ®
Another trade financing technique affected by the decline in creditworthiness of 
CEECs is that of forfeiting. Generally, forfeiting in East-West trade has been most 
frequently used in transactions not covered by insurance.^’ Forfeiting consists of the 
purchasing by a forfeiter of a claim from the exporter at a discount of the face value. The 
key feature of forfeiting is that the debt instruments are purchased from the exporter on 
a non-recourse ("à forfait") basis. The forfeiter takes the credit risk and, in return for this, 
charges the exporter a commitment fee and a discount on the purchasing price. The 
forfeiter in general resells the claim on the secondary market. Clearly, the availability and 
the price of this type of trade financing instrument is highly sensitive to the perception 
of the credit risk characterizing a specific country. Indeed, after the declaration of default 
by Bulgaria, trade in claims created by forfeiting vis-à-vis most CEECs virtually ceased 
- despite the fact that trade in these claims had accounted for roughly one-third of the
“ Gabrisch (1986, p. 180).
But forfeiting may also be used when the exporter has obtained a guarantee or insurance. From the viewpoint 
of the exporter, the main attraction o f forfeiting is that he can realize cash on his claims, and this clearly is easier with 
a guarantee or insurance.
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total forfeiting market volume in the mid-1980s/^ Moreover, the discount rates on such 
claims also increased/^ However, there has been a modest revival of the trade in claims 
vis-à-vis Poland in the aftermath of the country's debt reduction and some trade in claims 
vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia, albeit only in those ones with a maturity of up to two years. 
Forfeiting was not available for trade with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Russian 
Federation. For Czechoslovakia and Poland it was available only occasionally and at a 
high price.
Non-trade related or general-purpose financing is not common in the external 
finance of CEECs.^ "* This form of external financing was used by Hungary, the former 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria during the second half of the 1980s. General- 
purpose financing occurs either in the form of bank-to-bank credits, awarded on Western 
capital markets or in the form of syndicated credits or bonds on the Euromarkets. It 
remains of only minor quantitative importance for most of the CEECs. Financing from the 
Euromarkets offers the advantage that the funds can be used flexibly, but the interest cost 
is generally higher than for trade-related credits. The interest costs on Eurocredits can be 
decomposed into two parts: a fluctuating component usually equal to the six-month 
interbank rate (LIBOR, etc.), and the margin or spread over LIBOR representing the 
specific component of the credit. Like the case of Eurocredits, a spread for Eurobonds 
may be defined as the additional yield that an issuer must offer on its bonds as compared 
to that on a riskless bond. The spread increased for Central and European countries 
between 1985 and 1991. The development in the spread of Hungarian bond issues, the 
region's largest borrower on these markets, is described in section 3.4 of chapter 3. Most 
of these countries experienced extreme difficulties in raising any new funds at all from 
the Euromarkets. Only Hungary and Czechoslovakia continued to have access to funds 
from such sources.
The general picture emerging from this discussion is one of increased costs of
“ Zloch (1986, p. 150).
Trade Finance and Banker International, February 1990, p. 60.
 ^The distinction between trade-related and non-trade-related credits refers to the purpose of the individual credit.
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financing - interest rates, fees and commissions - in response to deteriorating 
creditworthiness. There has also been a general switch towards the use of trade financing 
techniques involving higher transaction cost, such as counter-trade.
2.3.2 Officially guaranteed trade credits
2.3.2.1 Terms of insurance cover for credits to CEECs
The traditional forms of East-West trade financing such as buyers and suppliers 
credits usually have export credit insurance cover, generally from official EGAs. Thus the 
terms and conditions of such cover are another determinant of the transaction costs of 
international trade. In the following subsections, aspects of the terms and the availability 
of official export credit insurance cover are discussed, and, in the next section, aspects of 
the relative quantitative importance of this trade financing mode are discussed.
Export credit insurance serves to insure the exporter against the risk of 
non-payment. The event causing this loss can be either of a commercial (commercial or 
buyer risk) or political nature (political risk).^  ^ Commercial loss arises through the 
inability of the borrower to repay the debt because of insolvency. Political loss arises 
through the occurrence of some event in the debtor's country which prevents it from 
repaying the debt. The events leading to such a political loss can include a wide spectrum 
from changes in government policy, restrictions on the availability of foreign exchange, 
to the outbreak of civil war. When Eastern European foreign trade and external borrowing 
were centralized in government hands, commercial risk and political risk were 
indistinguishable. The recent move towards decentralization of foreign trade and 
borrowing means that commercial risk has now become an independent factor and, in 
order to offset it, a guarantee from the State Bank must be acquired by the exporter.
Political risk can be reflected in insurance premium surcharges and other
See also the definition in section 1.2, of chapter 1.
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conditions on which insurance cover is available/^ The insured exporter has to pay 
premium surcharges in addition to the annual base premium for general activity if he 
extends export credits to those (perceived risk) countries for which such premium 
surcharges apply. Such premium surcharges can be considerable. For example, the Italian 
Sezione Spéciale per I'Assicurazione del Credito all' Esportazione (SACE) imposes 
premium surcharges of up to an equivalent of 3% of the amount of credit covered for 
insurance against political risk. Other credit agencies, such as the United Kingdom's 
ECGD, do not distinguish between political and commercial risk explicitly and charge a 
unique premium for cover of both categories of risk, amounting to more than 6% for 
"high-risk" countries.^  ^ In addition to insurance against a credit risk, an exporter can 
insure himself against "pre-credit risk", that is against losses incurred by him in the event 
of frustration of his export contract before despatch of the goods. Losses in this context 
refer to costs expended less any proceeds arising from disposal of the goods elsewhere. 
The premium that is charged for insurance against the pre-credit risk - in general lower 
than the premium for insurance against the credit risk - also rises with political risk.
Not only the premia but also other conditions on which insurance cover is 
available reflect political risk. When an importing country's political risk is increasing, 
the conditions on which insurance cover is available for export credits are likely to 
become more restrictive.^* This tightening of conditions represents an increase in the 
transaction cost - comparable to higher premium surcharges - in the sense that either the 
fulfilment of the additional requirement induces additional costs, or the conditions cannot 
be matched, and so recourse must be had to other - more costly - forms of financing and 
payment arrangements.
“ The term premimn surcharges which is used in the practice of export credit insurance corresponds to the concept 
of premium rates which is used in the theoretical insurance hterature. It is called premium surcharges because this part 
of the premium payment is charged in addition to the premium for a global or comprehensive insurance policy, i.e. 
when the insured has exposure in those markets to which such premium surcharges apply. See also section 6.2, of 
chapter 6.
” Communication from Jardine Credit Insurance Ltd on 27 August 1991.
** It should also be noted that the identification of country-specific determinants is rendered difficult by the 
complexity of other factors influencing the availability o f insurance cover, such as the nature o f the good imported, the 
reputation o f the individual firm, the economic situations in the importing and exporting countries, and the political 
goals o f the credit insurance agency, etc..
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The most frequently applied restrictive conditions concerning terms of payment are 
the requirements to obtain a letter of credit or a State guarantee/^ For example, for those 
countries where the borrower is not identical to a State institution - because some 
decentralized external borrowing is already authorized - EGAs tend to require that the 
export credit be guaranteed by the State Bank or that an "irrevocable letter of credit" 
(ILC)“ be issued by a bank approved by the credit guarantee agency. If the State Bank 
extends a guarantee, the credit risk is reduced to sovereign risk/^ If another non-state 
bank issues an ELC, this means that the bank promises to pay in case the importer does 
not pay - and thus the risk that the importer goes bankrupt is replaced by the lower risk 
that both the issuing bank and the importer go bankrupt.
The most restrictive condition applied by the United Kingdom's ECGD represents 
the requirement of a "confirmed irrevocable letter of credit" (CILC). Confirmation of an 
irrevocable letter of credit means that another bank - usually an OECD bank^  ^ - adds its 
own promise to pay to the one given by the issuing bank. From the point of view of the 
exporter, a CILC represents a superior form of insurance against non-payment®  ^ because 
the OECD bank's promise will stand even if the issuing bank cannot or will not make 
good on its promise. Thus, for the exporter the sovereign risk is completely removed, as 
it is for the credit guarantee agency. The fact that an EGA requires a CILC means that it 
is not willing to cover the credit risk but only the pre-credit risk. The credit risk will 
thereby be bome by the confirming bank. It subsequently became difficult to obtain a 
confirmation for CEECs, and, even when available, the fees charged were considerable.
” The following brief exposition will concentrate on the practice o f ECGD, which is important for the empirical 
analysis in the following section.
A letter of credit is a document issued by a bank authorizing another bank or banks in a foreign country to 
provide funds to the named holder of the letter against reimbursement by the issuing bank. An irrevocable letter of 
credit is one to which amendments cannot be made, nor can the credit be cancelled, without the full consent of all 
parties to the credit. Waxman (1985).
The State Banks of Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union had become increasingly reluctant to extend guarantees.
® In theory, a confirmation of a letter of credit can also be made by another bank located in the same country as
the importer and issuing bank. In practice, however, such a confirmation will not be accepted by credit guarantee
agencies.
“ It must be bome in mind that several credit guarantee agencies do not cover 100% of the credit amount - whereas
a confirmation applies to the whole credit amount.
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as shown in table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Indications of confirmation fees for letters of credit(a)
Country Fee in percentage of 
credit volume
Restrictive conditions
Bulgaria 6% sight preferred^ '"^
Czechoslovakia 1-2% up to 180 days only^^
Hungary 2-3% up to 180 days only
Poland 3-4% up to 180 days only
Romania 3% up to 180 days only
Former USSR 6% sight onV®^
Source: Informal communication by expert from Deutsche Bank AG.
(a) As o f end-August 1991. Confirmation being extremely difficult to obtain, the indication should be 
treated with caution. The confirmation fees are in fact approximate and subject to frequent changes. The 
indications should be regarded as the minimum fee that would have to be paid.
(b) Up to 180 days only: Payment has to be made by the purchaser's bank (the issuing bank) within 180 
days after presentation of the bill o f exchange.
(c) Sight only: The purchaser's bank has to pay immediately on presentation o f the biU o f exchange.
Other restrictive conditions include increases in the "claims waiting period" or the 
application of "discretionary limits". These have not been applied by ECGD to CEECs but 
have occasionally been applied by other credit insurance agencies. The national credit 
insurance systems differ widely^ with respect to the application of conditions for 
insurance cover. For example, in response to deterioration of a country's creditworthiness, 
the German Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG applies liability ceilings in the form of 
maximum amounts for single transactions or for liabilities incurred in the country 
concerned, raises the uninsured portion of the risk to be bome by the exporter or the 
claims waiting period, and eventually takes a risky country completely off cover.“ In 
sum, there was a general trend among national ECAs of tightening conditions for
^ Attempts at harmonization within the EC have been unsuccessful as yet. "The Long Good-Bye to Export Credits", 
Trade Finance, August 1991, p. 45.
Cover from Hermes for Bulgaria was not available. "Hermes-Plafond an den Iran ist ausgeschopft", Franlfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 August 1991.
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insurance cover for credits to that region, and to a lesser extent of increasing the price for 
such insurance cover.
When the conditions required by ECAs cannot be fulfilled and thus official 
insurance cover is unavailable, recourse is often had to payment arrangements that involve 
collateralization. Collateralization represents a costly alternative: even when the collateral 
is in the form of liquid assets, the bank takes a commission that amounts to between 1 % 
and 2% of the value of the order.
2.3.2.2 The example of ECGD of United Kingdom
This subsection illustrates how the points concerning the availability of export 
insurance cover made in the general analysis in subsection 2.3.2.1 above have applied in 
practice to CEECs, mainly on the basis of data from 1985 to 1991 for the ECGD of the 
United Kingdom. A general analysis of the practice of ECAs suggests that policy changes 
towards most debtor countries do not differ widely among ECAs from different 
countries.^^
Information about the policies of ECGD and Eximbank are available from Trade 
Finance. On the basis of this, the policies of these agencies towards any individual 
country can be broadly classified according to whether insurance cover for credits to this 
country is available on normal terms, only on restrictive conditions, or not available at all. 
The terms and conditions of insurance cover conceivably differ between short-term export 
credits, on the one hand, and medium- and long-term export credits, on the other.
Table 2.8 gives an account of the changes in these agencies' policies vis-à-vis the 
CEECs and the group of Highly Indebted Countries (HICs) based on the classification 
described above. It shows that for the latter the favourable changes were more numerous 
than the unfavourable ones. The favourable changes were concentrated among countries
“ Bnm and Gooptu (1990).
In general, Germany's Hermes is less restrictive than other ECAs towards CEECs.
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which had reduced their external indebtedness. On the other hand, for the CEECs, the 
unfavourable changes were more numerous than the favourable ones. Although this broad 
classification gives some insights, a more detailed classification should allow the 
representation of more of the available information.
Table 2.8: Terms of insurance cover available to HICs and CEECs
(number of instances *^^
CEECs HICs
1987 1989 1991 1987 1989 1991
Normal terms^^ short-term '^') 4 2 2 2 3 8
medium-term 5 4 2 1 3 3
Restrictive terms short-term 3 6 8 25 23 18
medium-term 2 4 6 25 22 18
No cover short-term 5 4 3 3 4 4
medium-term 5 4 3 4 5 9
Source: UNCTAD's calculations for HICs (Highly Indebted Countries) and author's own calculations for
CEECs based on the Exporter's Regional Guides in Trade Finance, between 1987 and 1991.
(a) The principle underlying the statistical analysis is that a country can be characterized by one of the 
three possible situations regarding the availability of insurance cover: normal terms, restrictive 
conditions, or completely unavailable. On the basis of the data about the United Kingdom's ECGD 
(1) short-term and (2) medium-term policy and about the American Eximbank's (3) short-term and 
(4) medium-term policy, each country corresponds to four units in the table (i.e. ECGD short-term, 
ECGD medium-term, Eximbank short-term and Eximbank medium-term).
(b) Normal terms apply when cover is available without restrictive conditions and without premium 
surcharges.
(c) Short-term credits are defined by ECGD as those with maturities of up to 180 days. Eximbank uses 
the same classification with the difference that credits for the purchase of certain equipment goods 
and bulk agricultural commodities with maturities up to 360 days are also denoted as short-term 
credits. Other ECAs and institutions define short-term credits in general as those with maturities 
of up to 180 days.
In the analysis which follows, the ECGD's policy towards an individual country 
is characterized by one of five combinations of the above-mentioned terms and conditions. 
For example, insurance cover available on normal terms for short-term and for medium- 
and long-term export credits represents the most favourable policy of the ECGD, whereas
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the most restrictive policy is that where insurance cover is not available - for any period 
whatsoever of export credit. Table 2.9 lists the terms available for CEECs from the end 
of 1985 to mid-1991, where an entry of 1 denotes the most favourable and 5 the most 
restrictive policy.
All deviations from normal terms ("standard terms") are classified as constituting 
restrictive conditions - with the exception of the conditions "limited foreign goods", "no 
foreign goods" and "guarantee from State Bank or ILC required". The condition "limited 
foreign goods" means that coverage for non-domestic components is available only for the 
share of foreign goods not exceeding 15 to 20% of the total transaction, and "no foreign 
goods" means that no coverage is available for foreign components. These two restrictions 
appear to be stimulated by national interest considerations rather than by considerations 
relating to a country's credit risk; an assessment supported by the cumulative imposition 
of this restriction on a number of countries at the same time. "Guarantee from State Bank 
or ILC required" is not included among the deviations from normal terms because this 
condition is intended purely to eliminate the ECA s exposure to commercial risk, while 
the present discussion is concerned only with political risk,^ *
The table illustrates that Czechoslovakia is the only country which consistently 
enjoyed normal terms. For Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union, insurance cover was 
available on normal terms until mid-1990 and early 1991, respectively, but thereafter 
cover for short-term export credits was only available on restrictive conditions. For 
medium- and long-term export credits to Hungary, insurance cover was consistently 
available on normal terms, whereas insurance cover for short-term export credits was only 
available on restrictive conditions. For medium- and long-term export credits to Romania, 
insurance cover became available from mid-1986, and thereafter for both short-term, and 
medium- and long-term export credits insurance cover was available but only on very 
restrictive conditions.
“ However, it should be noted that the imposition of this condition in fact can raise the cost for the importer or even 
inhibit imports. This can result when the State Bank does not extended guarantees automatically but only on special 
terms and conditions. For example, the State Bank of Bulgaria and Vneshekonombank of the former Soviet Union 
became increasingly reluctant to extend guarantees because they did not want to accumulate further sovereign debt and, 
in the case of the latter country, also because of the progressive breakdown o f the State.
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Table 2.9: Estimates of the restrictiveness of terms of insurance cover available
for CEECs from ECGD (method 1)
Date B(b) C H P R S
Late(=) 1985 1 1 2 5 4 1
Early 1986 1 1 2 5 4 1
Mid-1986 1 1 2 5 3 1
Late 1986 1 1 2 5 3 1
Early 1987 1 1 2 5 3 1
Mid-1987 1 1 2 5 3 1
Late 1987 1 1 2 3 3 1
Early 1988 1 1 2 3 3 1
Mid-1988 1 1 2 3 3 1
Late 1988 1 1 2 3 3 1
Early 1989 1 1 2 3 3 1
Mid-1989 1 1 2 3 3 1
Late 1989 1 1 2 3 3 1
Early 1990 1 1 2 3 3 1
Mid-1990 2 1 2 3 3 1
Late 1990 2 1 2 2 3 1
Early 1991 2 1 2 2 3 2
Mid-1991 2 1 2 2 3 2
Source: "Exporter's regional guides" in Trade Finance and Banker International, December 1985 - August
1991.
(a) The numbers denote the "regime" concerning official insurance that the specific country is facing. In 
general the higher the number the more restrictive is the system. In particular:
1. Standard terms apply to cover for both short-term credits and medium/long-term credits.
2. Standard terms apply to either short-term or medium/long-term credits, whereas restricted terms apply 
for the remainder.
3. Restricted terms apply to cover for both short-term and medium/long-term export credits.
4. For either short-term or medium/long-term credits cover is available on restrictive conditions, whereas 
for the remainder no cover is available at all.
5. There is no cover available for either short term or for medium/long-term export credits.
(b) B = Bulgaria 
P = Poland
C = Czechoslovakia 
R = Romania
H = Hungary 
S = Former Soviet Union
(c) The information published in the April, August and December issue of Trade Finance are 
classified as "early year", "mid-year" and "end-year", respectively.
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For export credits to Poland, insurance cover was not available until late 1987 but 
then became available for short-, medium- and long-term export credits on restrictive 
conditions. Thus, for the region as a whole, according to the broad classification used 
here, no clear trends in the terms and conditions available are observable. A detailed 
analysis of the restrictions reveals that further changes have occurred in the terms and 
conditions applied to CEECs. These changes are illustrated in table 2.10, which lists the 
degree of "restrictiveness" of conditions for export credit insurance cover. The percentage 
figures therein are based on a weighting of the terms and conditions applied by the 
ECGD. Czechoslovakia does not appear in the table because it had consistently been 
considered by the ECGD as a market for which normal terms applied, the sovereign risk 
being considered as low. An irrevocable letter of credit (ILC), issued by an ECGD 
approved bank, or a guarantee from the State Bank was the only requirement for export 
credit insurance cover for this country.
Bulgaria enjoyed throughout the second half of the 1980s normal terms for 
insurance cover for short-term export credits. Only an ILC or guarantee from the State 
Bank was required for export credit insurance cover. At the beginning of 1990, Bulgaria's 
external debt position had deteriorated critically, which triggered the application of 
premium surcharges on export credit insurance.^  ^ When, in March 1990, the Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank declared a suspension of payments of principal coming due on its 
medium- and long-term debt, the ECGD as a consequence required a confirmed 
irrevocable letter of credit as a condition for extending insurance cover for short-term 
credits. Thus the imposition of this highly restrictive condition for export credit insurance 
cover was one cost of default for Bulgaria. In the beginning of 1991 this condition was 
dropped. However, the premium surcharges applying for cover of credit risk and pre-credit 
risk remained considerable. Cover for medium-term export credits, although subject to 
restrictive conditions after Bulgaria's moratorium on debt, remained generally available.
The former Soviet Union enjoyed standard terms for both short-term and medium- 
term credits until early 1991. Afterwards standard terms applied only for short-term export
The ECGD now uses the term "market rate additions" to denote premium surcharges.
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credits, while for medium-term ones considerable premium surcharges applied for the 
cover against the credit risk.
After the declaration of default by Romania in 1982, no cover was available for 
medium-term credits to that country during the first half of the 1980s. As a reaction to 
the countries' successful policy of debt reduction, the ECGD again made available 
insurance cover for medium-term credits to Romania as of mid-1986. However, the 
conditions for export credit insurance cover remained very restrictive, cover for both 
short-term and medium-term credits requiring a CILC.
The conditions and terms applied to export credits to Hungary deteriorated during 
the second half of the 1980s, in response to the massive build-up of external debt. 
Premium surcharges - modest in the mid-1980s - increased significantly. The premium 
surcharge applied even to credits between associated companies, that is between 
companies characterized by close relations and experience in doing business with each 
other. Although the quantitative importance of this restriction is rather limited because of 
the small number of companies of this kind involved in trade with Eastern and Central 
Europe, the application of this additional restriction indicates concern over the sovereign 
risk.
The only country of the region that had experienced an improvement in the terms 
and conditions of insurance cover in recent years was Poland. After Poland's declaration 
of default, no cover was available from ECGD for export credits to Poland until the end 
of 1987. Thereafter, cover was made available by ECGD on the condition that the 
exporter obtain a CILC. Shortly before the announcement by the G-7 nations in January 
1991 of a reduction in Poland's official debt, the ECGD had lifted the requirement of a 
CILC to cover short-term debt. Afterwards only an ILC was required; however, the 
premium surcharges were considerable.
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Table 2.10: Estimates of the restrictiveness of terms of insurance cover available
for CEECs from ECGD (method 2 p
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Former
USSR
1985m 0 20% 100% 95% 0
19861 0 20% 100% 95% 0
1986H 0 20% 100% 90% 0
1986m 0 20% 100% 90% 0
19871 0 20% 100% 90% 0
1987H 0 20% 100% 90% 0
1987m 0 20% 90% 90% 0
19881 0 20% 90% 90% 0
1988H 0 20% 90% 90% 0
1988m 0 20% 90% 90% 0
19891 0 20% 90% 90% 0
1989H 0 40% 90% 90% 0
1989m 0 40% 90% 90% 0
19901 0 40% 90% 90% 0
1990n 20% 40% 90% 90% 0
1990m 55% 40% 85% 90% 0
19911 40% 50% 85% 90% 30%
199in 40% 50% 85% 90% 30%
Source: Own calculations based on "Exporter's regional guides" in Trade Finance and 
ECGD "Market Rate Additions" (communicated by ECGD).
Explanation: All deviations from "standard terms" of insurance cover (as explained in the previous table), either 
for short-term export credits or medium- and long-term credits, are considered as restrictive conditions. Each 
restriction is given a weight, and the weights are added iq). The weights attached to the restrictions are set so 
that they would reflect most accurately the relative importance of each restriction. This decision is based on a 
careful analysis of the restrictions applying to both developing countries and CEECs between 1985 and 1991. 
Thus, the higher the percentage figure, the more difficult it is to obtain insurance cover for export credits to the 
country. The following weights are used (percentage points o f weights in brackets): insurance premium
surcharges of up to 1% (20%), between 1% and 2% (30%), between 2% and 4% (40%), confirmed irrevocable 
letter of credit (45%), "no cover" (50%), each o f these conditions being mutually exclusive (so that the maximum 
possible score would be 50%). Insurance cover for short-term credits, on the one hand, and medium- and long­
term credits, on the other, is considered separately; thus the final score, i.e. the degree of restrictiveness, hes 
between 0 (normal terms) and 100% (no cover either for short-, medium- or long-term export credits). This 
presentation is valuable because premium surcharges are relatively inert for any debtor country and changes in 
its risk perception are primarily reflected in the apphcation or removal of the above conditions.
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The practice of ECGD is used to illustrate the point that the conditions on which 
official insurance cover is available for export credits to Bulgaria, the former Soviet Union 
and Hungary have become more restrictive. Conditions for insurance cover for the Polish 
market - although somewhat improved - and for the Romanian market had to be classified 
as restrictive. Only for the Czechoslovakian market did normal terms apply. In general, 
all major ECAs - with the exception of the German Hermes and the Italian SACE - had 
stiffened their conditions for CEECs. Common to all agencies is that changes in the debtor 
country's creditworthiness are reflected primarily in the tightening or easing of conditions 
rather than in variations of the price for insurance, i.e. the premium rates. For example, 
the premium rates applied by the ECGD to insurance cover of credits to CEECs have not 
changed significantly during the second half of the 1980s.
2.4 Trade financing modes and the trade financing costs of CEECs
The analysis in the previous section of the experience of CEECs between 1985 and 
1991 shows that the trade financing modes available to a country depend on its 
creditworthiness. More specifically, the lower the creditworthiness, the more expensive 
and complicated are such arrangements. This is particularly evident in the tightening of 
conditions of official insurance cover for export credits to buyers from these countries. 
This section is concerned with aspects of the effects on trade of such a worsening of 
financing conditions. Clearly, it is not possible to disentangle these relative price effects - 
i.e. the increase of the price of imports - from the other important developments affecting 
the economies of CEECs, principally the income effects, i.e. the reduction in national 
output and the effects of the structural adjustments that these economies are undergoing. 
However, some likely effects on trade of the described changes in trade financing 
conditions are briefly discussed in this section. It also includes a tentative estimate of the 
additional transaction costs in the trade of CEECs in 1991.
The tightening of terms and conditions for officially insured export credits to 
CEECs was reflected in a decline in guaranteed buyer's credits, that is, guaranteed credits 
from banks extended directly to the importer. Despite strong demand for guaranteed
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credits, their amount had declined during the second half of the 1980s for most of the 
CEECs as shown in the table 2.11. Alongside the decline in guaranteed buyer's credits 
there was a decline of supplier's credits for almost all CEECs, with the notable exception 
of Poland, in this period. These suppliers credits contained both guaranteed supplier 
credits and credits extended directly to the foreign buyer by the official sector of the 
exporting country.^ ® The exceptional increase in suppliers credits to Poland was due to 
the fact that the country received (direct) credits on a large scale from the G-24 countries, 
for the financing of imports. On the other hand, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania and the former Soviet Union experienced a reduction in their total trade-related 
debt. If the focus is purely on banks' claim, then the CEECs' trade-related claims declined 
during the late 1980's whereas their total bank debt increased. As a consequence, the ratio 
of trade-related claims as a share of total claims of Western banks diminished (see 
table 2.12).
In general, the tightening of trade financing conditions does not only imply cost 
increases but also makes the transactions more complicated. Like cost increases, this 
might discourage trade.
When discussing the effects on trade of increases in transaction costs a crucial 
question is about the incidence of such costs among exporter and importer. In the first 
place, the costs of export credit insurance must be met by the exporter. However, the 
literature on export credit insurance takes it almost as an axiom that the exporter passes 
on the insurance costs to the importer. As an OECD study {Export Financing Systems, 
1987, p.84) puts it: "as a general rule the exporter passes on the premium charges directly 
to the buyer, either by including them in its price or by charging for them separately." 
This hypothesis is valid only under specific circumstances, as being discussed briefly here 
and in section 6.4 of chapter 6. In general, the incidence of these additional transaction 
costs, like the incidence of export taxes '^ depends on the slope of the importing
™ Unfortunately, there exists no published information which contains disaggregated data for officially insured (or 
guaranteed) credits, on the one hand, and credits extended directly by official institutions in the exporter's country to 
the buyer, on the other.
Export credit insurance premium rates are in this sense similar to export tax rates, except that the former are not 
obligatory but are paid in an attempt to minimize risks.
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country's demand curve and the market structure. For example, for a competitive market, 
the proportion of costs that is passed on from the exporters to the importers is generally 
between 0 and 100%, with 100% shifting if the elasticity of supply is infinite or the 
demand completely inelastic.^  ^ In a non-competitive market the situation is different. As 
Stem (1987a) has demonstrated, the shifting can be either below or above 100%, the 
proportion shifted depending sensitively on the slope of the demand curve. Intuitively, the 
lower the elasticity of demand the greater will be the shifting, because the rise in price 
is only little dampened by the increase in elasticity. The author thus comments that 100% 
shifting is not the polar case which it would appear to be in a simple model of perfect 
competition, and that "it is possible that it provides a sensible middle choice for some 
applied work".^  ^ Evidence from case studies^ '  ^ of individual East-West transactions 
during the 1970s and 1980s suggests that at least a considerable proportion of the trade 
financing costs was indeed passed on from the exporter to the importer.^  ^ The scope for 
such shifting is likely to have increased as a result of the changes in the foreign trade 
regime in CEECs between 1988 and 1991,^  ^ the move from centralized to decentralized 
trade meaning that certain restrictions on import demand were lifted.
^ Stem (1987a) and Stem (1987b, p.70ff).
” Stem (1987a, p.l41).
It appears that individual case studies could provide some more guidance with respect to the aspect o f die shifting 
of additional costs or taxes than empirical analyses on a larger scale. The latter suffers regularly from the problem that 
determinants of prices cannot be separately identified. This is reflected in the results o f empirical studies concemed with 
the impact of exchange rate risk on the prices of a country exports. There does not appear to be any pattern to their 
results; and some of them are conflicting, the results being reviewed e.g. in Mann (1989).
This is particularly well documented for the gas pipeline deals between the Federal Republic o f Germany and 
the former Soviet Union. When the Soviet partner refused to pay a certain risk premium - spread - on its trade credits, 
the Ruhrgas AG increased their prices to compensate the banks. It has been suggested that such arrangements occurred 
because the Soviet trade negotiators were more constrained by higher authorities with respect to the trade financing costs 
rather than to contract prices - the latter o f which were more difficult to asses by the authorities (see Schich (1986)). 
Clearly, the scope for such practices hinged on the importance for the Soviet Union of the goods.
By June 1991 aU CEECs had abolished the foreign trade organizations' monopoly and firms were in principal 
allowed to trade directly. The major liberalization measures were implemented between 1988 (Hungary) and 1990 
(Romania) according to IMF, Exchange Rate Restrictions, 1993.
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Table 2.11: Exchange-rate-adjusted cumulated changes in stocks of trade-related
credits of CEECs
1897(a) 1988 1989 1990
Bulgaria Guaranteed
buyer's credits^^
-40 +127 +36 -16
Suppliers credits^ *"^ -96 -54 -272 -282
Total trade- 
-related credits
-136 -63 -299 -597
Czechos- Guaranteed 
lovakia buyer's credits^^
-36 -182 -219 -353
Suppliers credits^ ^^ -59 -171 -224 -245
Total trade- 
-related credits
-95 -353 -443 -598
Hungary Guaranteed
buyer's credits^^
-51 -353 -608 -527
Suppliers credits^ *"^ -87 -160 -165 -111
Total trade- 
-related credits
-138 -513 -773 -638
Poland Guaranteed
buyer's credits^^
-281 -92 -807 -796
Suppliers credits^ *"^ +2154 +1566 +2890 +3718
Total trade- 
-related credits
+1873 +1474 +2083 +2922
Romania Guaranteed
buyer's credits^^
-52 -192 -807 -796
Suppliers credits^ *"^ -349 -589 -853 -868
Total trade- 
-related credits
-401 -781 -1040 -1060
Former Guaranteed 
USSR buyer's credits^^
-1392 -2101 -2061 -2321
Suppliers credits^ *"^ -2854 -4551 -3871 -4047
Total trade- 
-related credits
-4246 -6652 -5932 -6368
Source: BIS, OECD.
(a) End-year figures (millions of US dollars).
(b) Guaranteed external bank claims.
(c) Non-bank trade-related credits (non-bank trade-related credits under official insurance or guarantee and
credits extended directly to the foreign buyer by the official sector of the exporting country).
56
Table 2.12: Ratio of guaranteed trade-related claims against total bank claims
vis-à-vis CEECs ")
1988 1990
Bulgaria 18.0 5.9
Czechoslovakia 23.9 12.5
Hungary 13.4 8.7
Poland 20.2 8.1
Romania 31.9 11.0
Former USSR 16.0 11.1
Source: BIS, OECD.
(a) Guaranteed external bank claims as a percentage of total external bank claims.
Several problems are associated with the attempt to quantify the extent to which 
the trade of CEECs had been saddled with higher transaction costs. In general, the premia 
applied by official ECAs are relatively inert and changes in the debtor's creditworthiness 
are primarily reflected in the tightening or loosening of their conditions for cover. It is 
difficult to quantify the effects of restrictive conditions and the estimation results depend 
sensitively on the weights attached to each restrictive condition. Unlike official insurance, 
the premium rates for private insurance cover are more flexible with respect to the 
debtor's creditworthiness; however, historical data on these terms are generally not 
available.^  ^ Despite these shortcomings a tentative estimate of the additional transaction 
costs can be made and is shown in table 2.13.
^ However, a list of premium surcharges applied by a private insurer to developing countries during 1992 and 1993 
was obtained for our research. It was subjected to an empirical analysis, and the results of that analysis are shown in 
the fourth chapter of this thesis.
57
Table 2.13: Estimates of additional trade financing costs of CEECs in 1991^)
(in thousands of US dollars)
Total In private 
financing
In official 
financing
Total as % of value 
of imports^ *')
Bulgaria 185.35 156.76 28.59 4.8%
Czechoslovakia 20.11 20.11 0 0.2%
Hungary 65.55 56.48 19.07 0.7%
Poland 118.13 76.04 42.09 0.9%
Former SU 475.48 399.61 75.87 1.0%
Source: own calculations based on data from BIS {Maturity Distribution), OECD 
{External Financing) and UN/ECE {Bulletin).
Explanation: Additional transaction costs are defined as the costs that exceed those 
associated with standard trade financing conditions. A laborious procedure had to be used 
for the estimation because data on new gross trade-related credits are not available. The 
procedure is described in the following: Total debt (as of end - 1990) minus debt up to 
and including one year (as of end - 1990) gives the hypothetical debt outstanding at end 
1991, i.e. debt outstanding in the absence of any new contracting during 1991. The value 
of this hypothetical debt outstanding is subtracted from actual outstanding debt as of end 
1991 to obtain debt contracted during 1991. The debt contracted during 1991 was 
associated with surcharges in form of a higher interest in the case of bank lending and 
with premium rate increases in the case of officially supported credits (data being 
communicated from Jardine Credit Insurance Ltd.). The former is approximated by the 
confirmation fees as shown in table 2.7 and the latter by ECGD's premium surcharges as 
discussed in the previous section. These rates are applied to the estimated figures for the 
debt contracted during 1991 in form of bank credits and officially supported credits, 
respectively. The shares of bank credits and officially supported credits in the debt 
contracted during 1991 were estimated by taking the median of the shares of these two 
forms of debt as of end-1990 and end-1991, respectively. This appeared to be a valid 
estimate because the shares did not change significantly between these two dates.
(a) Romania is not included because for this country no official cover and thus no indications o f premium 
surcharges were available.
(b) Imports in convertible currencies.
The table relates the additional transaction costs to the imports of CEECs. It shows 
that these costs were considerable for Bulgaria, amounting to the equivalent of almost 5% 
of total convertible currency imports. This shows the extent to which default can increase
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the costs of importing^* and it provides some support for the hypothesis that one penalty 
of default consists of an increase in trade financing costs.
Some caveats must be acknowledged. Most importantly, since there exists no 
published breakdown of officially supported credits into officially insured and directly 
extended credits, both were included. Strictly speaking, the increase in costs does not 
apply to the latter, which are often extended at concessional rates. Thus, the inclusion of 
the directly extended credits tends to overestimate the increase in transaction costs. On 
the other hand, the total increase in these countries' transaction costs is underestimated 
in so far as no account is taken of the increase in costs resulting from the greater use of 
other more expensive trade financing arrangements, such as counter-trade.
To the extent that the additional transaction costs are borne by the importing 
country, such increases in costs are similar to interest rate increases or price increases and 
represent - ceteris paribus - a terms of trade deterioration. The effect of terms-of-trade 
changes due to these transaction cost increases is not separately identifiable in CEECs' 
recent trade figures^  ^ and may have been small in relation to that caused by other factors, 
especially in the former Soviet Union. In general, terms-of-trade deteriorations of any kind 
reduce the purchasing power of existing output and thus may induce cuts in consumption 
and investment, thereby potentially cutting future output as well. If imports of essential 
goods are cut, i.e. of goods which, at least in the short run, can only be obtained via 
imports, then future output may further decline. However, in most CEECs the general 
decline in trade-related credits did not coincide with a decline in imports.*® Only
^ For example, given 100% shifting (as discussed above), these point estimates indicate the increase in these 
countries' import bills.
™ At the time when this chapter was written, terms-of-trade figures were only available for the period between 1980 
and 1989. The deterioration in the terms-of-trade with the convertible currency area (the relevant currency area) during 
this period was concentrated among those CEECs which were characterized by an increasing debt burden; i.e. Bulgaria, 
Hungary and the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland experienced an 
improvement in their terms-of-trade. The data on terms-of-trade were obtained from Marer et. al. (1992). It should be 
noted that the terms-of-trade figures are calculated for the trade with non-socialist countries, including developing ones, 
for Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania, for trade with developed countries only for Hungary and the former Soviet 
Union, and for both convertible-currency and non-convertible-currency trade for Bulgaria.
However, if import prices had increased, the value added of a constant amount of nominal imports would have 
decreased.
59
Bulgaria had to curb imports from the convertible currency area considerably. Elsewhere, 
imports increased.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 The solvency constraint and the debt-service ratio
The most frequently used rule of thumb in appraising the debt-servicing capacity 
of borrowing countries is the debt-service ratio, i.e. the ratio of interest and principal 
payments associated with debt over export earnings. It signifies the proportion of foreign 
exchange earnings absorbed by debt service and is used as a measure of the pressure of 
debt service on the debtor's economy. The usefulness of this ratio for the assessment of 
a country's debt-servicing capacity has been questioned but the following arguments in 
favour of it are acknowledged: (i) it is seemingly simple and states an easily 
understandable relation - i.e. debt service against exports, (ii) it can easily be computed 
and has a relatively firm statistical basis, unlike variables recorded in the country's 
national accounts, and (iii) there is no alternative that has found wide acceptance. This 
section describes one situation in which this ratio is meaningful - namely, where it can 
be related to the "solvency constraint" in the external borrowing of a small country.*'
Consider the standard formulation of borrowing of a small debtor country which 
is treated as if there were a representative consumer who tries to maximize the discounted 
value of its utility from consumption. The utility is additively separable across time 
(future consumption being discounted), and utility in each period is a concave function 
of consumption in period t. The debtor country can borrow from abroad at an interest rate, 
r, which for simplicity is assumed to be constant over time. The country receives foreign 
exchange from the export of services, X^ , which are assumed to be exogenous and entail 
no costs for the country. There is no other domestic production and thus consumption is
*' The presentation follows in parts Eaton (1993) to which the interested reader can turn for a detailed discussion 
of the solvency constraint.
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restricted to goods purchased by means of export earnings and the net transfer.The 
resulting maximization problem of the borrowing country will not be described explicitly; 
it is described elsewhere.*  ^ The borrowing country maximizes utility by choosing the 
optimal consumption path subject to the solvency constraint. This solvency constraint is 
the subject of the remainder of this section; in particular, it is shown how the debt-service 
ratio can be related to it.
Let Dt denote the stock of debt in period t and assume that Dq is equal to zero.^ 
Then - Dj.j is the new borrowing in period t, rDj., is the interest payment on debt 
accumulated as of the end of the previous period, and NTj is the net transfer in period t, 
i.e. the new borrowing less debt service. Then the consumption in each period is given as
C, -  X, 4. (D, -  D,_,) -  rD,_, = X, + NT, (D
and debt at the end of period t is given as
D, = (1 + r)D,., + NT, = £  (1 + t)'-‘NT, . (2)
i=0
Debt in period t is just the cumulative discounted net transfer since the period zero. 
With a perpetual roll-over of maturing debt, i.e. all principal and interest payments being 
forever financed by issuing new debt, the debtor can achieve an arbitrarily high level of 
consumption.*^ This path is not considered here because it implies that the debt-servicing 
capacity of a country - which is the crucial concept of this study - does not have any 
meaning. If all resources were provided in this way, the event of default would only
“  This implies that all consumption is from imports.
The maximization problem and solution are described by Eaton (1993). It wiU not be repeated here because this 
section is concemed primarily with the relation between the solvency constraint and the debt service ratio.
^ A list of all symbols used is provided following the conclusion in chapter 7.
This path is called Ponzi financing. It is named after Charles Ponzi, a Boston "financial wizard" who offered high 
returns on "deposits" to acquire large amounts of them, so that he could use new "deposits" to fulfil his commitments 
on previous ones. Such financing schemes are discussed by Minsky (1982, 1986), and in the context of international 
lending by O'Connell and Zeldes (1988).
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depend on the supply side.*® To avoid losses, lenders cannot allow the anticipated 
discounted value of resource transfers that they ultimately provide the country to exceed
zero.*^
^  _ i 5 _  = f ;  S j l i S  i  0 . (3)
^ 0  (1 + r)* (to (l+r)‘
This is often called the intertemporal budget constraint. Dividing equation (2) by 
(1 + r)* results in the following expression.
p . ^ f  NT,
(1 + r)‘ (1 + r)
which can be substituted into (3), so that the following condition is obtained:
zi—  = y  (4)
Ùo V ’
p . ^ E  — — - .
(1 + t y - ‘
Because consumption cannot be negative, this condition implies, from the 
creditors' perspective, that
p.  ^ Ê  - . («)
(1 + r y - '
This condition is often called the solvency restriction. It states that debt in any 
period cannot exceed the present discounted value of the borrowing country's stream of 
export earnings. Otherwise, lenders would not find their relation with the borrowing 
country profitable. It can be related to the debt-service ratio using the assumption that all 
debt instruments have a maturity of one period. This means that, in any period t, the total 
disbursed debt from the previous period becomes due. Thus the debt service in period t
“ This does not mean that aspects of the supply are not important. It means that these aspects are not the only 
important ones.
^ All present discounted values regarded here should be expected discounted present values. However, for notational 
convenience, we ignore this.
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is equal to (1 + r) D^_, and new borrowing in period t is identical to D,. Thus the above 
condition (6) can be transformed into a condition for the debt service, i.e.
This condition states that, in any period t, the debt service associated with the 
previous period's disbursed debt cannot exceed the value of the stream of export earnings, 
i.e. including both the value of current and the present discounted value of future export 
earnings. Note that the debt-service ratio, DSj /X, is identical to (1 + r) Dj.j / X .^ Dividing 
(7) by X, and substituting DS^  / X, into it, the following condition is obtained:
w l i h x '  .  £
T-tÏ = t+1 (1 + r)
This condition states that the debt-service ratio cannot exceed the sum of one and 
the quotient of present discounted value of future export earnings over current export 
earnings. This is equivalent to saying that the debt service cannot exceed the sum of 
current export earnings and the discounted present value of future foreign exchange 
earnings. It implies in particular, that if the debt-service ratio becomes greater than one**, 
the discounted value of future export earnings must be positive - otherwise the inequality 
stated above does not hold. Thus the debt-service ratio is of importance in one formulation 
of the solvency constraint of the debtor country.*  ^ There are several limitations to the 
practical use of the ratio in that interpretation. For example, in practice this ratio rarely 
exceeded the value of one for borrowing countries, while default can be observed for 
countries where the value of this ratio is well below one. Thus, the question arises 
whether a debt-service ratio which is substantially lower than one may point to the
** Note that this does not imply default since the debt service can be financed through new borrowing.
” We acknowledge that standard theory of international debt requires to include the current account surplus, i.e. 
exports minus imports instead of just exports in the solvency constraint. However, this would be less neat for the 
backing of DS/X, as a meaningful indicator.
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emergence of debt-servicing difficulties at some future date; and if such critical level 
exists, what it is. Some empirical studies of default have identified the debt-service ratio 
as statistically significantly related to the event of rescheduling;^® however, they have 
provided no guidance with respect to the determination of a critical level.^^
2.5.2 The balance of payments and the debt-service and reserves-over-imports ratios
The reserves-over-imports ratio is an indicator of the external financial position of 
a country, which is related to aspects of its liquidity.^  ^ Clearly, to prevent default a 
country must always be liquid, i.e. its foreign exchange available must exceed its debt- 
service demands in each period. For example, default could occur despite a country being 
solvent because it encounters a liquidity problem.®^
We use the standard discrete time notation for the balance of payments with the 
exception that we assume that all securities are in the form of zero-coupon bonds with a 
maturity of one period and a continuously compounded interest rate. This assumption is 
used frequently for analytical simplicity in this study and its introduction in this section 
is designed to ease the understanding of the notation in later parts. However, as a result 
of this assumption the presentation of the balance of payments differs from the one in 
standard textbooks and thus may look unfamiliar to the reader.
See Frank and Cline (1971), Feder and Just (1977), Sargen (1977), Cline (1984), and Solberg (1988).
A similar conclusion was made by Mikesell (1962, cited by Avramovic (1964, p.40)) in his analysis of past 
defaults, i.e. "history provides little guide for determining the maximum debt-service ratio which countries can sustain 
without default". One example of a practical application of the solvency concept is provided by Cohen (1985, 1990). 
He assumes that a country's resources are given by the present value of its future export earnings. These he calculates 
as follows. He projects future exports by augmenting current exports by the GNP growth rate and discounts future values 
by a constant interest rate to obtain present values. The resulting estimate he interprets as a solvency index for each 
country. Almost all developing countries appear to be solvent according to that index.
” The presentation follows Klein (1991) in some parts.
” The debate in the mid-80s about the issue whether the observable defaults were attributable to insolvency or 
illiquidity of the debtor country is reviewed in Armendariz de Aghion and Ferreira (1993). The discussion is reflected 
in the collection of papers presented at the 1984 World Bank symposium on international debt of developing countries 
edited by Smith and Cuddington (1985).
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In general, the balance of payments can be represented as follows:
LB, + KB, + D,' = 0 . (9)
The first term, LB,, denotes the current account balance, the second one, KB^ , the 
balance of capital transactions and "exceptional financing".For convenience 
consider that all securities are in the form of discounted zero-coupon bonds with a 
maturity of one period and a face value of one. Let Fn denote the number of foreign 
securities, such as international reserves, which were purchased by the debtor country in 
period t - 1 and H., denote the number of bonds issued abroad in t - 1. Furthermore, let 
r (in R = e'*) be the discount factor for foreign securities and b^  (in B^  = e'^) the one for 
the bonds issued by the debtor country.^  ^ Since the nominal value of the bonds at their 
date of maturity can be split up into their purchase price, i.e. RF^ .j [and Bj.jNj.i, 
respectively] and their discount, i.e. (1 - R) F,., [and (1 - B,.J the current account 
balance - which records export and import of goods and services - can be written as 
follows:
LB, = (X, -  I,) + (1 -  R)F,_i -  (1 -  , (10)
where ( - 1, ) denotes exports and imports of goods and services, (1 - R) Fj., denotes
the interest obtained from foreign securities (i.e. from F,., bonds purchased in t - 1 at the 
price R, paying one at time t) and (1 - Bj.,) N,., denotes the interest paid on bonds issued 
in period t - 1 (i.e. from N,.i bonds issued in period t - 1 at the price of B^ .j and requiring 
the repayment of one in period t).
The second term in the balance of payments is the balance of capital transactions, 
KBj, which records export and import of capital,
KB, = [RFt-i + BtNt] -  [RFt + Bt-iNt-i] • (1^)
Its right hand side contains two terms. The first one documents the capital inflow.
^ Note that the changes in tiie reserves are accounted for in KB„ unhke in the standard presentation of the balance 
of payments. D,^  is defined in equation (12) where it is stated that it is non-negative.
” Time indicators are suppressed because by assumption all debt instrument have a maturity of one period.
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consisting of the principal of foreign securities purchased in period t - 1 and the value of 
newly issued debt. The second term documents the capital outflow which consists of 
purchases of foreign assets and the retirement of own debt issued in the previous period.
The third term in the balance of payments is exceptional financing D * which is a 
hypothetical form of external finance and results either from unilateral suspension of 
payments or from a renegotiated debt reduction. It is by definition positive when the 
debtor country is in default on its debt servicing obligations. Combining and rearranging 
the above identities the following condition can be obtained for exceptional financing:®^
D" = 0 for (X, -  I,) + (F,_i -  RF,) + h D, ,
D" > 0 for (X, -  I,) + (F,_, -  RF,) + < D, .
Exceptional financing D i s ,  by definition, non-negative. It is positive when the
trade balance, X, - 1^, a reduction of foreign securities and international reserves, - RF^
> 0, or the issuing of new bonds abroad, >- 0, do not generate sufficient foreign 
exchange such that the country could meet its debt-service demands.^^ This gives us 
another definition for default. One could proceed to a theory of default by making 
assumptions about the relative importance of the variables for the occurrence of liquidity 
problems.
For example, consider the case where international lenders cut their capital flows 
to a debtor country, i.e. B^ N, = 0, because they perceive liquidity problems of the debtor 
country. These might reflect underlying solvency problems (as defined in the previous 
section) or may be due to coordination problems among the lenders regarding provision 
of the necessary finance so that the debtor's liquidity problems can be overcome. In such 
a situation, the debtor does not build up further foreign assets, i.e. RF^  = 0, but has to 
make recourse to its reserves in order to meet its debt-service obligations.®* Under these 
circumstances, the above equations can be reduced to the following forms:
** Note that D, replaces N,.,.
^ Otherwise, exceptional financing is equal to zero.
®* For a description of this scenario see Feldmann (1991, in particular pp. 688-89).
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D * = 0  for X, + F,., h I, + D, , ^^ 3^
D,* > 0  for X, + F,., < I, + D, .
The above inequalities illustrate that - under the specific assumptions made - 
default of a country occurs, if export earnings, X^ , and the foreign assets, F^, are not large 
enough to meet import and debt-service demands. This relation can be restated as follows:
Dj = 0 for Xj -
D * > 0  for X, -  D, < I, -  .
The above representation illustrates that the relation between the variables could 
be expressed in terms of two ratios, i.e. the ratio of exports to debt-service demands, 
X/D(, and the ratio of foreign assets to imports, F,.;/!^ . Given that, in practice, international 
reserves are a major component of foreign assets, F^ _„ the latter ratio can be proxied by 
the reserves-over-imports ratio. Similarly, the former ratio can be proxied by the debt- 
service ratio. Thus, under the specific assumptions made here, default can be related to 
the realization of the two external financial indicators, i.e. the reserves-over imports ratio 
and the debt-service ratio. This provides a rationale for the use of the two ratios in 
assessing the external financial situation of a country.^ The debt-service ratio is more 
relevant for its solvency and the reserves-over-imports ratio for its liquidity.
The two indicators described in this and the previous section are particularly relevant if  the binding constraint 
for the debt service was the debtor's abihty-to-pay. By contrast, if aspects of its willingness-to-pay were more important, 
these indicators are presumably less relevant. Other factors, such as the debtor's expectations about benefits fiom and 
the penalty for default would became more relevant. A model which includes aspects of the willingness-to-pay is 
explained in the third chapter.
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Chapter 3: The Interest Rate Spread in External Borrowing
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter suggested that the creditworthiness of a country is reflected 
in the interest rate premium - the spread - that it is charged in its borrowing on 
international capital markets. To understand the determination of the spread, the present 
chapter applies a conventional model of international lending in the presence of a default 
threat. It tests the implications of the model with respect to the spread empirically, using 
the example of the international borrowing of LDCs and CEECs between 1989 and 1992. 
The model is a variation of a model by Cohen and Sachs (1985) incorporating aspects of 
both the ability and the willingness of the debtor country to meet its debt-service 
demands. It implies that in the presence of a default threat there exists a debt ceiling, 
which is determined in particular by the debtor's expected future resource transfer 
potential and its expected losses in default. The closer the country's actual debt level gets 
to that ceiling, i.e. the smaller the external financial margin, the higher will be the spread 
in its international borrowing. The model allows the derivation of an expression for the 
spread as a function of economic variables for which proxies can be selected and included 
as explanatory variables in an empirical regression of the spread. By contrast, most 
previous empirical studies were not based on an explicit theoretical model and the 
explanatory variables, such as e.g. international reserves or the debt-service ratio, were 
selected rather on an ad hoc basis.’
The empirical part of the chapter consists of two separate analyses. The first one 
is concemed with the identification and description of the spread in Hungary's Eurobond 
market issues between 1985 and 1991. It appears that the spread in these bond issues 
increased with the amount of the country's outstanding bond debt, thus providing some 
weak support for one implication of the theoretical model, i.e. that the spread is, ceteris 
paribus, increasing in the level of debt. The second analysis uses the example of the
' Backer and Klein (1993) conduct their empirical analysis on the basis o f an underlying theoretical model. The 
present study uses their data.
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borrowing on international capital markets of 16 LDCs and CEECs between 1989 and 
1992. It finds some support for the hypothesis that the spreads in these transactions were 
influenced by the country-specific economic variables in the direction suggested by the 
theoretical model. This is an interesting result because previously some authors have 
argued that the spreads have varied so little among transactions that they could not reflect 
the country-specific economic variables of the debtors.^
More specifically, the results of the latter empirical analysis are as follows. They 
point to the hypothesis that the spread tends to be higher in the borrowing of countries 
which have a rescheduling record than in the borrowing of those which do not have such 
a record.^ If the focus is on countries with a rescheduling record, the spread appears to 
be significantly determined by indicators related to their liquidity and solvency situation. 
In particular the ratio of reserves over the IMF quota (included as a proxy for the liquidity 
situation) appears to be significant, pointing to the hypothesis that the liquidity of the 
debtor is of central importance to the spread.'  ^ There is also some support for the 
hypothesis that the spread in the borrowing of these countries is positively related to their 
debt-service ratio. Unlike for countries with a rescheduling history, the spreads of those 
without a rescheduling history does not appear to be significantly influenced by indicators 
related to their liquidity or solvency situation. The estimated direction of influence of 
openness, i.e. the ratio of imports to GNP, on the spread differs among the two groups 
of countries. For example, it appears to be positive for the countries with a rescheduling 
record, thus agreeing with the prediction of the ability-to-pay approach. Since imports 
represent claims of foreign exchange which compete with debt-service obligations, a 
higher share of imports implies a greater probability of solvency or liquidity problems and 
thus a higher spread. By contrast, the spread of countries without rescheduling records 
appeared to be significantly negatively related to their openness, thus agreeing with the
 ^ Guttentag and Herring (1985), Folkerts-Landau (1985), Plan (1985), and Group of Thirty (1982).
 ^A first statistical and graphical analysis of the data suggested that the model parameters are different depending 
on whether a country previously had a rescheduling of its commercial bank debt or not. Therefore a regression model 
was used which allows for different estimates of both the intercept and the slope coefficients, depending on a country's 
rescheduling record. To the author’s knowledge this distinction has not been made in any previous spread analysis.
The reserves-over-IMF-quota ratio was included instead of the reserves-over-imports ratio because the inclusion 
of the latter, together with the debt-service ratio, gave rise to problems of multicoUinearity.
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prediction of the willingness-to-pay approach. Namely, to the extent that one penalty of 
default consists of the loss of trade financing facilities, countries with a higher share of 
imports of GNP would suffer more in default, and thus have a greater incentive not to 
choose such a measure. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate in detail the 
reasons for these empirical results concerning openness; however, a tentative explanation 
is suggested at the end of section 3.5.
This chapter is organized as follows. The second section provides a rationale for 
the interpretation of the spread as a (default) risk premium and presents selected results 
of previous empirical studies of the spread. The third section presents a standard model 
of international lending in the presence of a default threat. Section 3.4 describes the 
practical aspects of identification of the spread using the example of Hungarian 
Eurobonds, and it also describes its development. Readers familiar with the spread 
analysis can turn directly to section 3.5 which presents the results of a pooled cross­
country time-series analysis of the spread in LDCs' and CEECs' borrowing.
3.2 The interest rate spread as a default risk premium
The typical interest rate on an international syndicated loan consists of two 
elements, (i) a variable component that is equal to the three or six months London 
interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and (ii) a fixed component called the spread that is 
specific to each individual loan contract. In analogy to these uses in the market for credits, 
a spread can be defined for any bond as the differential between its yield and the yield 
of a benchmark bond. This benchmark bond must be one that is customarily regarded as 
risk-free and should have (otherwise) the same characteristics as the bond under 
consideration. Such a spread can be interpreted as a measure of the market's perception 
of the default risk associated with that debtor. The underlying rationale for this 
interpretation is described in the following where, for illustrative purposes, all debt 
instruments are assumed to be zero-coupon bonds.
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In a world without uncertainty, default does not occur. Creditors could calculate 
ex ante that level of debt above which the sovereign debtor would ex post declare default. 
Consequently, they would restrict their exposure to that country so that this level would 
not be reached. Realistically, this critical level and repayment are uncertain. For example, 
repayment might depend on the realization of a country's debt-servicing capacity, K, i.e. 
the maximum debt service that the debtor country can meet, given its economic and 
political constraints (see also section 1.2, chapter 1). Consider that default then occurs 
when the contractual debt service D exceeds the debt-servicing capacity, i.e. D > K. Under 
these circumstances the ex post return on a debt instrument r issued by a country is 
stochastic and can be written as follows;
where b denotes the nominal yield of the debtor's bonds and the stochastic return in 
default. Thus, the expected net return viewed from the investor is
Ef = (1 -  n)b  + 7TE[f^|K < D] , (2)
where n = prob {K < D} denotes the (positive) probability of default and E[ r^ | K < D] 
the conditional expected value of the net return in the event of default. Assuming that 
investors do not receive any interest payments, but only their principal in default, the 
conditional expected return is given as follows:
B [ f u |K < D ] = 0 .  (3)
Assume that international investors are risk neutral, competitive, and face the 
alternative to invest in a risk-free asset with a return of r. Under these circumstances, no 
arbitrage opportunities would be left and the expected return on the (defaultable) bond 
would be equal to the return on the default-free asset r.
EÎ = r . (4)
Thus the nominal yield on the country's bonds b will be determined by the 
condition that investors obtain the risk-free return on expectations for a given default 
probability.
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b = --------  >“ r . (5)
1 -  71
Since n is positive, by assumption, the nominal yield b of the defaultable bond 
must be higher than the risk-free interest rate r. The difference between the bond yield and 
the risk-free interest rate is the spread, that can be written as follows:
r X 0 . (6)
This equation gives a definition of the spread. It also gives a theoretical rationale 
for the view that the spread is a measure of the (default) risk perception of the market. 
This risk perception may be particularly influenced, among other variables, by the 
economic and financial indicators characterizing the debtor's country. For convenience, 
most empirical studies assume either explicitly or implicitly a specific function for the 
influence of these indicators on the risk perception. Namely, they assume that it is a 
logistic function of a vector of indicators k, i.e.:
N
« 0  + Z  O ,
 . (7)
«0  + ^
1 + e
so that the logarithm of the spread (according to (6)) can be written as follows:
N
Ins = «Q + E + Inr . W
n  = 1
Consequently, proxies were selected for the vector k, and the spread regressed on 
these variables. These variables were generally selected on an ad hoc basis and not from 
an explicit theoretical model.
Table 3.1 lists selected hypotheses and results of empirical studies of the spread. 
At the top of each cell, it shows the sign that was expected for the estimated coefficient 
of the included variable (i.e. either + or -), and below, at the bottom of the cell, the actual 
sign of the estimated coefficient (i.e. either + or -). If that estimated coefficient is 
significant in at least one regression specification and at least at the 5% level, the cell
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includes an exclamation mark. Similarly, if the coefficient was significant in at least one 
regression specification and at least at the 10% level, the cell includes a bracketed 
exclamation mark.
Table 3.1: Selected hypotheses and results of empirical studies 
of the determinants of the spread '^ ^
Feder 
and Just 
(1977)
Feder 
and Just 
(1980)
Edwards
(1984)
Edwards
(1986)
Gottlieb (1987) Schich
(1992a)
Ozler
(1992)
APA^« WPA^^
debt service/ + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4-
exports^ ') +  (! ) + (!) + ( ! ) -(I) 4- ! 4- ! +  ( ! ) 4-
imports/GNP + + + 4- - 4-
+  ! 4- I +  ! 4- ! -
debt, debt/GNP, + + 4- 4- 4- 4-
debt/population + +  ! +  ( ! ) 4- ! 4- ! 4- ! 4- !
investment.
investment/GNP - 0 ) - 1 -  !
reserves over IMF
quota, over GNP, - ( ! ) - ! 4- - 1 -  I
or over imports
observation 1973 - 1973 - 1976 - 1976 - 1971 - 1971 - 1985 - 1968 -
period 1974 1975 1980 1980 1983 1983 1991 1981
(a): Most studies use pooled cross-country time-series data, except for Gottlieb (1987) and Schich (1992a),
which use pure time-series data.
(b): The cells contain signs and exclamation marks. The sign at the top of the cell indicates the direction
in which the variable was expected to influence tiie spread and the sign below it indicates the estimated 
direction of influence. The exclamation mark '!' and the bracketed exclamation mark '(I)' indicate that 
the coefficient was found significant at least in one regression specification, and at least at the 5% level, 
or at least at the 10% level, respectively.
(c); Feder and Just (1977) use a modified debt-service ratio which includes both exports and capital inflows.
(d): APA stands for the ability-to-pay approach and WPA for the willingness-to-pay approach.
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Three observations are singled out for special attention:
(i) The reserves variable, i.e. either reserves over the IMF quota, either over GNP, or
over imports, were always found to be significantly negatively related to the 
spread when it was included in the empirical analysis.
(ii) Although the debt-service ratio is the most widely used indicator to assess the
solvency situation of a country, it did not appear to influence the spread to such 
a great extent as one might have expected from that fact. The coefficient of the 
debt-service ratio was found significant in the expected direction only once at the 
5% level and otherwise only at the 10% level. In one study (Ozler (1992)), it was 
not significant, and, in another one (Edwards (1986)), it was significant at the 10% 
level in the opposite direction, i.e. with a negative sign.
(iii) The expected sign of the coefficient of openness, i.e. imports/GNP is controversial.
For example, the willingness-to-pay approach (WPA) suggests a negative sign for 
this coefficient whereas the ability-to-pay approach (APA) suggests a positive sign. 
The WPA implies that the higher the relative importance of imports the greater 
should be the debtor's incentive to maintain access to capital markets to finance 
its imports.^ On the other hand, the APA suggests a positive sign because of the 
following reasoning. Since imports reflect claims of foreign exchange which are 
competing with debt-service obligations, higher ratios imply a higher probability 
of default.^ The empirical results of existing studies seem to suggest that investors 
believe in the APA rather than in the WPA. For example, the coefficient of
See Aizemnann (1987, 1988, 1991).
* For example, Avramovic (1964) explains that the "debt servicing capacity depends on the ease with which a 
county can reconcile competing claims on its resources" (p. 10). For example, the higher the ratio of imports over GNP, 
the higher tend to be the non-compressible imports, i.e. imports that have to be pursued even in a situation where there 
is financial distress and thus die greater will be the probabihty of default. Another aspect is stressed by Frenkel (1983), 
who states that more open countries would be more vulnerable to adverse external shocks, such as e.g. sudden import 
price increases.
74
openness is never found significant with a negative, but only with a positive sign/
It is of interest to note that, except for one study, the observation periods do not 
extend beyond 1983/ It is likely that the ideas put forward by the willingness-to-pay 
approach were not widely disseminated during these observation periods since the seminal 
article of that approach dates back only to 1981/ This may have changed since 1983. 
None of the studies has included variables related to the debtor's payment record.^ ® As 
explained in the fifth section of this chapter, the reesults of our empirical analysis 
suggested to distinguish between debtor countries, i.e. between those which previously had 
a rescheduling and those which did not.
3.3 A macroeconomic model of the spread
3.3.1 The basic model with certainty
This section is concerned with the establishing of a theoretical framework which 
helps to identify economic variables that are potentially relevant for the determination of 
the spread. For this purpose, a two-period model of lending in the presence of a default 
threat is described, which is a variation of a well-known model by Cohen and Sachs 
(1985). It will allow us to derive an expression of the spread as a function of several 
economic variables. This subsection explains the basic model with certainty to introduce 
some aspects of cross-border lending and to ease the understanding of the model with 
uncertainty. Certainty means in particular that the debtor's second period resource transfer
’ Gottlieb (1987), testing explicitly the empirical implications of the two approaches against each other estimates 
a positive coefficient for openness and interprets this as evidence for the hypothesis that international investors believe 
in the APA.
* To the author's knowledge there exist no other empirical studies o f the spread than those fisted in the table, which 
were checked for cross-references.
® Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a).
Ozler (1992) includes the number of previous credit transactions of a borrower as explanatory variable for its 
spread, the idea being that the number of transactions increase the investors' "experience" with the borrower and thus 
reduce the spread. However, it is not clear how the author accounts for the performance of the previous issues, i.e. 
whether they have been serviced in full or not.
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potential is known already in the first period. Under these circumstances, no default will 
be observed since lenders provide debt just below the level at which the borrower would 
default. Consequently, neither default nor a spread will be observed.
Consider that the world consists of a capital-abundant (creditor country) and a 
capital-deficient country (debtor country). Cross-border borrowing is effected through the 
issuance of foreign bonds, i.e. the debtor country issues bonds on the domestic capital 
market of the capital-abundant country. These bonds have a maturity of one period and 
an interest rate of b, the total nominal value of bonds being denoted by D. The debtor 
country receives in each period an exogenously given endowment of (transferable) 
resources X, say, for example from the net export of services, the production of which 
entails no costs. There is no other production. Thus, the debtor country's total resources 
available in period one are equal to (D + X); they can be used either for consumption, Cj, 
or investment, I. Thus, its budget constraint in the first period is given as follows:
X + D = Cj + I . (9)
The total resources in the second period, Xj, are given as the sum of the regular 
constant endowment of resources X and the return of the investment; they are transferable 
and thus can be used either for domestic consumption, Cj, or for the repayment of debt 
to foreign creditors. Since (by assumption) these resources are completely transferable, 
they define the debtor's resource transfer potential in the second period, which is as 
follows:
X2  = X + (1 + i(I))I with i'(I) > 0 , (10)
where i is the rate of return on investment, which is increasing in I. The rationale for this 
specific form of the investment function is as follows. Consider that all investment 
represents investment in the restructuring of the economy. In general, such restructuring 
efforts are more effective the more extensively they are done, which is reflected in the 
common notion that half-hearted reforms on a limited scale come to nothing.’* However,
“ This appears to be a plausible assumption for economies undergoing structural changes. This specific assumption 
about the form of the investment function is not necessary to obtain the results presented later. Other simple investment 
functions have the same imphcations.
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it is assumed that, due to administrative and technical constraints, the scope for 
restructuring has an absolute limit f , thus 0 1 C o n s i d e r  that the borrowing country
is governed by a social planner who maximizes the country's welfare, which is 
represented as an additively separable function of consumption in periods one and two, 
the consumption of the second period being discounted by the social preference rate P:
u(C,,Cj) = c ,  + q ( i  + p)-> . (11)
By definition, the consumption in the first period is the difference between total 
resources available and those used for investment, i.e.
C, = X + D -  I . (12)
The feasible consumption in the second period depends on the government's 
decision whether to meet the debt service demands or to default on its debt. The costs of 
honouring the debt contract consist of the resources transferred to the creditors, (1 + b) D, 
which are no longer available for consumption in period two. Thus, when repayment is 
made, the debtor's consumption is given as follows:
Cj* = Xj -  (1 + b)D . (13)
Alternatively, i.e. in default, the contractual debt service (1 + b) D continues to be 
available for consumption; however, the debtor country suffers a default penalty which 
is inflicted upon it by the creditors. Following the convention, it is assumed that the 
debtor's loss from that penalty is equivalent to a fixed fraction y of its resource transfer 
potential in that period.Consequently, consumption in default, is given as follows:
c f  = (1 -  y )X2 . (14)
The fraction y summarizes all of the possible costs of retaliation of the creditors 
including e.g. the freezing of the debtor's assets held abroad, the withdrawal of future
Like Cohen and Sachs (1985), a large number of studies assume that the default penalty represents a fixed and 
exogenous fiuction of the debtor's resources and that it does not imply any costs to the creditors. The present chapter 
follows this assumption in order to keep the model simple. An example of an endogenous penalty is provided by 
Aizenmann (1987, 1988, 1991) and an example of a stochastic penalty in Eaton (1990). Bulow and Rogoff (1988) 
consider a penalty that is costly to the inflicting party. Introducing such assumptions in the present model would have 
an influence on the spread determination, the direction of which is not clear.
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access to credit, and in particular to trade financing facilities, etc/^ The government 
chooses not to repay its debt if the costs associated with it are lower than the costs of 
repayment/'^ Thus, actual consumption in the second period, Cj, is the maximum of 
feasible consumption in the cases of repayment, i.e. (13), and default, i.e. (14),
q  = max[Xj -  (1 + b)D, (1 -  y)X^] . (15)
The remainder of this subsection explains the behaviour of the creditors, i.e. the 
investors purchasing the bonds issued by the debtor. They are assumed to be competitive, 
risk-netitral, and to be facing the alternative of investing in a risk-free asset with a return 
of r. Since, by assumption, the creditors know the debtor's future resource transfer 
potential (and its maximization problem), they determine their supply of funds in such a 
way that a default never pays off for the debtor. In other words repayment is sustained 
by a high enough default penalty. Consequently, the interest rate b that the debtor is 
charged is equal to the risk-free interest rate r. The maximum feasible level of debt, i.e. 
the debt ceiling, D^, is given as follows;
= 7 X2 ( 1  + r)-‘ . (16)
To determine this ceiling, creditors must consider the investment decision by the 
government since the investment I forms part of the resource transfer potential in the 
second period, Xj. Due to the linearity assumptions in the present model, the investment 
is equivalent to either zero or f .  In a world without default, the debtor would always 
exploit all investment opportunities as long as the return of investment i exceeds the risk- 
free rate of return r. In a world with default, the decision by the debtor whether to invest
" The spectrum of default penalties is reviewed by Kaletsky (1985). He si%gests that, in practice, the loss of trade 
financing facihties is the most important one. Our analysis in the previous chapter supports the hypothesis that the loss 
of trade financing facihties and the increase in the costs associated with them are indeed an important consequence of 
default.
For simphfication, outright default is considered. Considering partial defaults would not affect the quahtative 
results of this analysis, but would generally reduce the level of the spread. The assumption of outright default is a 
common assumption for the case of bond lending as opposed to bank lending. As Bulov and Shoven (1978) put it, 'their 
(i.e. the bankholders) non-cohesive nature imphes that they cannot negotiate to alter the terms of their loan when 
bankruptcy becomes apossibihty." In particular, the transaction costs involved would be prohibitive. There are also free­
rider problems which give each borrower the incentive to demand full repayment, knowing that the rem aining creditors 
will still have a strong incentive to prevent default (see Folkerts-Landau (1985)). Eichengreen and Portes (1988a,b) 
analyze some unsuccessful attempts of arranging renegotiations between sovereign borrowers and bondholders in the 
interwar period.
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or not depends not only on i and r but on i, r and p. The conditions for investment in 
such a case are derived in Cohen and Sachs (1985).’^  Investment tends to be maximal 
for relatively high values of the parameter i and low values of the parameters r and p.'*’ 
Substituting for Xj, the equation (16) can be rewritten as follows:
J)C ^ y j x  + (1 + t(I))I 3 (17)
1 + r
Summing up, in the case of certainty, the implication of this model is that the 
presence of the threat of default results in a credit ceiling for the sovereign debtor.’^  
Repayment of the debtor is sustained by a high enough default penalty, and the debtor is 
charged just the risk-free rate, i.e. there is no spread.
3.3.2 The case of uncertainty
This subsection discusses a situation with uncertainty, which gives rise to a 
spread.’* In particular, it is assumed that the resource transfer potential in the second 
period is stochastic and that the feasible realizations of it are equally likely viewed from 
the first period. More specifically, the resource endowment X is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed in an interval between zero and 2X,’^
" See also Schich (1992a, p.8f). These conditions are not dscussed here because they would unnecessarily 
complicate the presentation. For our purposes it is sufficient to know how i and r affect the spread.
Cohen and Sachs (1985) consider the timing structure between actual investment and the extension of credit as 
an additional determinant of the debtor's actual investment efforts. If the funds are granted before the investment 
decision is made and there are no means to guarantee that the funds will be dedicated to investment, the debtor may 
find it optimal to deviate ex post fiom its prior investment announcements. If there exists such a means to guarantee 
the use of funds (or if the funds are granted only after the investment decision is made), the investment will be generally 
higher since the debtor knows that his investment decision raises its debt ceiling. Such a phenomenon is referred to in 
the macroeconomic hterature as the problem of time-inconsistency (Calvo (1978)).
The debt ceiling would be equal to zero, i.e. there would be no lending at all i f  the penalty parameter were equal 
to zero.
** It is assumed that the uncertainty is shared equally by debtor and creditor, i.e. information are symmetric. 
Introducing asymmetry - e.g. borrowers have more information than lenders about the total amount of debt they have 
undertaken - generally imphes rationing and an equihbrium with borrowit^ might not exist, as shown in Kletzer (1984).
The same results are obtained for any interval of a uniform distribution around X.
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= X + (1 + i(I))I with X u.d.-[0, 2X]. (19)
By assumption, the debtor rationally weighs the costs and benefits from honouring 
its debt contract and chooses to default if the benefits of default exceeds the costs 
associated with it. Thus default will be observed in the second period for
yXj < (1 + b)D , (20)
where b denotes the nominal interest rate of bonds. This interest rate differs from the risk­
free interest rate r as long as the apread is positive; by definition, b = r + s. Assuming 
risk-neutral competitive investors and a zero net return in default, the no-arbitrage capital
market equilibrium is defined by the following relation between interest rates:
1 -  n = - L i z  . (21)
1 + b
This means that, in equilibrium, the investors demand such a nominal interest rate 
on the risky bond that the product of its nominal return (1 + b) and the probability of its 
repayment (1 - tt) equals the return of the risk-free asset (1 + r).^ ° The spread s is 
positive as long as the probability of default n is positive. This probability can be written 
more explicitly as follows:
71 = prob{ < (1  + b)D} . (22)
In other words, the probability of default is equivalent to the probability that the 
resources in the second period are so low that the default penalty is lower than the costs
“ A second term would appear on the left-hand side of the equation if the recovery value in default were different 
from zero, consisting of the product of n and the recovery value in default. The conceptual approach used in chapters 
4 and 5 considers that the recovery value in default may be different from zero.
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of debt servicing, i.e. the default penalty is not sufficient to sustain repayment.^* 
Rearranging (21) and substituting (r + s) for b, the spread can be expressed as follows:
s  —  (1 + I )  . (23)
1 - 7 1
This completes the system of equations needed to obtain an expression of the 
spread as a function of the debtors macroeconomic variables. For presentational purposes, 
we first consider a situation where the debtor abstains from investing. By taking the 
expected value of X2  which is given in (19), substituting it into (22), and substituting the 
resulting expression into (23), the following expression for the spread is obtained:
Xs = Y — 
D
1 - (MLjLi)[DC - D]Y"
V YX n
- ( 1  + 1) ,
(24)
with = y x
2(1 + r)
being the debt ceiling. is the maximum feasible level of bond debt which is compatible 
with the no-arbitrage condition on the capital markets (21). The actual level of debt D 
cannot exceed this debt ceiling because, otherwise, an increase in the nominal interest 
rate r would not be sufficient to offset - on expectations - the higher risk of default, and 
then (21) would be violated. When the debt ceiling is reached, i.e. = D, the spread is 
equal to (1 + r) and the probability of default k obtains its maximum value, which is 
7c = 0.5. In this situation, the no-arbitrage condition regarding the capital markets is 
satisfied, the expected return on the risky bonds being equivalent to (1 + r). Under rather 
general constellations of the parameters y, r, and P, the debt level which maximizes the
The above equation demonstrates - as claimed in the second section of the first chapter - that under certain 
circumstances the implications of the two concepts of explaining default, the APA and WPA, are equivalent. Namely, 
fiom the viewpoint of a small investor whose behaviour cannot influence the probabihty of default, it is virtually equal 
whether default occurs because (i) the default penalty is too low to force a reluctant debtor country to repay its debt, 
i.e. Y is too low, or because (ii) the debtor coimtry's resources are so low that it is unable to meet its debt service 
demands, i.e. X% is too low. Provided that the probabihty of default is exogenous, the debt-servicing edacity K, as 
discussed in the second section, is represented here by the product of y and Xj. Consequently, the probabihty 
prob{ K ■< D } described in section 3.2 corresponds to the probabihty prob{ yX^ ■< (1 + r) D}. This chapter is 
concerned with estabhshing a fi-amework fiom which the direction of influence of individual variables can be derived. 
Therefore the remainder of it continues to consider the two terms y and X% exphcitly. The next chapter considers only 
one term, i.e. the debt-servicing capacity.
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debtor's welfare is lower than this debt ceiling, i.e. This means that the debtor
country is left with some room for financial manoeuvre, i.e. its external financial margin 
is positive. The expression for the spread becomes more complicated when investment is 
considered:
Xs = Y — 
D
- -  D]j ' + Î -  (î[2 +
with = — — —  and Î = y ( l  +i )I . 
2(1 +r)
- d  + r ) ,
(25)
On the basis of (24) and (25), the determinants of the spread and the directions of 
their influence can be identified. For example, the spread increases with a decreasing 
external financing margin, in other words, the supply curve of funds to the country is 
upward sloping. Other determinants include the expected resource endowment X, the 
investment I, the return on investment i, the penalty parameter y, and the risk-free 
interest rate r. The spread s is increasing in r and decreasing in y, X, I, and i. The 
determinants of the spread are listed below.^^
s = s ( y , X , r , Dç -  D , D , I , I ) + e . (26)
(" )  ( “) (+) ( - )  (+) ( - )  (" )
These empirical implications were tested with observations and the results are 
presented in the fifth section of this chapter. Before that, the fourth section explains the 
method of identifying a spread and describes the development of the spread in Hungary's 
external bond issues between 1985 and 1991.
“ The explicit derivation is provided by Cohen and Sachs (1985). The intuition for such situation is as follows. An 
increase in debt has two opposite effects on welfare. It does augment the scope to advance consumption &om the second 
to the first period, thus increasing welfare, as long as p >- r. However, it also raises the probability of default in the 
second period and thus the probability of incurring a welfare loss of the default penalty.
^ The sign under each variable indicates the expected direction of influence.
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3.4 The example of Hungary
3.4.1 Background
In the first half of the 1980s, the Hungarian economy was characterized by slow 
growth and the government pursued a strategy of higher imports of investment goods in 
an attempt to improve economic performance. Imports of consumer goods from OECD 
countries also increased. At the same time, hard currency exports stagnated and, as a 
result, the gap between hard currency earnings and spending increased. This gap was 
closed by boiTowing on the international capital markets, in particular on the Eurobond 
market. Subsequently the hard currency current account balance deteriorated even more 
as growing interest payments added to the hard-currency burden, as a result of both an 
increase in total debt and the unanticipated increase of the interest rate in the syndicated 
Eurocurrency credits which were agreed upon on a variable interest basis. The result was 
a continuously increasing level of external debt, the gross debt increasing more than 
tenfold between 1974 and 1990 (see appendix table 3.5). The real increase in external debt 
has been overestimated by these figures because movements in exchange rates accounted 
for part of the nominal increase in external indebtedness, debt stocks being reported in 
nominal US dollars while most of the debt is actually denominated in other currencies 
such as the DM, etc..^ "^
The foreign trade sector of Hungary has undergone significant structural changes 
during the second half of the 1980s; however, the general trend - roughly stagnation - in 
the capacity to earn hard currencies persisted. Only quite recently, following the shift from 
the settling of accounts by means of transferable roubles to the settling of accounts in hard 
currencies, have exports increased. This outcome came as a surprise for both economists 
of the National Bank of Hungary and the Western economists, who expected that this 
ftmdamental change in inner-CMEA trade at the beginning of January 1990 would have 
been disadvantageous for Hungary, which relied heavily on oil imports from the former 
Soviet Union.
^ The real increase in debt, i.e. the increase net of exchange rate effects is slightly lower. Until the early 1990s, 
it had been regularly reported for the CEECs in the February issues of the OECD's Financial Market Trends.
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As a consequence of the almost continuous stagnation of hard currency exports 
since 1985 and the simultaneous increase in debt, debt-related indicators worsened. For 
example, the debt-to-export ratio of Hungary which had risen to 343 percentage points in 
1990 clearly indicated that the country was heavily indebted at that time.“ This heavy 
debt burden has forced the country to allocate two-thirds of total hard currency earnings 
to total debt service. As a result of these developments and also because of the generally 
increased uncertainty about CEECs' economies, the credit risk rating for Hungary has 
deteriorated, being reflected in the deterioration of the country's ranking in the Euromoney 
country risk rating poll.
3.4.2 The spread in Eurobond issues
This subsection is concerned with the spread in Hungary's Eurobond issues 
between 1985 and 1991. During this observation period all international bonds of Hungary 
were issued by the National Bank of Hungary (NBH). In addition to its activity on the 
Eurobond market, the Bank raised, albeit to a lesser extent, funds on other countries' 
domestic bond markets and on the market for syndicated Eurocurrency credits.^ ®
The identification of the spread and the construction of a time series for it is often 
difficult and sometimes impossible, the reason being that continuous issuing activity by 
one debtor country is rarely observed. This is reflected in the fact that all except two 
empirical studies of the spread use cross-country or pooled cross-country time-series data 
rather than time-series data.^^  In the present study, information about the spread is
It is customary to consider a ratio of more than 200 points as indicatii% a heavy debt burden.
“ The NBH ceased to borrow 6om the syndicated Eurocurrency market in 1990 whilst it continued to issue 
Eurobonds. An economist from the NBH suggested in an informal communication that this move is part of the Bank's 
borrowing strategy and was intended to signal that the country does not seek a renegotiation of its debt, renegotiation 
of bond debt unlike that of bank debt being generally prohibited by too high transaction costs. This view seems to be 
supported by the public statements of officials fix>m this institution which pointed out that the country is determined 
not to seek a solution "à la Poland". However, it cannot be ruled out that this move was the result o f the country being 
shut out of this market (a view expressed in the OECD's Financial Market Trends^  February 1991). If the latter were 
true, the actual observed spread for bonds would have underestimated the true risk perception of the markets.
^ To the author's knowledge there exist only two studies of tiie behaviour of the spread over time for one country 
(Gottlieb (1987), Schich (1992a)).
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aggregated from the DM Eurobond market and the market for Syndicated Euro-DM 
credits to construct a time-series of the spread, consisting of quarterly data from the first 
quarter of 1985 to the second quarter of 1991. Essentially it is based almost exclusively 
on data from the former of the two markets. The spread in Euro-DM bonds is constructed 
as the difference between the redemption yield at issue of a Hungarian bond and a 
German government bond with the same characteristics such as maturity, liquidity, etc.. 
The latter is identified using information about bond characteristics as recorded in the 
capital markets' information system, datastream. Data on the redemption yields at issue 
of both bonds are obtained from Deutsche Bank Capital Markets' bondbase, and data on 
spreads in Syndicated Euro-DM credits to Hungary are obtained from the OECD's 
Financial Market Trends}^ Quarterly data on the amount of Hungary's total bond debt 
are obtained from the Bank of England.
The development of the quarterly spread in Hungarian external borrowing is 
illustrated in figure 3.1. The vertical axis measures the spread in basis points (100 basis 
points equals one per cent) and the horizontal axis measures the bond debt that was 
outstanding when this spread was observed. The line connecting the quarterly observations 
is increasing, thus providing some support for the hypothesis that the spread increases 
with the amount of outstanding debt.^^
Finally, using the example of a specific Hungarian bond issue, it will be shown 
that the spread is substantial, and thus a factor contributing to the debt service burden for 
Hungary. For example, it is of some interest that in March 1991, the NBH launched a DM 
Eurobond with a redemption yield at issue of 10.58% while in the same month the 
German government had to offer a redemption yield at issue of only 8.28% for its bonds
“ For the six quarters where there was no primary activity of the NBH the volume-weighted average of the 
redemption yields of this debtor's outstanding Euro-DM bonds (data from bondbase) is calculated, and from this the 
average yield of German government bonds (data from OECD's Financial Statistics Monthly) is subtracted to obtain 
a hypothetical spread at issue.
® This statement is supported by the results of a regression analysis. Regressing the available 13 observations of 
the spread in Hungarian bonds on the country's lagged (by one quarter) bond debt results in significantly positive 
coefficient estimates for that debt. One should mention that the line in figure 3.1 is decreasing in some parts. This 
reflects, according to an informal communication from a bond dealer at Deutsche Bank, London, general increases in 
the willingness of international investors to absorb new bond issues. This kind of demand factor is not captured by the 
spread model described in section 3.3.
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with the same characteristics. Thus the spread amounted to 2.3% (230 basis points); i.e. 
the NBH had to pay over a quarter more in interest than the German government.
Figure 3.1: The spread and Hungary's outstanding bond debt
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3.5 Statistical analysis of pooled cross-country time-series data
This section presents the results of a cross-country analysis of the spread in 
Eurobond issues and Eurocurrency credits of 16 LDCs and CEECs during the period from
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1989 to 1992. The data consists of 52 pooled time-series cross-country observations, 
which were obtained from Backer and Klein (1993).^° The data include the spread 
(denoted by s) in developing countries' bond issues and syndicated credits, as recorded 
in the data bank of the Deutsche Genossenschafts Bank (DG Bank), the debt-service ratios 
of the debt-issuing countries (denoted by DSR), and the London interbank offered rate 
prevailing at the time of borrowing (denoted by RATE). Backer and Klein regressed the 
spread s on the variables RATE and DSR, and obtained significantly negative coefficient 
estimates for these variables. These results contradict their prior expectations; namely, 
they expected to obtain positive signs for both variables. One explanation for this result 
may be that other relevant data were omitted.
Further variables were added to the data; they were proxies for the economic 
determinants of the spread, as represented in equation (26). They included undisbursed 
credits-over-total outstanding and disbursed debt (denoted by UDBDOD), as a proxy for 
the external financial margin - D. The reserves-over-imports ratio was not included 
because its inclusion gave rise to the problem of multicollinearity. Instead, we included 
the ratio of reserves over the IMF-quota, which had been included in previous empirical 
studies, that were concerned with the default risk in international debt, as a proxy for a 
debtor country's liquidity situation.^’ We uses this ratio, like the debt-service ratio, as 
a proxy for the debt-servicing capacity. The former of these two ratios is related more 
closely to the liquidity situation, and the latter more closely to the solvency situation of 
the debtor.^  ^ Furthermore, outstanding debt-over-GNP (denoted by DODGNP) was 
included as a proxy for D and gross fixed capital formation-over-GNP (denoted by 
INVGNP) as a proxy for I. The ratio of imports over GNP (denoted by OPEN) was 
included as a proxy for the openness of the debtor country.” All variables, except
The data set is unbalanced, the number of observations for each of the 16 countries ranging between two and four. 
The data are hsted in table 3.7 in the appendix.
An example is Lloyd-EUis (1989) who found it significantly related to defaults.
See appendices 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, of chapter 2.
“ Data on undisbursed credit commitments were obtained Irom the Bank for International Settlements' (BIS) TTie 
Maturity and Sectoral Distribution o f International Bank Lending (until 1993). Data on reserves, outstanding debt and 
GNP were obtained finm the World Bank's World Debt Tables (WDT, 1992-93) and on the IMF quota and the gross 
fixed capital formation finm the IMFs International Financial Statistics (until 1993). Further variables were included
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RATE, were considered in the regression estimates with a time lag of one year. Thus, 
their values corresponded to those that were publicly available data at the time when the 
spread was observed. A summary list of all variables and the signs expected for their 
estimated coefficients are given below in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: List of explanatory variables in the spread-regression analysis
variable name in 
regression
proxy
for
variable
expected 
sign of 
coefficient
undisb. credits over total debt outstg. UDBDOD D^ - D ( - )
debt outstanding over GNP DODGNP D ( + )
debt service ratio DSR X ( + )
reserves-over-IMF-quota ratio RESFQ X ( - )
imports/GNP OPEN Y ( APA: - , 
WPA: + )
LIBOR rate RATE r ( + )
gross fixed capital formation over GNP INVGNP I ( - )
There is evidence of correlation among some of the explanatory variables, the 
correlation coefficients being shown in table 3.6 in the appendix. Those variables for 
which correlation was particularly evident, i.e. UDBDOD and DODGNP, were never 
included simultaneously. To test whether the problem of multicollinearity is a serious one, 
we compared the coefficient estimates of the fully specified regression model, i.e. the one 
which includes all variables that are relevant according to the theoretical model, with 
those obtained from specifications in which possibly correlated variables were omitted. 
The estimated coefficients in the fully specified model, on the one hand, and the models 
with omitted variables, on the other, had the same signs and did not greatly differ from
in some regressions but the results are not reported here, either because the results obtained were similar to the ones 
obtained for comparable variables, that were already included, or, because their estimated coefficients were never 
significant.
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each other, thus suggesting that the problem of multicollinearity is not too serious/'* 
Nevertheless, the presence of this problem implies that the coefficient estimates must be 
treated with caution/^
Following the convention of empirical studies of the spread, least squares 
regressions were used/^ Following Edwards (1986), a regression model was used which 
contains a component that is constant over time and varies from country to country, and 
another component that varies over time and is constant over countries,
k
= I ]  P‘log(x^ + P A  + P A  + with i = l,..,n. (27)
i=l
Dg is a dummy that is one when country is c and otherwise zero; is a dummy 
that is one when time is t and otherwise zero; x‘ are the explanatory variables; p', p^ , and 
Pt are the coefficients to be estimated; n is the number of explanatory variables; and w^  t 
is an error term with the usual characteristics/® All variables were entered in logarithmic 
form/^
^ This is a common procedure if there is evidence for the presence of multicollinearity. We also used the 
instrumental variables technique, but did not obtain satisfactory results.
As a general rule, previous studies of the spread have not discussed the problem of correlation among the 
explanatory variables. This might be because the typical problems associated with multicollinearity (e.g. a high and 
insignificant coefficients) did not appear to be serious. However, one may speculate whether it has prevented the 
identification of actual relevant variables. For example, Edwards (1986) includes debt/GNP, the debt-service ratio, 
reserves/GNP, current account/GNP, and imports/GNP simultaneously in all regression specifications and failed to obtain 
strongly significant coefficient estimates.
See e.g. Edwards (1984, 1986), Feder and Just (1977, 1980), Gottheb (1987), and Ozler (1992). Edwards (1986) 
considers also the instrumental variables technique.
An alternative model was used by Feder and Just (1980) and Ozler (1992), where all coefficients were assumed
to be constant over time and constant from country to country and where the error term was assumed to capture
differences over time and countries.
In order to test whether fire dummies should indeed be included in the regression, F-statistics for the significance 
of groups of dummies were conducted. It was found that the null hypothesis that each of the effects, i.e. the country- 
specific effects and the time-specific effects, were zero as a group were rejected. Thus the dummies were included. This 
is a standard procedure, described e.g. in Judge et al. (1985, p.521).
A test of non-nested models was conducted comparing the log-log specification with a log-linear specification.
The obtained test-statistics clearly favoured the log-log specification.
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Table 3.3: Spread regression results with country and time dummies"^^
Eq. la Eq. 2a Eq. 3a Eq. 4a
UDBDOD - 0.70 - 0.84
(- 1.52) (- 1.74)
OPEN 1.04 1.41
(0.73) (0.94)
RATE 1.85 1.32 0.31 0.40
(1.64) (1.27) (0.46) (0.61)
INVGNP 0.94 0.82 1.04 1.17
(1.17) (1.03) (1.44) (1.63)
RESFQ - 1 . 0 1 - 0.92 - 0.95
(- 3.06)" (- 2.82)" (- 3.05)"
DSR 1 . 1 1 0.58
(1.42) (0.77)
DODGNP 0 . 8 8
(1.25)
R' (adj.) 0 . 8 8 0.84 0.87 0.87
F-statistics (25, 26) = (22, 29) = (22, 29) = (22, 29) =
15.94" 13.03" 16.48" 17.06"
(a) OLS regressions. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics and the asterisks denote the level of significance 
of the estimated coefficient ( * = significant at the 5% level, “ = significant at the 1% level). F-statistics are the 
F-statistics for the regression as a whole, and (adj.) is the corrected by degrees of freedom. Blanks denote
omitted variables.
(b) These regression equations included country-specific and time-specific dummies.
As table 3.3 illustrates, the results of the first regression model were mixed. 
Although the estimated coefficients of all variables except INVGNP had the expected 
signs, most of them did not appear to be statistically significant. The only significant 
coefficient estimate was the one for RESFQ, and it was significant even at the 1% level 
of significance. This appears to be an important result. It points to the hypothesis that the 
spread is significantly determined by the debtor's liquidity situation; i.e. the spread is 
higher the lower the debtor's reserves-over-IMF quota ratio. It is interesting to note that 
the estimated coefficient for DSR is positive, thus corresponding to a priori beliefs. By 
contrast. Backer and Klein had obtained a significantly negative coefficient estimate.
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As mentioned above, only one estimated coefficient was strongly significant, and 
the other coefficients were insignificant. It is possible that this reflected the inclusion of 
a dummy for each country. The dummies, to the extent that they were highly correlated 
with the explanatory variables, might have prevented the identification of some of the 
variation of the economic and financial indicators among countries. Indeed the results of 
regressions of each explanatory variable on the country dummies suggested that the 
hypothesis that there exists a high correlation between these variables and the dummies 
could not be rejected. Therefore, we tried to identify an alternative characteristic that 
separates countries, or groups of countries, and that could be included instead of the 
individual country dummies. We analyzed the data using various forms of graphics, 
examples being given in figures 3.2. to 3.5. Each figure includes two plots - one for 
countries with a rescheduling record and one for countries without such a record - of the 
spread against each of four explanatory variables."*® The figures suggest that the spread 
tended to be higher for those countries which previously had a rescheduling of their debt 
owed to private creditors."*’ They also point to the hypothesis that the influence of the 
explanatory variables on the spread were different, depending on whether a country 
previously had a rescheduling or not.
^ The x-axis and the y-axis have the the same length in both plots of each figure, so that the graphs can be easily 
compared.
Information on debt renegotiations is pubhshed in the World Bank's World Debt Tables^  1992-93.
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Figure 3.2: The reserves-over-IMF-quota ratio and the spread
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Figure 33: The debt-service ratio and the spread
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Figure 3.4: The openness and the spread
spread
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(a) Malaysia is not included in the graph because its exceptionally high openness required a larger box size for the 
group of non-defaulting countries, so that the axes of the two boxes would have very different scales.
Figure 3.5: The debt-over-GNP ratio and the spread
spread
20%
10%
0%
Countries without default history Countries with default history
0.11 0.24 0.52 0.67 0.77 0.24
debt-over-GNP ratio
0_51 0.66 0.77 1.12
93
Thus, we tested for structural change in the data, i.e. for differences between 
countries with a rescheduling history and those without such a history, and found evidence 
for such a change. The tests suggested that a model should be used which allows that the 
intercept and the slope coefficients differ among countries depending on whether that 
country previously had a rescheduling or not.'^  ^ Thus, the following model was used:
k -l
l o g S c ,  =  C +  5 2  P D F [ l o g x ^ , ] D F ^  + P îr o  N D ,
i=l
k -l
+ E  P N D [k g% <!,]N D ^  + P A  + P k lo g i  + •
i=l
where DF^ is one when the country c has a rescheduling record and zero otherwise, and 
NDc is one when the country c has no rescheduling history and zero otherwise. This 
distinction appeared important; however, it augmented the number of explanatory variables 
to an extent that a problem of over-identification was arising. In an attempt to reducing 
that problem, we eliminated those variables which were empirically less relevant, i.e. 
UDBDOD^, UDBDOD°^ DODGNP^, and DODGNP^^ and the country dummies. Such 
an elimination procedure is problematic because it implies that even those variables may 
be eliminated which are relevant according to the theoretical model; however, we believe 
that the limited number of observations available made such procedure necessary. The 
results of this exercise are shown in table 3.4. In the discussion of these results in the 
remainder of this section, we will refer to the countries without a rescheduling history 
as ND-countries and to those with a rescheduling history as DF-countries. Our preferred 
regression specification is model lb because it includes all of the variables which we 
regard as relevant.
The estimated coefficients of the variables INVGNP^ and INVGNP^ had the 
expected signs, but were not significant. Thus, the estimates did not provide evidence for 
the hypothesis that higher domestic investment reduces the spread in external borrowing. 
The results obtained for RATE^ and RATE°^ were similar to those obtained for RATE 
by Backer and Klein. They contradict the implications of the theoretical model explained 
in section 3.3, which predicts that an increase in the risk-free interest rate r, i.e. the rate
A standard procedure was used. See e.g. Johnston (1984, p.218f).
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of return on the investment alternative to the defaultable bond, be associated with an 
increase in the spread (see equation (23)). It is possible that RATE is not an appropriate 
proxy for the risk-free interest rate r, but that it reflects other developments; however, a 
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this study.
The coefficient estimates were considerably different between ND-countries and 
DF-countries. The intercept for DF-countries was positive and significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level. This provides some weak support for the hypothesis that the spread 
tends generally to be higher for countries with a default history. Moreover, it appeared 
that the sensitivity of the spread with respect to the debtor's liquidity and solvency 
situation differed among the two groups of countries. There appeared to be no significant 
relation between the spread in ND-countries' borrowing and their respective liquidity and 
solvency situation. By contrast, the spread in the borrowing of DF-countries appeared to 
be significantly influenced by the liquidity and solvency situation of these countries. In 
particular, their liquidity situation appears to be important, as being reflected in the highly 
significant coefficient estimate for RESFQ^^. Another important result is that, unlike in 
the analysis of Backer and Klein, the signs of the coefficients of DSR°^ and DSR^ 
correspond to a priori beliefs.
There was a significant difference in the estimated coefficients for OPEN^ on the 
one hand and OPEN®’' on the other. For ND-countries, the spread appeared to be a 
decreasing function of their openness, thus agreeing with the predictions of the WPA. By 
contrast, for DF-countries, it appeared to be increasing in the openness, thus agreeing with 
the predictions of the APA. We suggest the following tentative explanation for these 
results. We believe that the costs of default in terms of increases in the trade financing 
costs are potentially considerable."^  ^ This may well have induced international investors 
to charge lower spreads to countries with a greater degree of openness - corresponding 
to the logic of the willingness-to-pay approach. Indeed, such a negative relationship was 
observed for countries which previously have not had recourse to a rescheduling. At the 
same time, the solvency and liquidity indicators of such countries did not appear to have
Our estimates of the additional transaction costs in the trade of Bulgaria (see section 2.4, of chapter 2) provide 
some support for this hypothesis. A fairly comprehensive account of case studies can be found in Kaletsky (1985).
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any bearing on their spreads. One possible explanation is that their liquidity and solvency 
situation was perceived favourably, thus leaving their incentive to pay as the only 
potentially relevant constraint to their debt-servicing. By contrast, the solvency and in 
particular the liquidity situation of countries with a rescheduling history appeared to have 
significantly influenced the spreads in their borrowing. This may reflect the perception 
that, for the latter countries, the ability-to-pay is indeed a binding constraint. Under these 
circumstances, a greater penalty could not improve their debt-servicing perspectives in the 
short run. Consequently, a greater degree of openness of a debtor country, measured by 
its imports over GNP, tend even to increase the probability of debt-servicing problems of 
that country; i.e. according to the logic that imports represent claims competing for 
foreign exchange resources with debt service obligations.
The coefficient estimates are quite robust among different specifications, as 
illustrated by the estimates in the specifications 2b and 3b. There appeared to be neither 
a problem of heteroscedasticity nor one of functional misspecification.'*^ However, there 
appeared to be a problem of multicollinearity, the adjusted remaining almost constant 
after some variables had been omitted from the first specification. The results must 
therefore be treated with caution."^ ^
^ For example, we did not find evidence of systematic patterns between the residuals on the one hand and the 
spread and the explanatory variables on the other. It should be noted that our specification systematically underestimated 
the spread in the borrowing of Yugoslavia. The inclusion of a dummy for Yugoslavia did not change the other 
coefficient estimates significantly, but increased the explanatory power of the specification.
The instrumental variable method was not feasible because of the lack of appropriate instruments.
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Table 3.4; Spread regression results for countries 
with and without default history "^
Eq. Ib Eq. 2b Eq. 3b
general -6.17 -7.29 -3.85
intercept (- 1.25) (- 1.50) (- 5.64)"
intercept for 10.73 6.52 3.22
DF-countries (1.71) (1.18) (1.08)
OPEN"'° -0.58 -0.58 -0.60
(- 2.35)' (- 2.34)' (- 2.48)'
OPEN'"’’ 2.16 1.52 1.49
(2.36)* (1.85) 1.85)
RATE^° - 1.23 - 1.42
(- 0.57) (- 0.73)
RATE'"" -2.14 -2.28 -2.19
(- 2.27)' (- 2.42)' (- 2J7)'
INVONP""" - 0 . 1 2
(- 0 .2 1 )
INVGNP'"'’ - 1.24
(- 1.54)
RESFQ""" -0.29 -0.32 -0.45
(- 0.73) (- 1 .0 1 ) ( - 1.95)
RESFQ'"" - 1 . 6 6 - 1.85 - 1.84
(- 4.89)" (- 5.74)" ( -5.81)"
DSR""" 0.23 0 . 2 0
(0.53) (0.55)
DSR'"" 1.63 1 . 0 1 0.97
(2 .1 1 )' (1.53) (1.48)
R' (adj.) 0.75 0.75 0.75
F-statistics (14, 37) = (12, 39) = (10, 41) =
11.91" 13.53" 16.59"
(a) OLS regressions. The regressions include time dummies (i.e. for 1989, 1990, and 1991). The superscript ND denotes 
countries without a rescheduling history and the superscript OF denotes countries with a rescheduling record. The numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics and the asterisks denote the level of significance of the estimated coefficient 
( * = significant at the 5%  level, “ = significant at the 1% level). F-statistics is the F-statistics for the regression 
as a whole, and (adj.) is the corrected by degrees of fieedom. Blanks denote omitted variables.
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3.6 Statistical appendix
Table 3.5: External debt of Hungary, 1973 - 1990 (in millions of US dollar)
Year Net debt Gross debt
1973 805 2,118
1974 1,388 2,861
1975 2 , 0 0 0 4,199
1976 2,614 5,214
1977 3,580 6,253
1978 6,141 9,468
1979 7,123 10,507
1980 7,571 10,507
1981 7,477 10,740
1982 7,267 10,216
1983 6,994 10,745
1984 6,549 10,984
1985 8,046 13,955
1986 13,368 19,607
1987 13,683 19,584
1988 13,967 19,603
1989 14,900 20,390
1990 15,938 21,270
Source: Hungarian National Bank, (published in Heti Vilàggazdasâg, 20 April 1991)
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Table 3.6: Correlation coefficients of explanatory variables '^
UDBDOD OPEN RESFQ DSR RATE INVCAP DODGNP
UDBDOD 1 - 0.178 - 0.031 0.138 - 0.028 0.290 - 0.493
[0.0] [0.206] [0.825] [0.330] [0.842] [0.037] [0.0002]*
OPEN - 0.178 1 0.422 - 0.306 0.064 0.055 0.365
[0.206] [0.0] [0.002]* [0.027] [0.652] [0.701] [0.005]*
RESFQ - 0.031 0.422 1 - 0.484 - 0.037 0.165 -0.112
[0.825] [0.002]* [0.0] [0.0003]* [0.791] [0.243] [0.427]
DSR 0.138 - 0.306 - 0.484 1 - 0.018 0.352 0.063
[0.330] [0.027] [0.0003]* [0.0] [0.901] [0.010] [0.654]
RATE - 0.028 0.064 - 0.037 - 0.018 1 0.090 - 0.162
[0.842] [0.652] [0.791] [0.901] [0.0] [0.528] [0.249]
INVGNP 0.290 0.055 0.165 0.352 0.090 1 - 0.079
[0.037] [0.701] [0.243] [0.010] [0.528] [0.0] [0.577]
DODGNP - 0.493 0.365 - 0.112 0.063 - 0.162 - 0.079 1
[0.0002]* [0.005]* [0.427] [0.654] [0.249] [0.577] [0.0]
Source: own calculations based on data from World Bank, IMF and BIS.
(a) All variables are in logarithms.
Explanation: The entries are the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients and the 
values in brackets denote the probability that the correlation coefficient is significantly 
different from zero. The Pearson product-moment correlation is computed as
E  -  x -x x i -  y " )  
{ £  (X, -  x ^ Ÿ  E  (y. -  y ” )’
where x*” and y™ are the sample means of x and y. The superscript * denotes that the 
correlation is significantly different from zero at the 1 % level.
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Table 3.7: The data used for the regression analysis
Country Year Spread® UDB
DOD®
OPEN® RESFQ® DSR® RATE® INV
GNP»)
DOD
GNP*)
Algeria 1989 52 0.0931 0.1601 3.5456 0.7130 0.0717 34.1701 0.3975
1990 226 0.0894 0.1852 3.6434 0.6050 0.0891 29.7020 0.4677
1991 369 0.1022 0.2194 3.7297 0.6580 0.0882 26.4921 0.5329
1992 860 0.0815 0.2154 2.3284 0.6520 0.0885 26.8971 0.5156
Chile 1990 1257 0.0398 0.4362 9.8320 0.2230 0.0861 19.9537 0.9717
1991 360 0.0510 0.4622 15.4007 0.1800 0.0750 20.7024 0.7690
1992 301 0.0516 0.4432 17.4801 0.1650 0.0767 18.8406 0.7352
Yugosl. 1990 1131 0.0253 0.2612 7.9918 0.1690 0.0879 17.6892 0.2756
1991 3132 0.0202 0.2704 10.1272 0.1900 0.0795 12.1133 0.2183
Malaysia 1989 16 0.0421 0.6237 13.5953 0.1600 0.0708 22.9576 0.8035
1990 10 0.0445 0.6958 15.8494 0.1170 0.0897 24.1270 0.6163
1991 34 0.0611 0.8258 19.3448 0.0830 0.0884 29.6295 0.5052
1992 85 0.0644 0.8988 21.2650 0.0800 0.0878 32.7092 0.4461
Morocco 1990 2652 0.0191 0.3093 2.5114 0.2610 0.0924 23.0556 0.9948
1991 1332 0.0217 0.3423 7.6156 0.2620 0.0761 24.5334 1.0011
1992 1563 0.0193 0.3544 10.9088 0.2050 0.0700 22.3427 0.9456
Mexico 1991 153 0.0468 0.2134 8.7624 0.2370 0.0880 18.6082 0.4849
1992 134 0.0453 0.2233 15.4820 0.1900 0.0833 19.4199 0.4166
Nigeria 1990 2777 0.0249 0.2571 2.4012 0.2030 0.0882 8.1958 1.0734
1991 1235 0.0263 0.2662 4.8576 0.2270 0.0825 11.9427 1.1187
Philipp. 1990 1960 0.0431 0.3139 5.4500 0.2300 0.0880 20.8820 0.7684
1991 1609 0.0423 0.3495 4.6273 0.2270 0.0794 21.8695 0.6750
1992 1644 0.0299 0.3712 10.0818 0.2120 0.0752 19.6624 0.6827
Czechos. 1990 127 0.1505 0.3369 6.1169 0.1940 0.0921 11.2760 0.1436
1991 258 0.1451 0.3324 3.4915 0.1290 0.0887 13.4240 0.1572
1992 220 0.1119 0.3635 7.0780 0.1290 0.0877 8.3006 0.1857
Turkey 1989 40 0.0722 0.2675 9.1189 0.3620 0.0711 25.4653 0.6159
1990 117 0,0650 0.2690 14.6807 0.3140 0.0898 23.9839 0.5927
1991 154 0.0610 0.2770 17.7762 0.3210 0.0885 22.8313 0.5352
1992 138 0.0563 0.2730 15.4219 0.2880 0.0877 22.6529 0.4616
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Country Year Spread^ *^ UDB
DOD**
OPEN*) RESFQ*) DSR*) RATE*) INV
GNP*)
DOD
GNP*)
Hungary 1989 2 0.0649 0.4774 3.9944 0.5170 0.0718 24.7472 0.7807
1990 43 0.0647 0.4318 3.4765 0.5560 0.0897 20.9824 0.7074
1991 144 0.0492 0.4563 2.2335 0.3940 0.0886 19.9376 0.7307
1992 123 0.0382 0.4041 7.5857 0.3580 0.0899 17.7927 0.6756
Venezue. 1989 796 0.0967 0.3040 5.6778 0.2430 0.0620 22.7641 0.7433
1990 798 0.0423 0.3139 6.3426 0.2050 0.0630 17.1659 0.5955
1991 281 0.0584 0.3232 9.3287 0.1520 0.0787 14.1315 0.7915
1992 349 0.0684 0.2707 10.7281 0.1530 0.0479 17.8243 0.6974
China 1989 31 0.2545 0.1320 9.9339 0.2530 0.0708 32.1549 0.1162
1990 123 0.1415 0.1370 9.6416 0.2230 0.0900 26.2064 0.1125
1991 123 0.1056 0.1287 14.4191 0.1800 0.0885 25.1443 0.1060
1992 277 0.0579 0.1316 20.1443 0.1650 0.0858 27.7452 0.1420
India 1989 32 0.0424 0.1014 4.1875 0.2360 0.0950 21.6017 0.2198
1990 61 0.0468 0.1110 5.2582 0.2460 0.0939 22.7979 0.2167
1991 233 0.0393 0.1177 2.5530 0.2700 0.0790 23.0885 0.2393
1992 322 0.0240 0.1159 3.4493 0.2490 0.0710 22.3281 0.2374
Indones. 1989 33 0.0871 0.2932 6.2594 0.3500 0.0717 31.5330 0.6898
1990 119 0.0785 0.2871 6.3356 0.3090 0.0892 35.1892 0.6428
1991 145 0.1054 0.2988 8.5713 0.3440 0.0887 36.5770 0.5971
1992 177 0.0886 0.3258 10.2554 0.3140 0.0890 35.0651 0.6615
Colomb. 1990 3552 0.0662 0.2178 9.8020 0.4100 0.0554 18.0736 0.4521
1991 1709 0.0505 0.2328 11.3020 0.3660 0.0552 16.3339 0.4512
Source: DG Bank, World Bank, IMF, BIS and Statistical Yearbooks of China and 
Algeria.
(a) Spread in basis points (hundred basis points are equivalent to one percentage point).
(b) The variables are lagged by one year.
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Chapter 4: The Level and Volatility of External Financial Positions 
and the Costs of Export Credit Insurance
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates in more detail the costs associated with insurance of 
export credits to developing countries (including CEECs). International trade is not 
generally based on payment in cash but usually involves a credit from the exporter (or his 
bank) to the importer,' that is, an export credit. Consequently, a credit risk arises which 
the exporter (or his bank) regularly seeks to cover by an export credit insurance agency 
(EGA), the amount of export credits that are not guaranteed being indeed only marginal. 
Guaranteed export credits represent an important source of external financing for 
developing countries. For example, the long-term guaranteed export credits of developing 
countries amounted to 15 to 20% of their total disbursed long-term debt in 1991.  ^ In 
particular guaranteed export credits are important for the short-term financing of 
developing countries' trade. For example, for some regional groups of developing 
countries they represented almost half of these countries total short-term financing in the 
beginning of the 1990s.  ^This chapter seeks to identify how a country's external financial 
position and its (historical) development affect the costs associated with this form of trade 
financing.
The direct way to address this question would be simply to ask the country risk 
experts in the export credit agencies (EGAs) how the economic and financial indicators 
characterizing a debtor country affect the premium charged for cover of export credits to 
that country. This, however, is unlikely to be a helpful approach because these premia are
' See Brooke and Buckley (1988, p. 113).
 ^OECD, External Debt Statistics at End-December 1991, 1992. The share of flows of such guaranteed credits as 
of total credit flows to a country is difficult to assess because only net flows are reported in published sources and these 
net flows have been negative in many years for developing countries.
 ^ OECD, Financing and External Debt o f Developing Countries, 1992. The o&er important source of short-term 
trade financing are short-term trade credit lines provided by commercial banks.
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not always set according to a structured method, or information about their determination 
is confidential. Typically, the EGAs use a variety of political, economic, and financial 
data, and other information about a country in order to place it within one of a limited 
number of risk categories. Then, one insurance premium is applied to all the countries 
falling within each risk category, such premium being determined among other factors by 
the premium setting undertaken at other national agencies. Thus, leaving the problem of 
confidentiality of the country risk assessment aside, even a detailed knowledge of the 
premium-setting policy at these agencies does not allow one to identify exactly how 
individual economic variables characterizing a debtor country will influence the actual 
premium applied to that country. Therefore, to get some insight into the relationship 
between the external financial position of a country and its trade financing costs an 
indirect way is chosen. Namely, a theoretical model of international export credit is 
developed which allows us to derive an explicit formula which indicates what the 
insurance premia should depend on. Some of the implications of this model are then 
tested.
The remainder of this introduction explains the theoretical approach used to price 
the insurance contracts and summarizes some of the results of the empirical analysis of 
actual insurance premium rates. The approach is explained at greater length in section 
4.3.1; however, a discussion of its central aspects at this point should facilitate its 
understanding. In general, the cmcial aspect of export credit insurance (ECI) is the 
uncertainty about the debtor's future ability and willingness to meet its debt-service 
demands. In order to concentrate on that aspect, the theoretical model abstracts from 
informational asymmetries and assumes that the insurer and the insured share equally such 
uncertainty. Under these circumstances export credit insurance, viewed as a security, is 
analogous to a European put option. Such a put option is a security which gives the owner 
the right to sell an asset to the writer of the option, at a specified date and price. 
Equivalently, export credit insurance gives the exporter (or his bank) the right to sell his 
claim against the debtor to the insurance agency at a specific date.'  ^ The price at which
‘ In fact, there is a difference. Namely, the put option gives the right to sell an asset at a specific date whereas the 
insurance gives the right to sell the claim at any time c^er a specific date. However, the fairly general assumption of 
optimizing on the part of the insured imphes that the right to sell the claim is always exerted at the first possible date. 
Under these circumstances the two concepts are identical.
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he can sell that claim is either equivalent to or less than the nominal value of that claim, 
depending on the degree of insurance against losses. The analogy described above 
suggests that tools from option pricing theory might help to explain the value of such an 
insurance and to identity determinants of its costs. For example, the Black-Scholes 
portfolio arbitrage concept implies that the costs of credit insurance should depend not 
only on the debtor's current external financial position but also on the volatility of (the 
rate of) changes therein.
This hypothesis is tested with observations using the example of 80 developing 
countries. The premium surcharges^ applied by the private Nederlandsche 
Credilverzekering Maatschappij, UK (NCM, UK)  ^during 1992 and 1993, to these country 
destinations, are compared with level and development of the two financial indicators 
described in the appendix to chapter 2 , i.e. the reserves-over-imports ratio and the debt- 
service ratio. To the author's knowledge a similar data set has not been collected and 
subjected to an empirical analysis before.
A central finding of the empirical analysis is that the premium surcharges to a 
country appear to be negatively related to the reserves-over-imports ratio and positively 
to the volatility of the rates of changes of that ratio. There is also some weak evidence 
for the hypothesis that these premium surcharges are positively related to the debt-service 
ratio and the volatility of its rate of change. These findings are in accordance with the 
qualitative implications of the Black-Scholes based premium valuation concept, i.e. that 
the premium rates for export credit insurance to a country should depend on that country’s 
current debt-servicing capacity and the volatility of the rates of change of this capacity. 
The influence on the premium surcharges of the reserves-over-imports ratio appears to be 
stronger than the influence of the debt-service ratio on these surcharges, being reflected
 ^As explained in a footnote to subsection 2.3.2.1, of chapter 2, the term premium surcharges which is used in the 
practice of ECI corresponds to the concept of premium rates in the theoretical insurance hterature.
* The NCM, a private company, took over the responsibility of short-term credit insurance cover fiom ECGD and 
thus this short-term branch is now called NCM, UK. It continued to have access to political risk reinsurance from the 
pubhc ECGD for all coimtry destinations until 1992, and thereafter, i.e. since 1993 for selected country destinations. 
To the extent that such reinsurance is provided at preferential rates the NCM, UK receives official support. We beheve 
that such support, if there is any, is very limited. For example, this reinsurance was available in 1993 for less than ten 
country destinations.
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in a higher estimate of the point-elasticity coefficient for the former. This provides some 
weak support for the hypothesis that a country's liquidity is more relevant for its trade 
financing costs than its solvency situation.^
Another finding of this chapter is that the ranking of countries implied by the 
country specific premium-surcharges structure is consistent with the published 
creditworthiness ratings of these countries; however, the connection between them appears 
to be less close than the one between the spreads in these countries' international 
borrowing and their ratings. The root-mean-square-percentage-error between the rankings 
implied by the spreads and the ratings is significantly lower than the one between the 
rankings implied by the premium surcharges and these ratings.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains a brief explanation of the 
practice of premium setting for insurance cover at EGAs. Section 4.3 then explains the 
concept used for our theoretical model, the model itself and the valuation formula for 
export credit insurance obtained fiom it. Subsection 4.4.1 investigates whether some of 
the implications of the theoretical model are indeed reflected in observable data. 
Subsection 4.4.2 compares the premium surcharges applied to developing countries with 
their published country risk rating.
4.2 The costs associated with export credit insurance (ECI)
This subsection gives a brief description of the cover policy of EGAs; some further 
aspects of such a policy are discussed in chapter 6 . The cover policy includes all aspects 
of the availability of cover and the terms and conditions under which it is made available. 
Traditionally, the policy consisted mainly of the decision whether or not to make cover 
available. However, more recently the role of the price of insurance cover has increased. 
Indeed, since the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, the cover policy of several major 
agencies is characterized by a trend toward a greater differentiation between the country
 ^The two external financial indicators are discussed in the appendices 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, o f chapter 2.
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destination of the credit to be insured. This trend was also reflected in the decisions of 
Eximbank of the United States and, more recently, of Hermes of Germany to replace the 
uniform premium by one that is related to the country destination of the credit.® These 
changes in premium policy were accompanied by the allocation of more resources by 
several agencies to the assessment of the country risk. Such a country risk assessment has 
a pervasive influence on cover policy in general and premium determination in particular. 
Procedures for such assessment range from periodic reviews at annual intervals to those 
carried out on an ad hoc basis when a specific need arises. Until the debt crisis, these 
assessments generally focused on historical analysis and the current financial and external 
payments position of the debtor country, but efforts have since been made to look further 
ahead in such assessments. For example, some agencies, including the one whose 
premium rates we use for our empirical analysis, have developed quantitative techniques 
that systematically collect available information on debtor countries, which are then used 
to subdivide borrowing countries into more detailed policy categories according to their 
perceived relative riskiness. This information includes a large number of criteria, both 
economic and political. For example, variables such as the debtor country's outstanding 
total debt, its debt-service ratio, political stability, etc. are used as criteria to place that 
country into an ordinal ranking which, depending on the EGA, consists of 3 to 12 
categories. Consequently, premium rates are applied to these different risk categories and, 
in addition, restrictive conditions are specified on a country-by-countiy basis. In general, 
the premium rates that are actually applied to individual countries are not calculated on 
the basis of the expected loss associated with an insurance of credits to that country, but 
tend to be set so that they match those rates applied by other ECAs.^
In general, both the premium structure and the method of premium determination 
applied by EGAs are confidential; however, indications of premium surcharges by NGM,
* Hermes was the only remaining agency that apphed such a uniform premium until recently. From the beginning 
of 1994 debtor countries will be placed into one of five risk categories and hence a different premium will be apphed 
to each category. Hermes Gebiihren nach Lànderrisiken gestcgfelt. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23.7.92.
’ This has been pointed out in a meeting of the Berne Union by the chief economist of the Eximbank. See Bond 
(1992, p. 2).
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UK, a private company, for a sample of developing countries were obtained for this 
studyT The information available from this institution is not sufficient for singling out 
the individual quantitative influence of variables, such as the debt-service ratio or reserves, 
etc. on the premium that is actually applied to that country.” Therefore, an indirect 
approach to this question is chosen here by asking what such a relationship should be 
according to economic reasoning and whether such theoretically implied relationships are 
reflected in the actual data on economic variables and premia that are applied. 
Furthermore, these indications were compared to the ratings published by investor's 
magazines, such as Euromoney, which explains the method of determining the individual 
ratings. The next section develops a model that helps to identify what the relation should 
be between premium surcharges to a country and its financial indicators.
4.3 An option-pricing approach to the determination of the premium rate for ECI
4.3.1 The valuation concept
This subsection is designed to explain the valuation concept used for the 
determination of a "fair" premium rate for export credit insurance, where fair denotes that 
premium rate which makes the export credit insurance contract a transaction with zero 
net-present value. In general the value of such an insurance contract depends on whether 
the debtor defaults and on what the value of recovery is in the case of such a default. 
The uncertainty about whether the insurance contingency will occur and what the extent 
of the compensation payable will be are the most important single aspects of the valuation 
of such insurance contracts. In order to focus on that aspect it is assumed that such an 
uncertainty is shared equally by the insurer and the insured. The implications for the
Recently, a discussion has started on various fora, such as OECD, GATT and EC about the issue of subsidization 
in export credit insurance cover provided by official ECAs. One might like to speculate that ECAs are particularly 
concerned not to leak information about their premium setting methods because this issue has become a subject of a 
political debate. The issue of subsidization in export credit insurance is taken up again in chapter 6.
" Section 4.4.2 describes the systems used for the assessment of the country risk used by two institutions with 
similar concerns than ECAs.
Section 1.2 of chapter 1 contains the definition of default used in the present study.
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premium of informational asymmetries, leading to problems such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection, are mentioned at the end of this section, and some further aspects for 
export credit insurance of such informational asymmetries are discussed in section 6 .3 .
Some previous analysis of related issues exist in the literature. For example, 
Claessens and van Wijnbergen (1990), Clark (1991), Cohen (1990), Genotte, Kharas, and 
Sadeq (1987), and Klein (1991, 1994) are concerned with the valuation of debt 
instruments issued by a sovereign debtor. Dooley et al. (1990), Nocera (1989), and Scott 
(1990) value the insurance of such debt instruments and use tools that are similar to the 
ones used in the former studies mentioned here. The study by Nocera comes closest to the 
present one with respect to the aim, and the study by Klein comes closest to it with 
respect to the method used.
Several of the aforementioned studies rely on two key assumptions about the 
resources and the behaviour of the debtor country. Namely, they assume that there is an 
exogenously given but uncertain flow of resources available to make debt-service 
payments and that the debtor meets all of its contractual debt-service obligations, subject 
only to this resource constraint. The typical approach followed in these studies is to 
assume a specific probability distribution for the future realization of the country's 
resources available to make debt-service payments, and then to value the debt instruments 
issued by the debtors from that country or the insurance of these debt instruments, 
respectively as contingent claims, the value of which is determined by those resources.
In fact, credit insurance, viewed as an asset, represents another contingent claim, 
the value of which depends on the probability and extent of loss associated with the credit 
that is insured. It is similar in particular to a European put option^ as the definition of 
such an option by Black and Scholes (1973, p. 637) suggests:
An option is a security giving the right to buy or sell an asset, subject to
certain conditions, within a specified period o f time. An American option
is one that can be exercised at any time up to the date the option expires.
A European option is one that can be exercised only on a specified future
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date. The price that is paid for the asset when the option is exercised is 
called the exercise price or striking price. The last day on which the option 
may be exercised is called the expiration date or maturity date.
Accordingly, an export credit insurance contract, viewed as a security, corresponds 
to a European put option which gives the insured the right to sell his credit claim to the 
ECA at its maturity date. The price at which he can sell the claim is either equivalent to 
or less than the nominal value of the claim insured, depending on whether the insurance 
is complete or partial. The correspondence between such a put option and an insurance 
contract is reflected in their pay-offs. For example, the pay-off from a (complete) credit 
insurance at the date of maturity of the credit is as follows:
pay-off from insurance = max { 0 , D -  A } , (1)
where D denotes the value of the (insured) contractual debt service and A denotes the debt 
service that is actually made. It is equal to the difference between the amount insured and 
the actual payment by the debtor in the case of a default on that credit and zero if there 
is no default. Similarly, the value of a common European put option at its expiration date 
is as follows:
pay-off from put option = max { 0 , E -  S } , (^)
where E denotes the exercise price and S the price, at the expiration date, of the stock on 
which the option is written. Thus, as the value of a common European put option depends 
on the stochastic price of the underlying stock, S, the value of the insurance contract 
depends on the (stochastic) actual debt service made by the debtor, A. And as the value 
of the put option depends on the pre-specified exercise price, E, the value of the insurance 
contract depends on the nominal value of the contractual debt service that is insured, D.
By a similar reasoning Merton (1977) has interpreted the insurance of commercial 
bank deposits as a European put option. Such deposit insurance, as the name indicates, 
insures the deposits and thus protects the depositor against bank failures. It is funded from
" The existence of a claims waiting period is ignored.
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premia levied on the banks at which deposits are insured. In general a uniform premium 
is applied to all banks, a procedure widely criticized in the academic literature on deposit 
insurance. That literature suggests the application of risk-adjusted premia instead, these 
to be estimated e.g. using tools from option pricing theory.
Similar approaches have recently been used to value debt instruments issued by 
debtors from developing countries and the insurance of these instruments, notably by some 
of the authors mentioned above.One  simple approach followed in the literature is to 
directly apply the textbook Black-Scholes option pricing formula to estimate such values, 
using historical data on the market prices of such instruments or using a proxy for the 
debtor's debt-servicing capacity which determines the value of such instruments. This 
approach has the advantage that the calculations are straightforward. However, its validity 
rests on strong assumptions that some authors do not always make explicit. Namely, that 
the portfolio arbitrage concept, which is the basis of the Black-Scholes formula, requires 
the existence of complete financial markets. More specifically, the basic idea of the Black- 
Scholes concept is that the option can be continuously replicated by appropriate 
transactions in the stochastic asset on which the option is written (i.e. here the debt- 
servicing capacity) and a riskless security, such that the option effectively becomes a 
redundant asset. However, unlike a stock, a country's debt-servicing capacity is not 
tradeable so that one requirement for the application of the Black-Scholes formula is not 
satisfied.
However, although one cannot trade directly in the country's debt-servicing 
capacity, the required replication strategy can be achieved by trading in other commodities 
provided their value is correlated with this capacity. For example, Claessens and van 
Wijnbergen (1991) identify the foreign exchange earnings as the principal component of 
Mexico's debt-servicing capacity and explain that, "even though the foreign exchange 
earnings of Mexico are non-traded assets, and as such not priced directly in the market, 
they are likely to be spanned by assets which are traded and whose current values are 
known. For example, Mexico's oil earnings can easily be spanned through forward and
Claessens and Van Wijnbergen (1990), Clark (1991), Cohen (1990), Dooley at al. (1990), Genotte, Kharas, and 
Sadeq (1987), Klein (1991, 1994), Nocera (1989), and Scott (1990).
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futures contracts traded on over-the-counter and exchange markets. Consequently, the 
pricing methodology underlying the option valuation, which assumed traded assets, can 
be used."^  ^ Consequently, the insurer of credits to Mexico (the writer of the put option) 
would have to purchase a risk-free interest bearing asset with exactly the same maturity 
as the credit and in addition to sell short Mexican oil. This is illustrated using a simple 
example in appendix 4.5.1.
In fact, the assumption of complete markets, as described above, is not necessary 
in order to obtain an explicit valuation formula. One could assume instead that the insurer 
is risk-neutral.'^ This is a common assumption for an insurer and it is justified on the 
grounds that the insurer can eliminate risk through pooling of a large number of risks 
provided these risks are independent.'^ This alternative approach is more general in the 
sense that it allows the average rate of change of the debt-servicing capacity to differ from 
the risk-free interest rate. On the other hand, the latter approach requires the equality of 
the risk-free rate and the rate of return on all assets, where these returns include the 
average rate of change of the debt-servicing capacity. Namely, consider that complete 
markets existed so that such debt-servicing capacity could be traded like any other asset. 
Then continuous arbitrage would equal the expected returns on all assets, the expected 
return of such capacity being its average rate of growth p. Otherwise, the implications of 
the two concepts are similar; they are discussed in section 4.3,4. The present study applies 
both valuation concepts mentioned above to the problem of setting a premium for export 
credit insurance.
The valuation concepts provide benchmark premium rates, i.e. the premium per 
dollar insured, which would change in variations of the underlying assumptions. For 
example, here we follow the conventional approach'* and assume that information about
” Claessens and van Wijnbergen (1991, p. 9).
This is what Claessens and van Wijnbergen (1991) effectively do.
If one considered risk aversion on the part of the insurer the premium rate for insurance cover would be higher 
than with risk neutrality, the difference depending on the degree of risk aversion.
'* To the author's knowledge there exist no rigorous analysis of the effects of the presence of asymmetric 
information on the value of the insurance against pohtical risk.
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the probability of the country's default are shared equally by insurer and insured, i.e. that 
information are symmetric. A situation with asymmetric information includes that the 
insured exporter knows more about the risk than the insurer (giving rise to the problem 
of adverse selection) or that he may even affect the risk through some costly effort (giving 
rise to the problem of moral hazard).’^  Under these circumstances, the insurance contract 
generally would have to specify a "deductible" - i.e. a proportion of losses to be borne by 
the insured - in order to reduce the inefficiency associated with these problems. For 
example, in the case of moral hazard this deductible should be set according to the 
costliness to the exporter of his efforts and his degree of risk aversion so that the exporter 
will find it optimal to make some efforts to reduce the risk. The case of adverse selection 
is more complicated. Namely, the deductible has normally the role of inducing bad risk 
types to sign insurance contracts at higher premium rates than good ones do. A set of 
contracts would have to be offered, each contract specifying a deductible and a premium 
rate. This set of contracts should be determined according to the information about the 
number of different risk categories and their specific riskiness. In general, the 
determination of the two parameters, i.e. the deductible and the premium rate, depends on 
the type of informational asymmetry.^®
4.3.2 Contractual debt service and debt-servicing capacity
In general, the single most important aspect of insurance cover against the political 
risk is the uncertainty about the debtor country's future capacity to meet its debt-service 
demands. Three terms are introduced here which will be frequently referred to in this 
subsection and the ensuing ones;
Dj denotes the contractual debt service.
At the actual debt service, and 
Kt the debt-servicing capacity.
” These are widely used definitions of adverse selection and moral hazard.
“ The concept considered here allows the inclusion of an exogenously given deductible. The changes in the 
valuation formula are straightforward. The premium rate would be decreasing in the amount of deductible specified.
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The first two terms, the contractual debt service and the actual debt service 
correspond to terms used in balance of payments statistics. Namely, the contractual debt 
service corresponds to debt service on accrual basis, and the actual debt service to 
debt service on cash basis. Although in practice collection of data is imperfect, these 
variables are in principle measurable. By contrast, the debt-servicing capacity is a 
hypothetical concept. The term debt-servicing capacity means the maximum debt service 
that the debtor country can meet, given its economic and political constraints. It is 
unobservable and its realization determines the actual debt service.
In general, credit insurance is concerned with two aspects. First, it is concerned 
with the probability that such debt-servicing capacity falls short of the debtor's contractual 
debt service, meaning that he does not meet its debt-service demands in full. Secondly, 
it is concerned with the level of actual debt service that the debtor meets. The first event 
is generally understood as default of the debtor, and the amount that the debtor actually 
transfers in such a situation is denoted by recoveiy. An insurer must estimate the 
probability of default and the extent of recovery based on assumptions about the dynamic 
behaviour of the debtor's debt-servicing capacity K^ , on the one hand, and its debt service 
demands on the other. Abstracting from reporting problems, it is fair to say that the 
future contractual debt service due is known. For example, the contractual debt service 
is regularly reported in the World Bank's World Debt Tables. On the other hand, the 
country's debt-servicing capacity is not known. This stylized scenario is captured in this 
dynamic model by assuming that the contractual debt service is a deterministic variable 
and the debt-servicing capacity a stochastic one.
What determines the debt-servicing capacity of a country is a subject of discussion 
in the literature. Following the points made in section 1.2, of chapter 1, one could state 
that for a sufficiently small ECA, i.e. one which cannot influence the probability of 
default, the two major explications of default, i.e. the inability and the unwillingness to 
pay, have identical implications. They both imply that there exists a certain exogenously 
given amount of resources, the debt-servicing capacity, that can maximally be extracted 
from the debtor country, either because it cannot or will not pay more. In general, such 
a capacity is influenced in a complex way by the current and the anticipated values of a
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number of factors, such as export earnings, terms-of-trade, international reserves, the 
benefit of future access to international capital markets, the situation of lenders, and 
domestic and international political factors, etc.. In particular, it is related to earnings from 
exports and expenditures on imports. These in turn are influenced by movements in the 
prices of export and import commodities and in exchange rates, the stochastic dynamics 
of which are adequately described by a Brownian motion.^’ Therefore, the conventional 
assumption is that the debt-servicing capacity is also governed by such stochastic 
process,^^
d / Kj = dt + o dWj , (3)
where p is the trend parameter and a the diffusion parameter of the Brownian motion, and 
Wj is the standard Wiener process, with E(dW,) = 0 and the variance E(dWt^) = dt.^  ^
This assumption is convenient because the expected value of K at any time in the future 
has a simple expression as shown in appendix 4.5.2. It should be noted that the 
application of the Black-Scholes (or complete markets) concept requires the specification 
of a dynamic process for the debt-servicing capacity, while the alternative concept (i.e. 
valuation based on risk-neutrality) would only require the assumption that this capacity 
is lognormally distributed at the dates of maturity.
Some important technical assumptions are made. First, the changes in the debt- 
servicing capacity are intertemporally uncorrelated. This does not necessarily mean that, 
for example, the foreign exchange earnings are intertemporally uncorrelated, but it does 
mean that, while anticipated changes in these earnings already form part of the country's 
debt-servicing capacity, unexpected ones ("shocks") are intertemporally uncorrelated. Thus 
"shocks" are not forecastable from past expected changes. Second, the variance of the 
change in value is constant through time. Third, changes in the debt-servicing capacity can
Bartolini and Dixit (1991, p.831).
“ This assumption is regularly made in studies concerned with the valuation of sovereign debt, including those of 
Bartolini and Dixit (1991), Cohen (1990), Claessens and van Wijnbergen (1991), Genotte, Kharas and Sadeq (1987), 
Klein (1991), and Nocera (1989). However, none of these authors has tested whether the proxy used for such debt- 
servicing capacity is indeed lognormally distributed; such a test being regularly hindered by the limited number of 
available observations.
“ More information on the Brownian motion are provided in ^pendix 4.5.2.
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be either positive or negative, but the value of such capacity can never fall below zero 
when its starting value is positive. Such restriction is essential for a net debtor country 
because otherwise the intertemporal budget constraint will be violated.
4.3.3 Default and debt renegotiation
As explained in the previous subsection, the crucial element in this model is the 
debt-servicing capacity and the uncertainty about its future realization. This subsection 
explains what happens when such capacity falls short of the debtor's debt-servicing 
demands.
In general, such capacity changes continuously whereas debt is issued and becomes 
due at discrete intervals. For simplification it is assumed that the debt instruments have 
a maturity of one period, i.e. all debt becomes due after one period; consequently, the 
contractual debt service is identical to total debt. Consider that debt is issued at time t and 
becomes due at time t + 1. At that date of maturity, the debtor country repays its debt if 
its debt-servicing capacity exceeds its debt-servicing demands. Otherwise it is in default, 
and enters into debt renegotiation with its creditors.^ "^
No default if K.+. > D . ; (4)
default if  ^ .
In general, the agreements of such renegotiations include a variety of measures, 
all of which are designed to bring the contractual debt service more in line with the 
debtor's capacity to service it. For this purpose, two central measures are used, including 
the prolongation of the maturity of debt and the adjustment of contractual interest or 
principal. The former measure generally aims to maintain the present value of the nominal 
debt while the debtor is granted a liquidity relief. The latter corresponds to a reduction 
of the contractual debt service below the level stated in the original debt contracts. Debt 
and debt-service reductions (DDSR) are indeed a common feature of recent debt
^ Note that, by assumption, the contractual debt service is identical with the total debt of the country.
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restructurings of both official and private debt.^  ^ This scenario is reflected in the stylized 
rescheduling model of Claessens and van Wijnbergen (1990) which we adopt for 
convenience/^ It considers that the contractual debt service of the insolvent country is 
reduced to its actual debt-servicing capacity, so that the actual debt service is given as 
follows:
A,.i = min { D ,„ , K,., ) . (5)
Thus the aggregate loss of creditors at time t + 1, L,+i, is given as
-  A,., = max { D,.j -  , 0 ) , (6)
where A^+i = K^+i -< 0^ +, in the case of default. In the absence of seniority provisions the 
aggregate losses are shared proportionally by all creditors.^  ^ Under such circumstances, 
the loss per claim is
i M  = max I  ~ , 0 I . (7)
The above equation describes the loss per claim and, equivalently, it describes the 
value of a complete insurance of one claim at time t + 1 The value of such a complete 
insurance at time t depends on the assumption about the stochastic dynamics of the debtor 
country's debt-servicing capacity and the rescheduling mechanism. It will be explicitly 
derived in the next subsection.
“ As Sachs has put it already in 1989, "a partial write down is the norm, not the exception" (p.23) in debt 
restructurings.
“ For the purpose of our analysis it is essential that the creditor incurs some loss. Otherwise an insurance (against 
losses) would not be required.
^ A common principle of debt renegotiation is that the losses are equally shared among foreign creditors (Feldmann 
(1991, p.227 and p.771)). This principle was mentioned early in the Leges XII Tabularwn (a Roman law published 
around 450 b.c.), which provides that the bodies of defaulters may be divided and distributed pro rata amoi^ the 
creditors (Winkler (1993, p. 17)). It also characterizes the recent practice within the Paris Club (Plan (1985, p.37)). In 
general there exist no written seniority provisions. However, the behaviour of debtors in financial difficulties has 
revealed that there exists an impUcit seniority ranking, i.e. short-term debt and official and officially supported debt are 
often serviced with priority over private medium- and long-term debt. As long as officially supported debt, i.e. credits 
insured by an official ECA, are indeed part of the senior debt, the premium valuation formulae would be identical 
except that would represent only the senior and not the total debt. The imphcations of a seniority ranking for the 
valuation of junior debt are discussed in Bartolini and Dixit (1990) and Dooley and Stone (1992). The analysis in the 
fifth chapter of the present study is close to such concerns.
“ This holds, provided that the credit risk is exogenous.
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4.3.4 The premium rate valuation formula
In this subsection, an explicit formula for the price of export credit insurance is 
derived which allows to quantify how the costs of export credit insurance change as a 
result of changes in exogenous variables. The algebra is provided in appendix 4.5.3.
It is assumed that export credits are in the form of zero-coupon bonds which are 
continuously compounded, have a maturity of one period, and a nominal value of one at 
the date of maturity.^  ^ There exists also an alternative debt instrument which is default- 
free but has otherwise exactly the same characteristics as these export credits. Let and 
R denote the value at time t of the defaultable and the default-free debt instrument, 
respectively,
^ ^ ' (8 ) 
R = e %
where b^  is the interest rate of the risky claim and r the risk-free interest rate. The 
presence of the default risk on implies that r < b, and B^  -< R. The debtor country's 
aggregate debt-service demands in period t + 1  are given as the nominal value of the 
claims at maturity B,+, times the number of claims which have been issued in the 
previous period, i.e. in period t,
D..1 = N. . (9)
Consider that there exist competitive and risk-neutral ECAs which insure the 
holder of a claim against a loss arising from default of the debtor on that claim. Under 
risk neutrality (on the part of the insurer), the price of the insurance is given as its 
discounted expected pay-off. The pay-off at time t + 1 depends on whether the sovereign 
debtor which has issued the (insured) debt instrument is in default or not, where default 
means any failure of the debtor to meet its contractual debt service in full. As formulated 
in (7), the pay-off (per dollar insured) is equal to zero if K^+, t  and equal to
” This assumption is being made in order to simplify the calculation but it is not necessary to obtain the qualitative 
results presented here.
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(Dt+, - K^ +i) / K^+, if Kt+i -< Dt+j. Thus, the price of the insurance per dollar insured, i.e. the 
premium rate is given as follows:
(10)e-'E, max 0  , P t . i  -  K i ] ►
where £([•] denotes the expected value at t of the insurance contract at the time of the 
maturity of the credit. The above equation contains, on the left-hand side, the safe return 
for the insurer from the insurance contract at time t and, on the right-hand side, the 
present value of the expected (negative) pay-offs from that contract. Competition ensures 
the equality of both sides.
Denote 7 1 , the probability of default viewed from period t. Since by assumption the 
debt instruments are in the form of zero bonds with a face value of one (i.e. Bj+i = 1 ), it 
follows from (9) that Dj+i = N,. Thus the above equation can be written as follows:
Pt = N.
(11)
where E,[ | ] denotes the expectation at t about the debtors payment conditional on the 
occurrence of default. In other words the price of the insurance is given as the discounted 
present value of the insurance in the case of default, E([ | ], weighted by the probability 
of default The term E^ [ | ] can be written as follows:
$
ln(K ,/N , ) + |i + aV2''
$ ln(K ,/N , ) + |i-oV 2''
(12)
with 0 ( ) denoting the distribution function of the standard normal probability distribution. 
The probability of default can be written as follows:
It, = prob,{ K, ,^ N, } = ®
ln(K,/N,) + |i -  0V 2 (13)
Thus, combining equations (11) to (13) an explicit formula is obtained for the 
value of the insurance at time t, in terms of variables that are all known at that time. It
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allows to estimate the fair premium for export credit insurance, the value of which 
depends only on a limited number of exogenous variables. Namely, it is given as follows:
Pt = e
From this equation the formula considered by Nocera (1989) is obtained as a 
special case; namely, if p is set equal to r as it would hold if continuous trading were 
possible (as described in the last paragraph of subsection 4.3.1), the following formula 
obtains:
e,-' 0
' ln(K,/N,) + i»-aV 2l
- e f — $
' ln(K,/N,) + |i+aV2V (14)
°  J N. 0 j]
e '  *
' In(K,/N, )+ r-o V 2 '
°  J N. I
' h»(K./N.).r.aV2j ^ ,5^
Equations (14) and (15) express the price of export credit insurance as a function 
of a limited number of variables, which are as follows:
Kt, the debtor country's debt-servicing capacity;
N„ the number of debt instruments issued by the debtor country
( which is, by assumption, identical to the total debt service due at time t+1, Dt+J;
p, the average rate of change of the debt-servicing capacity;
a ,^ the volatility of the rate of change of the debt-servicing capacity;
r, the world interest rate.
The impact of these variables on the price of credit insurance is discussed in an 
intuitive way using the example of the risk-neutrality concept as shown in (14). The 
function for p^  includes two standard normal distribution functions 0 ( ), which will not 
be distinguished in this description because they are qualitatively equivalent. The value 
of O(') is bounded between zero and one and depends on the constellation of K^ , N^ , p, 
and a. For example, if K, is very large relative to N^ then 0 ( ) « 0 and thus the price of 
the insurance is close to zero. Alternatively, if is small relative to N^ , then 0 ( ) « 1 and 
thus the price of the insurance is close to the one of the risk-less asset, R = e'\ The 
variables p, r, and have negative signs, thus the premium rate Pt is decreasing in p
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and r, and increasing in Summarizing all effects, the price of the insurance is 
decreasing in K^ , p, and r, and increasing in N, and a.
These relations are confirmed by a simulation analysis, shown in figures 4.1 and 
4.2, illustrating the sensitivity of the price of insurance with respect to the variables K^ , 
a  and For example, figure 4.1 depicts the relation between the debt-servicing 
capacity and the volatility of the rate of change of that capacity a  and the insurance 
premium rate p^ . The graph is drawn on the basis of equation (14) with r = p = 0.06, 
N, = 1, ranging from 0.1 to 3, and a ranging from 0.2 to 1.6. It illustrates that the 
premium rate is very high and exceeds 85 per cent for a very low and a high o. By 
contrast, it is very low for a high and a low a; however, it is always positive as long 
as the volatility a  is positive. The surface shows a sharp increase in the premium rate as 
K decreases through one. This sharp increase is notable when the volatility a  is low; 
however, when the volatility is high the surface becomes smoother. This means that in the 
presence of a high volatility of the rates of changes of the absolute magnitude of 
becomes relatively less important. Applying this idea to a cross-country comparison this 
means that the distinction between a country with a currently high and one with a low 
debt-servicing capacity becomes blurred in the presence of a worldwide high volatility in 
external financial positions.
Figure 4.2 depicts the sensitivity of the premium rate with respect to different 
values of p and a, the graph being drawn on the basis of (14) with = 1.5, N, = 1, 
r = 0.06, p ranging from 0.08 to 0.01, and a ranging from 0.1 to 0.8. The graph 
demonstrates the crucial importance of the volatility in the concept used here. Namely, 
there is a sharp increase in the surface at a  = 0.5, the premium being only marginal if o 
is lower than 0.5 but increasing exponentially with a  increasing above 0.5. On the other 
hand, the effect of the growth rate is limited, an increase in that rate reducing the 
premium rate only linearly.
The effect of <t‘‘ on p, is dominating the one of +o^/2 on it.
For expositional purposes, we supress, in all figures, the time subscripts of the variables used as labels for the
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The difference between (14) and (15) is that the latter does not include \i. This is 
a well-known feature of the Black-Scholes concept and it can be explained in an intuitive 
way as follows. As the Black-Scholes concept, owing to the assumption of continuous 
trading opportunities, is valid for any risk preferences, it must also be valid for the case 
of risk neutrality. Consequently, under risk neutrality and complete markets, the expected 
rate of return of any asset equals the one of the riskless asset. However, when (14) is 
derived, it is assumed that markets are not complete and so r and p are allowed to differ 
from each other even in the case of risk neutrality. Clearly as long as p and r have the 
same values both concepts imply exactly the same premium. Otherwise, the premia 
according to these two concepts differ. For example, if r < p, the premium estimated 
according to the Black Scholes concept would be lower than that estimated according to 
the alternative concept, i.e. the valuation based on risk-neutrality of ECAs.
The analysis of this subsection allows the formulation of a hypothesis in terms of 
the relationship between the level and the development of a debtor country's external 
financial position, on the one hand, and the export credit insurance costs applying to it, 
on the other. The less favourable the relation between a debtor country's current debt- 
servicing capacity and its contractual debt service and the higher the volatility of changes 
in that capacity, the higher are the costs associated with the insurance of export credits 
to that country. Furthermore, according to the risk-neutrality approach, the less favourable 
the rate of change of that capacity, the higher are these costs. These hypothesis are tested 
with observations and the results reported in the next section.
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Figure 4.2: The premium rate, the rate of changes of the debt-servicing capacity, 
and the volatility of the rate of changes of that capacity
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4.4 Empirical analysis of the premium rates for ECI
4.4.1 Premium surcharges and financial indicators
The previous section explained that the premium rates for credit insurance to a 
country destination should be determined not only by this country's current debt-servicing 
capacity but also by the volatility of its rate of change. In addition, according to one of 
the two concepts considered there, i.e. the valuation based on the risk neutrality 
assumption, these premium rates would also be determined by the rate of change of such 
a capacity. These hypotheses are subjected to empirical tests.
We use the premium surcharges applied by the Nederlandsche Creditverzekering 
Maatschapij, UK during 1992 and 1993 as proxies for the premium rates discussed in the 
theoretical model.^  ^ These premium surcharges apply when the exporter - who is already 
insured under a general comprehensive policy - has credit exposure to any of the countries 
for which such premium surcharges are specified. Thus they represents the specific 
premium rate for insurance cover of the risk associated with that country destination, and 
thus correspond to the concept of the premium rates defined in the theoretical model. 
They vary between 0 and 6 %, depending on the country destination. The premium 
surcharges applying to developing countries are compared with two external financial 
indicators of those countries, i.e. their debt-service ratios and their reserves-over-imports 
ratios.^  ^ The latter are used alternatively as proxies for the debt-servicing capacity. The 
debt-service ratio is inverted to obtain another ratio (i.e. exports over debt service) that 
corresponds to the expression (K^  / NJ contained in the premium rate formulae of the 
theoretical section. Data on these two indicators are obtained from the United Nations data 
bank. The proxies for the other variables which appear in the premium rate formulae (14) 
and (15), i.e. the average rate of change of the debt-servicing capacity and the volatility 
of that rate, are calculated from the historical development of these indicators, using
Indications of these surcharges were made available for this study by Jardine Credit Insurance Limited, a private 
insurance company in the United Kingdom.
The reserves-over-imports ratio used here is calculated by dividing reserves over the equivalent of three months 
of imports.
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standard formulae. To be included in our sample, a country must be included in the list 
of indications of premium surcharges, and complete data must be available for it in all of 
the explanatory variables. The following variables were considered, all independent ones 
with a lag of one period:^ "^
PS = the
DSR = the
DDSR = the
VDSR = the
RES = the
DRES = the
VRES = the
The formulae (14) and (15) cannot be further simplified; thus the independent 
variables cannot be expressed separately. Therefore, two methods of testing are proposed 
here.^  ^ First, the specific structural form of this equation is tested by simulating the two 
terms on the right hand side and regressing the observed premium surcharges on these two 
terms. Secondly, the premium surcharges are regressed directly on the independent 
variables to test whether they are significant in the suggested direction.
Concerning the first method of testing, the following procedure was used. The 
external financial indicator RES (or alternatively DSR), its average rate of change DRES 
(or DDSR), and the volatility of that rate VRES (or VDSR) were used as proxies for 
(K^  / Nt ), n, and a, respectively. They were used as inputs to calculate the value of the 
two terms of the premium rate formulae, denoted below by T, and Tj, and then the actual 
premium surcharges were regressed on these two terms. Ideally, their estimated 
coefficients would be significant and equal to one. In fact, the results of this test method
^ The premium surcharges, PS, being applied during 1993 were used as the dependent variables. The data were 
neither previously subjected to an empirical analyses nor are they publicly available. The data are listed in the appendix 
4.5.4. The explanatory variables are available from pubhcized sources. The values o f the proxies for ct and p were 
calculated from historical data using standard formulae. They were calculated for the past three, four, and five years. 
Here, only the results for <y and p calculated for the three year period are reported, the results for the variables 
calculated for different periods being broadly similar.
The author is indebted to A.C. Atkinson who suggested these testing methods.
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were mixed. For example, using the debt-service ratio, the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are equal to zero could not be rejected. The specification using the reserves- 
over-imports ratio performed better, i.e. the null hypothesis of all coefficients being equal 
to zero was rejected at the 1% probability level. The results obtained on the basis of this 
latter ratio are given below:
PS93 = 0.96C + 0.03Ti -  O.lSTj , = 0.29 ,
(11.26)*** (0.93) (-4.23)*'* F(2,77) = 17.24***,
ln( K/N) + ÿi-ô^l2
k ® j
In ( K/N) + jl+ô^/2'
with T, = e ■ ®
and T, = ' —0
N
with K= RES, \L= DRES, â=  VRES, and r= 0.05. The result suggests that there exists a 
significant influence of the second term on the premium surcharges; however, less than 
a third of the total variation in the premium surcharges are explained by the above 
specification.^^ In fact, the variation in the second term, Tg, of which the coefficient is 
significant, is dominated by the changes in the reserves-over-imports ratio in front of the 
bracketed expression. Thus the results point to the hypothesis that this ratio is important 
but that the specific structural form of the regression equation is not correct.
In the next step, it was tested whether the model's qualitative implications with 
respect to the influence of its central variables are consistent with the data. These 
implications are as follows:
Pt = Pt( ) according to Black Scholes concept ,
( - )  (+)
= Pt( , |i.j. , 5  ^ ) according to risk neutrality concept ,
( - )  ( - )  (+)
with K= RES (or DSR), p= DRES (or DDSR), and a= VRES (or VDSR). These relations 
were tested using parametric and non-parametric regressions.
There was no evidence of heteroscedasticity, and functional misspecification was not detected.
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The results using linear OLS regressions are as follows. First, a regression 
specification was used which included all of the above listed explanatory variables and, 
in addition, a dummy variable for Argentina ARG to account for the exceptionally high 
premium surcharges applying to that country.^  ^ The estimated coefficients of DSR, RES, 
VRES and ARG were significant in the expected direction and the coefficients of DDSR, 
VDSR and DRES were insignificant. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
variables DDSR, VDSR and DRES were jointly zero could not be rejected. These 
variables were eliminated and then the regression re-estimated. The following results were 
obtained:^*
PS93 = 0.97C + 1.20DSR -  1.63RES + 5.14VRES + 4.70ARG ,
(6.48)"" (2.53)" ( -  4.74)*" (3.07)"* (7.92)***
r ' = 0 . 5 6 ,  F(4,75) = 26.35 .
The estimation shows that the estimated coefficients of all included variables had 
the expected signs, and that those of DSR, RES and VRES were significant. In particular, 
the coefficients of the reserves-over-imports ratio RES and the volatility of the rate of 
changes of international reserves VRES were significant at the 1 % level (denoted by ***).
The coefficient of DSR was significant at a lower level, i.e. at the 5% level (**). There
was evidence for heteroscedasticity, but the estimated coefficients changed only little 
when a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator was used, except that the level of 
significance of the coefficient of DSR was lower.^  ^ In both estimates the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients as a group were insignificant could be strongly rejected. Several tests 
for functional misspecification were applied, but no evidence of it was found. For 
example, using a test of non-nested models, the linear model was confirmed as a better
” This high surcharge has been applied by the then-ECGD following the outbreak o f the Falkland war between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom. It has been reduced only shghtly since then and continues to represent the 
maximum surcharge applied by the private NCM, UK to any country in this sample.
A logit transform of the premium surcharges would be the appropriate dependent variable because it prevents the 
estimated premium surcharges from becoming negative. However, using the logit transform, tiie explained variation was 
much lower and therefore an approximation (i.e. the non-transformed variable) is used instead.
The degrees-of-freedom-corrected version of a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator (White (1980)) was used 
to obtain the following coefficient estimates (t-ratios in brackets): 0.97 (6.45) for C, 1.20 (1.75) for DSR, -1.93 (-6.21) 
for RES, 5.14 (3.70) for VRES and 5.14 (27.94) for ARG. Thus, the t-ratios increased for RES, VRES and ARG but 
decreased for DSR, so that the latter was significant only at the 10% level.
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description of the variation in the data than the linear-log (semi-log) one. Several 
additional variables were included in the regression specification and the extended 
specification re-estimated, these additional variables including the quadratic forms of the 
independent variables and the squares of the predictions of the original linear model. They 
were not found significant.
Using the estimated coefficients for DSR, RES and VRES the point elasticities of 
the premium surcharges with respect to these variables were calculated.^ The estimated 
elasticities of DSR, RES and VRES were 0.20, - 0.38 and 0.24, respectively. In words, 
an increase in the debt-service ratio by one per cent increases the premium surcharges by 
0.2 per cent, a decrease in the reserves-over-imports ratio by one per cent increases them 
by 0.38 per cent and an increase in the volatility of the reserves-over-imports ratio by one 
per cent increases them by 0.24 per cent. In this sense the reserves-over-imports ratio is 
more important for the determination of the premium surcharges than the debt-service 
ratio. This could be interpreted as support for the hypothesis that indicators related to the 
liquidity of a country are perceived by the EGA as being more important than indicators 
relating to its solvency.
These results, obtained from parametric regressions, were partly supported by 
estimates using non-parametric kernel regressions.'^’ These estimates are shown in figures 
4.3 and 4.5, and the associated density estimates in figures 4.4 and 4.6.'^  ^ Figure 4.3 
illustrates the relation between the premium surcharges (denoted by PS in that figure), on 
the one hand, and the debt-service ratio (denoted by DS) and the volatility of its rate of 
change (denoted by V), on the other. The figure below, i.e. figure 4.4, contains a density
The coefficients obtained fix>m the use o f the heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator were used to calculate the 
elasticities (see previous footnote).
The kernel density estimator used is the standard bivariate one, as being described in Silverman (1986, p.76). The 
observation for Argentina was eliminated because we believe that the high PS applying to that country is politically 
motivated. The estimates for DDSR and DDSR are not reported here because they did not show clear patterns.
The kernel estimator used had the optimal window width, i.e. the one which minimizes die mean square error. 
The effect of varying the window width is as follows. As the window width tends to zero, the surface becomes "spiky", 
while as it becomes large, all detail, spurious or otherwise, is obscured. A large window width generally introduces a 
systematic error, or bias, into the estimation. Therefore, the results that we obtained increasing the window width are 
not reported here.
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estimate. The latter is an essential tool to interpret the surface plot shown in figure 4.3. 
In general the interpretation of this surface plot should concentrate on those areas where 
most of the density is concentrated. The areas with low density are generally poorly 
determined and thus unreliable. Figure 4.4 shows that the area with high density is the one 
in the south of the surface (viewed from the front axis, i.e. DS-axis), with most density 
being concentrated in the south-east. The estimates in the southern area of the surface are 
not unequivocal. In the area with the highest density; i.e. the one between the DS-values 
of 0.010 and 0.153, viewed from the DS-axis; the premium surcharges appear to be 
decreasing in DS, while they appear to be increasing in the remainder of the southern 
area. They appear to be always increasing in the volatility of the rate of change of the 
debt-service ratio V. Figure 4.5 illustrates the relation between the premium surcharges 
(denoted by PS in that figure) and the reserves-over-imports ratio (denoted by R) and the 
volatility of its rate of change (denoted by V). The area in the south-east of the surface 
plot is characterized by a high density. Starting from the origin in the south-east comer, 
the high-density area extends roughly up to the west to a R-value of 0.663 and to the 
north to a V-value larger than 0.10, In this area, PS appears to be decreasing in R and 
increasing in V, though only slowly. To sum up, the estimates obtained from non- 
parametric regressions provide some support for the hypothesis that the premium 
surcharges are negatively related to the reserves-over-imports ratio and positively to the 
volatility of its rate of change, the debt-service ratio and the volatility of its rate of 
change.
The elasticities calculated from the non-parametric regression estimates were 
consistent with those calculated from the parametric regression estimates, though the 
former were generally lower. For example, the density-weighted elasticity estimates were 
equivalent to 0.20 with respect to the reserves-over-imports ratio, 0.22 with respect to the 
volatility of its rate of change, 0.17 with respect to the debt-service ratio, and 0.08 with 
respect to the volatility of the rate of change of this ratio.
The parametric and non-parametric regression exercises convey an idea about the 
relation between the premium surcharges and the level and volatility of the rate of
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external financial indicators/^ However, the estimates should be treated with caution. 
The sample size, i.e. 80 observations, is so small that the results of the regression analysis 
appeared to be significantly influenced by the realization of individual observations. If one 
wants to summarize the empirical results, the following can be said. They do not provide 
support for the hypothesis that the average rate of change, i.e. the trend in the financial 
indicators of a country, such as the debt-service ratio and the reserves-over-imports ratio, 
affect the premium surcharges applying to that country.'*  ^ They point to the hypothesis 
that the premium surcharges are significantly positively related to the debt-service ratio 
and the volatility of its rate of change. Furthermore, they provide support for the 
hypothesis that the reserves-over-imports ratio and the volatility of the rates of change of 
the reserves-over-imports ratio were negatively and positively (respectively) related to the 
premium surcharges. The finding that not only the current reserves-over-imports ratio, but 
also the volatility of the rate of changes of this ratio, affect such premium surcharges, is 
in accordance with the qualitative implications of the Black-Scholes based premium 
valuation concept, i.e. that the premium rates for export credit insurance to a country 
should depend on tliat country's current debt-servicing capacity and the volatility of the 
rates of change of this capacity.
Deleting two outliers and re-estimating the relations, the results reported above were confirmed. The outlier were 
identified using scatter plots, as shown in appendix 4.5.5. Note that such scatter plots are another means to identify 
relations between the variables. Indeed, the picture that is emerging from them agrees with our central empirical results.
^ According to the premium valuation concept based on the assumption o f risk-neutrality o f EGAs, the trend in the 
debt-servicing capacity of a country should be negatively related to the premium rates for insurance of export credits 
to that country. This implication is not reflected in the sample data used for this study, the proxy for this trend being 
insignificant.
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F igure 4.3: N on-param etric regression of the prem ium  surcharges 
on debt-service ratio  and its volatility
Premium surcharges (PS), d eb t-se rv ice  ratio (DS), and its volatility (V)
PS
1.85
1.48  ■
0.170
0.114
0.058 V
0.296
0.153
0.010DS
Figure 4.4: Density estimates
Density estim ates  of d e b t -s e r v ic e  ratio (DS) and its volatility (V)
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32.76 0.170
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Figure 4.5: N on-param etric regression of the prem ium  surcharges 
on the reserves-over-im ports ratio and its volatility
Premium surcharges (PS), reserves/imports ratio (R), and its volatility (V)
0.990
0.337
0.010
Figure 4.6: Density estimates
Density estim ates of reserves/im ports ratio (R) and its volatility (V)
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0.19
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0.663
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4.4.2 Premium surcharges and country risk ratings
It has been suggested that the country specific premium structure applied by ECAs 
does not reflect the differences in risk among country destinations/^ One test to examine 
this hypothesis is suggested here. Namely, we examine whether the ranking of countries 
implied by the structure of premium surcharges is consistent with the ranking of these 
countries that is implied by their published creditworthiness ratings according to 
Euromoney and the Institutional Investor.^ Furthermore, we compare the relation 
between premium surcharges and creditworthiness ratings, on the one hand, and spreads 
and creditworthiness ratings, on the other.*^ ^
The most widely used'^ * country risk ratings are the ratings which are published 
biannually in the Institutional Investor (U) and annually in the Euromoney (EM) 
magazines, respectively. The methodology behind the U rating was self-described in the 
March 1990 issue: "The country-by-country credit ratings developed by Institutional 
Investor are based on information provided by leading international banks. Bankers are 
asked to grade each of the countries on a scale of zero to 100, with zero representing the 
least creditworthy countries and 100 representing those with the least chance of default. 
The sample for the study, which is updated every six months, ranges from 75 to 100 
banks, each of which provides its own ratings. The names of all participants in the survey 
are kept strictly confidential. Banks are not permitted to rate their home countries. The 
individual responses are weighted using an Institutional Investor formula that gives more 
weight to responses from banks with greater worldwide exposure and more sophisticated
s. van Wijnbergen drew the author's attention to this hypothesis. This hypothesis is mainly articulated in the 
context of public and officially supported ECAs. Unfortunately, these ECAs, as a general rule, do not make available 
information about their premium structures. The ECA considered here, i.e. the NCM, UK, is private and does not appear 
to receive any significant official financial support.
^ The application o f a flat insurance premium to all country destinations provides evidence for such a hypothesis. 
A flat premium was apphed by the officially supported German Hermes until recently.
As appendix 4.5.6 shows, the two forms of risk premia are similar under specific circumstances.
Koghnayr and Müller (1987, p.382), "Abbildung 1: Entscheidungshilfen durch und Bekarmtheitsgrad von 
ausgewahlten Risikoindikatoren".
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country-analysis systems." The Euromoney risk rating consists of a weighted scheme of 
indicators designed to describe a country's economic, financial, and political situation, and 
its market access. A poll of bankers is used to assess the political situation, and the 
financial one is measured by a hypothetical financial indicator. It is calculated as the 
weighted sum of three ratios, which includes the debt-service ratio but does not include, 
for example, the reserves-over-imports ratio."^  ^ It is interesting to note, that despite their 
different rating systems, the published country ratings of EM and II are very similar. The 
interesting aspect of these ratings is that they consider in principle all determinants of the 
credit risk, i.e. not only economic, but also political and social determinants.^® Clearly, 
one should expect that the risk premia that apply to debtor countries, such as the premium 
surcharges and the spreads, are negatively related to their ratings.^' This hypothesis was 
tested and the results are presented in the remainder of this section.
First, it was tested whether there is statistical evidence for the hypothesis that the 
premium surcharges applying to country destinations were consistent with (or better 
influenced by) the published ratings of those countries. For this purpose, the logit 
transformations^^ of the premium surcharges, as applied during 1993 to 60 countries,^  ^
were regressed on the ratings of these countries according to the Institutional Investor and 
Euromoney in September 1992. The following estimation results were obtained for the 
EM rating, using a non-linear least square regression:
The financial indicator is calculated on the basis o f the ratio of the current account balance to GNP, the debt- 
service ratio, and the ratio of the external debt to GNP ratio. The debt-service ratio is multiplied by two and added to 
the external debt-to-GNP ratio. The current account balance-to-GNP ratio is multiphed by ten and subtracted fix>m the 
former term to obtain the financial indicator. The lower the resulting score, the better will be the rating of the cotmtry 
according to that indicator. The score enters with a weight of 10% in the total calculation. See Ettromoney, September 
1992, p.70.
However, an obvious shortcoming is that neither selection nor weighting of the economic, social and pohtical 
aspects is based on a consistent theoretical concept. This is reflected, for example, in the ûuf hoc chosen weights for the 
calculation o f financial indicator. One example of such a calculation was explained in the previous footnote.
" Lee (1991) claims to have shown that the "credit ratings provide a reasonable measure o f borrower's (i.e. 
countries') creditworthiness." In fact, he has shown that the rating o f a country reflects the occurrence o f past or present 
reschedulings. Indeed, in another statistical analysis, we find that the capacity of the II to predict debt-servicing 
problems is rather limited. One should furthermore note that the risk in export credit insurance is different from the risk 
in international bonds and credits, the Institutional Investor being geared primarily towards international investors and 
bankers.
“ The logit transform was used to prevent that the estimated values of the dependent variable become negative.
” This is the number of countries that are common to both data sets.
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PSiogit = aiCEM)*^
ai = 0.58(16.64)*** 
= -0.23(-4.35)*** 
= 0.25 .
The two estimated coefficients, and aj, are highly significant and the direction 
of their joint influence is as expected. The higher the rating of a country, the lower are 
the premium surcharges applying to it. This can be interpreted as evidence for the 
hypothesis that the premium surcharges applying to debtor countries are consistent with 
their published creditworthiness ratings.
This result was compared with the result of a similar exercise; namely, a 
comparison between the spread and the Euromoney rating. The spread data consisted of 
the data set used in chapter 3, i.e. a vector of 52 pooled cross-country time-series 
observations. This vector was regressed on a similar vector of EM ratings, the ratings 
being obtained from the Euromoney issue prior to the spread observation. To be 
comparable with the above estimation for the premium surcharges, the logit transformation 
was applied to the spread as well. The following estimation were obtained:
spread,^ = a, (EM)** 
a, = 0.77(22.01)"' 
= -0.11 (-8.93)""  
R* = 0.60 .
The estimated coefficients were significant, thus providing support for the 
hypothesis that the spread is influenced by the rating of a country.^  ^ The direction of 
their joint influence corresponds to prior expectations, i.e. a lower rating implies a higher 
spread. A remarkable difference between the two regressions, i.e. the one of the premium 
surcharges and the one of the spread, is that, the explained variation of the dependant 
variable is much higher in the latter than in the former one. This means that the relation
^ There was no evidence for misspecification in neither of these two regressions, i.e. the one of the premium 
surcharges and the one of the spread. There was evidence for heterosce<iasticity, but applying a heteroscedasticity- 
consistent estimator (White (1980)) the coefficient estimates did not change.
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between the spreads and the creditworthiness ratings is closer than the one between the 
premium surcharges and these ratings/^ This result is confirmed by another analysis 
where pairs of vectors are compared using the criterion of the root-mean-square- 
percentage-error, RMS%E. This criterion measures the deviation of two vectors, with the 
same number of observations, from each other. It allows the comparison of the relative 
deviation among any pair of vectors with that among any other pair of vectors.^® It is 
defined as follows:
2
RMS%E = ,
E  (Pi/Pi -
i = l
where pi and pj represent one pair of vectors and n the number of observations per vector. 
For example, p, would be either the vector of the spread or the one of the premium 
surcharges and pj either the vector of the EM or the II ratings. For convenience of 
comparison, the EM and the II ratings are transformed to variables indicating the relative 
riskiness of a country, i.e. the ratings are subtracted from 100 and then divided by 100. 
Thus these variables are bounded between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating the most and 1 the 
least creditworthy country.
The table 4.1 shows that the pair of vectors in the bottom row, i.e. the spread and 
the n  vector, exhibits the least deviation among the five pairs considered here. This 
provides some weak support for the hypothesis that the premium surcharges by the ECA 
are less responsive to the creditworthiness of a country than the interest rate premium - 
the spread - in international lending.^  ^ The support is only weak because the two vectors
Using a linear log-log regression, the point elasticities of boüi, the spread and the premium surcharges with 
respect to the rating were estimated. They were -2.98 for the premium surcharges and -4 for the spread. This means 
that a decrease in the rating by one point is associated (on average) with an increase in the premium surcharge by
0.0298 per cent and the spread by 0.04 per cent.
” The two pairs of vectors are not required to have the same number of observations.
The close relation between the spread and the creditworthiness rating that is identified here is indeed a familiar 
result. It appears that these ratings are not endogenous in the regression of the spreads; namely, on the one hand, 
bankers read the II magazine and determine their risk perception accordingly, and, on the other, they answer the II 
questionnaires with reference to their observation of the spread. Under these circumstances the coefficients estimated 
for the rating in the spread equation may not be consistent because of the problem of simultaneity.
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containing the spreads and the premium surcharges are not directly comparable; they 
contain observations for different countries and time periods/^
Table 4.1: Deviation between premium surcharges, country risk rating, and
spreads (cross-country data)^“^
Vectors compared RMS%E
premium surcharges 1992 and II rating 1991 4.08%
premium surcharges 1993 and II rating 1992 4.13%
premium surcharges 1992 and EM rating 1991 4.42%
premium surcharges 1993 and EM rating 1992 4.44%
spread and n  rating in prior year 1.19%
Source: Euromoney, Institutional Investor, Backer and Klein (1993).
(a) The Euromoney and Institutional Investor ratings were transformed. The ratings were subtracted from 100 
and then divided by 100.
Another comparison was considered; namely, the Euromoney creditworthiness 
rating (EM) and the premium surcharges (PS) were alternatively regressed on a common 
set of explanatory variables, in order to identify the differences in the sensitivity of EM 
and PS with respect to those variables. These explanatory variables were selected 
according to the implications of the model of section 4.3, the empirical results obtained 
here, and those reported by Lee (1993) in connection with its empirical analysis of the 
determinants of country creditworthiness ratings.^  ^ The variables include RES, VRES,
“ They differ in various respects, such as the form of the data set (pooled time-series and cross-coimtry data, on 
the one hand, and cross-country data, on the other), the number of observations (52 and 80), and the countries for which 
observations are available.
Lee regressed the EM ratings of 40 developing countries on economic variables and regional and other dummies. 
He found that the variability of the per capita GNP of a country is negatively related to its rating. This result is opposite 
to the author's prior expectations, who appears to have followed the argument of a typical willingness-to-pay model,
i.e. that the variability of a debtor's income is positively related to its creditworthiness. To the extent that the debtor 
country borrows for consumption smoothing and the default penalty consists o f an exclusion from future borrowing, 
a higher variabihty of income implies a higher penalty of default and thus a lower probability o f default. By contrast, 
our theoretical model (presented in section 4.3) would predict the opposite and thus be consistent with the described 
empirical results - provided that the per capita GNP of the country is a sensible proxy for its debt-servicing capacity. 
We believe, however, that other indicators, such as the reserves-over-imports ratio or the debt-service ratio, are better 
suited for that purpose, and therefore give them priority over the former variable in our study.
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DSR, and VDSR, and in addition the following ones:^°
UDB = undisbursed credit commitments over GNP,
VUDB = volatility of UDB calculated over past three years.
Furthermore, four regional dummies - which were found to be significantly related 
to the EM ratings in the above mentioned study by Lee - are included to account for the 
geographical location of the developing country:
D^i^ = East Asia and Pacific,
DLatin = Latin America and the Caribbean,
Ï^ N Africa ~ North Afiica and Middle East,
E^aropt -  Europe and Mediterranean.
The creditworthiness rating of each country is subtracted from the maximum 
obtainable score of 100 in order to obtain a measure of the riskiness of the country, 
denoted EMR. The results for the two dependent variables, PS and EMR, can thus be 
compared, the expected signs of estimated coefficients being the same. The logistic 
transformation is applied to the two variables PS (denoted PS^o^J and EMR ( denoted 
EMRLogi,) to prevent the estimates of the dependent variable from becoming negative. 
Using OLS these two variables are alternatively regressed on the logarithms of the 
explanatory variables, the results being given in table 4.2.^’
Some results are singled out for special attention. The adjusted R^  is higher in the 
regression of EMRLogj^  than in the one of PS^ gg^ t, and a greater number of variables are 
significant in the former than in the latter one. In the former of these regressions, the 
regional dummies for Europe, Asia and North Africa are significantly negative, thus
“ The data set consists o f 60 observations for developing countries. To be included in the sample, a country must 
be a developing country with complete data available in all of the dependent and explanatory variables.
** The specification in logarithmic form was preferred to one which included the variables with their absolute values 
because for the former (but not the latter) the hypotheses o f misspecification could be rejected and heteroscedasticity 
did not appear to be a problem. The results of tests of non-nested regressions were inconclusive, except for the 
information criterion which favours the non-logarithmic model because it explains more of the variation in the dependent 
variable.
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confirming the result of Lee (1993). He interpreted that result as evidence for the 
hypothesis that developing countries from (left-out) Sub-Saharan Africa receive a lower 
creditworthiness rating than those from Europe, Asia and North Afnca. In the regression 
on EMRLogit, the coefficient of the ratio of undisbursed credits over GNP (UDB) is highly 
significantly negative, and the one of the volatility of the rate of changes of that ratio 
positive at the 10% level of significance. The latter coefficient is positive at the 5% level 
of significance in the regression on PS^ ogit. The significantly negative relation between 
EMRLogjt and UDB is not astonishing. On the one hand, bankers are asked to provide the 
political risk assessment for the EM creditworthiness rating, and thus such assessment 
enters into the total score of the rating, i.e. with a weight of 20%. On the other hand, they 
decide about the credit commitments to a country and, thus, have an influence on the 
undisbursed credit commitments as well. Clearly, there might be a simultaneity problem 
in that regression but we believe that it is not a serious problem. The volatility of the rate 
of changes of the ratio of undisbursed credits over GNP (VUDB) is significantly positive 
in the regressions at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. To the extent that this liquidity- 
related ratio is correlated with the debt-servicing capacity of a country, these results would 
be consistent with the implications of our theoretical model of the determination of a risk 
premium explained in section 4.3.3.
Another important finding is that the influence of liquidity-related indicators such 
as RES, VRES, UDB, and VUDB appears to be stronger than the influence of solvency- 
related indicators such as DSR and VDSR, the level of significance of some of the former 
variables being much higher.
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Table 4.2: Estimation results of OLS regression of Euromoney rating and 
premium surcharges on logarithmic variables and regional dummy variables
^^^Logit P^ Logit
constant 0.672 (24.762)'" 0.943 ( 8.549)'"
RES - 0.019 (- 4.109)"' - 0.078 (- 4.035)'"
VRES 0.011 ( 1.817)* 0.063 ( 2.587)'"
DSR - 0.006 (- 1.269) 0.012 ( 0.627)
VDSR - 0.837E-3 (- 0.189) 0.041 ( 2.275)"
UDB - 0.008 (- 2.538)'" 0.007 ( 0.575)
VUDB 0.006 ( 1.810)' 0.024 ( 1.944)"
Europe - 0.053 (- 3.799)'" 0.066 ( 1.154)
N^.Afiica - 0.023 (- 2.128)" 0.092 (2.011)"
^Asia - 0.036 (- 3.108)'" 0.060 ( 1.281)
^Latin - 0.013 (- 1.228) 0.074 ( 1.677)'
Adj. R" 0.45 0.28
F(10,49) 5.76/" 3.343'"
Explanation: OLS estimation results with dummy variables representing geographical 
location of borrowers. Other independent variables are in logarithmic form. The dependent 
variables are the logistic transformation of the premium surcharges (PS^ ogit) and logit 
transformation of the riskiness of a country according to Euromoney (EMU^ og^ J. The 
figures in parentheses denote t-statistics, and levels of significance are denoted as follows: 
*** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
To sum up, the results reported here confirm those reported in the previous 
subsection, i.e. that the reserves-over-imports ratio is significantly negatively related and 
the volatility of that ratio significantly positively related to the premium surcharges. The 
results reported here do not provide evidence for the hypothesis that the premium rates 
fail to reflect the differences in risk among credit destination countries.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 The principle underlying option valuation
This appendix is designed to illustrate the fundamental economic principle of 
option valuation by arbitrage methods using a simple numerical example.
The fundamental principle of modem option pricing theory is the absence of 
arbitrage opportunities. An arbitrage opportunity is when one or a set of trades results in 
a positive cash flow at one point in time and in zero cash flows in all other points in time. 
The absence of arbitrage opportunities means that this is not possible. The valuation of 
a put option is based on the following idea. If one could establish a portfolio of long and 
short positions in the underlying commodities, i.e. the commodities on which the option 
is written, and risk-ffee debt instruments in such a way that the pay-offs of a put were 
completely replicated (by that portfolio), then to prevent riskless arbitrage opportunities 
from occurring, the current values of these positions and the put option would have to be 
identical.
This idea is illustrated using a simple example, which follows Cox, Ross and 
Rubinstein (1979), p.331. Consider two periods, denoted period 1 and 2. In period 1 the 
ECA writes a European put option on Mexican oil. The price of oil per barrel in period 1 
is Priceoii “  $20, and in period 2 it is either $10 or $40. The option expires in period 2 
and has an exercise price of E = $20. Consider that one can trade either in these options, 
directly in oil or borrow and lend at the riskless interest rate of 5.3 per cent. Under these 
circumstances, the following hedge helps to determine the price of the put in period 1:
(1) Write 3 puts at price n each,
(2) sell short 1 barrel of oil at $20,
(3) lend $38 at 5.3 per cent to be paid back in period 2.
The tabulation below gives the pay-offs from this hedge for each possible level of 
the oil price in period 2.
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Tabulation: Pay-off Structure of Riskless Hedge
Period 1 Period 2
Priceoii = $20 Priceoii* = $10 Priceoii* = $40
Write 3 puts + 3 7T -30 0
Sell short 1 barrel oil + 20 - 10 - 40
Lend $38 at 5,3% - 38 + 40 + 40
Total 0 0 0
Regardless of the outcome concerning the oil price, the (riskless) hedge exactly 
breaks even in period 2. Therefore, the no-arbitrage condition requires the following 
equation to hold: 371 + 20 -38 = 0. Thus the value of the put in period 1 must be equal 
to $6. If its price differed from $6, a sure profit would be possible. For example, if 
K = $10 the above hedge would yield an additional cash flow of $12 in period 1 and 
would experience no further gain or loss in the second period.
4.5.2 Stochastic dynamics of the debt-servicing capacity
This appendix is designed to explain the basic assumption about the stochastic 
dynamics governing the debtors' debt-servicing capacity and the implications of that 
assumption for the expected value and the variance of the level and logarithm of that 
capacity.^  ^ This is needed for the actual derivation of the pricing formula in the next 
appendix and also helps to understand the characteristics of the assumed stochastic 
process.
Our exposition follows partly the example o f Dixit (1992).
142
We follow recent studies in the sovereign debt literature and assume that the debt- 
servicing capacity can be described as a geometric Brownian motion/^ A Brownian 
motion^ is a continuous-time stochastic process that can be understood (approximately) 
as the cumulation of independent identically distributed increments. Namely, it can be 
obtained from a symmetric random walk by increasing the number of unit steps to the 
limit. The geometric Brownian motion is a variation of such a process, its characteristics 
being that it is not the absolute but the relative (percentage) changes that are independent 
identically distributed. Consider that the debt-servicing capacity, K^ , follows such a 
geometric Brownian motion process, being described by the following stochastic 
differential:
dKj/Kj = pdt + odW, with > 0 , A.(l)
where the parameter \x represents the drift coefficient and a  the diffusion parameter, and 
Wt the standardized Brownian motion (Wiener process) whose increment dW, is normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance dt, and is assumed to start in zero, Wq = 0. 
Equivalently, p measures the instantaneous rate of change of and a the volatility of the 
rate of change in K^ . More formally.
p = lim — B 
h-o h
[ K t . h - K ,
= lim — Var 
h-o h
K,
Kt.h
A.(2)
Kt
Equation A.(l) can be transformed to obtain the stochastic differential of the 
logarithm of the debt-servicing capacity, InK^ . Let f(Kt) = InK^ . Using Itô's Lemma, the 
following equation is obtained:
® See also footnote 22 in the text of subsection 4.3.2.
^ The Brownian motion is the most renowned, and historically the first stochastic process that was investigated in 
depth. It is named after the Enghsh botanist, Robert Brown, who in 1827 observed that small particles immersed in a 
hquid exhibited ceaseless irregular motion. The theory of Brownian motion was given a rigorous mathematical 
formulation by Norbert Wiener in his 1918 dissertation and in later papers. This is why the Brownian motion is also 
called the Wiener process. The first appUcation of Brownian motion in economics was made by Louis Bacheher in his 
dissertation "Théorie de la spéculation" in 1900. In the early 1970s, Merton, in a series o f papers, established the use 
of stochastic ceilculus as a tool in financial economics. See Palgrave (1992).
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df(K,) = tiK,f'(K,)dK, + a% V 2f'(K ,)d t . ^.(3)
Since f  (K^ ) = l/K  ^ and f"(K )^ = - the stochastic differential of InK^  can be 
written as follows:
dlnK, = ( | J i  -  o^/2)dt + odW, . A.(4)
Thus, while follows the geometric Brownian motion, InK^  follows the ordinary 
Brownian motion. Suppose follows the process described in A.(l) and starts at t = 0 
in the known position Kq. We know that InK^  follows the Brownian motion as described 
in A.(4). Then at any positive time t, InK^  is normally distributed with mean (InKg + (p - 
a/2) t) and variance oh:
InKj = In Kg + (p  -  a /2) t  + aW^ . A.(5)
By assumption, the dates of maturity of the debt are located at discrete intervals. 
Consequently we are interested in the evolvement of InK, between these intervals. From 
the above equation we obtain the stochastic equation in differences which is as follows:
InKj = lnKj_j^  + (p  -  o^/2)h + ow^ , A.(6)
where h denotes any discrete time interval and w, is defined as (W* - W .^J. These 
increments w, are independent random variables characterized by a normal distribution 
with mean zero and variance h. Consequently, the expected value and conditional variance 
of InK^ , respectively, are given as follows:
E [ln K ,|ln K ,J  = + (n  -  oV 2)h , A.(7)
Var,,^lnK, = o^h . A.(8)
While InK^  is normally distributed, is lognormally distributed. Transforming
A.(4), the value of at any time t, t > 0, can be expressed in terms of its starting value 
as follows:
K, = V
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Equivalently, the value o f  the debt-servicing capacity at time t viewed from time 
(t - h) can be written as follows:
K, = K,.,e (ji - oV2)h * a A.(IO)
Given w  ^ N(0,h), the expected value and variance o f  can be obtained using 
well-known formulae for the expected values and variances o f  lognormally distributed 
variables/^ They are given as follows:
E[K, IK,.J = , A .(ll)
Var[K,lK,J = -  1) . A.(12)
Thus, p can be interpreted as the average rate o f  change o f  the debt-servicing 
capacity and as the volatility o f  the rate o f  change o f  that capacity. Since we have 
assumed that the debt instruments become due exactly after one period, we can set h = 1. 
Under these circumstances the expected value and variance o f  the debt-servicing capacity 
at time t + 1, viewed from time t, can be written as follows:
E[K,,, |K,] = K,e<i* - = K,e" , ^.(13)
Var[K„i |K,] = -  1) . ^.(14)
For X~N(m,s^) , E [e*] = * ‘/2 v«[x] ^ .  s’/2
and Var[e^] = E[e* -  e®™f = e ^ ( e “' -  1)
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4.5.3 Algebraic derivation of the premium rate formula
This appendix explains how the formula for the fair premium for export credit 
insurance is obtained. In order to obtain such explicit formula we have to make two 
important assumptions; namely, that the insurer is risk neutral and that the debtor 
country's debt-servicing capacity follows a geometric Brownian motion. As a result the 
fair premium, that is the one which makes the contract a zero expected profit transaction, 
can be expressed in terms o f  its discounted expected (negative) pay-offs as follows:
P,=e-'E, max< 0, D1*1 L\ Dt+i
t+1
A.(15)
where n  ^ is the probability o f  default in period t + 1  viewed from period t. Considering 
the stochastic dynamics o f  K ,^ as explained in the previous appendix (see particularly 
A.(6)), this probability is given as follows:
= prob{Kj,i <
= probflnK^ i^ -< InD^ j^}
= prob{lnK^ i^ -< InNJ
= p ro b fln K t + ji -  o ^ / 2  + < lu N J  A.(16)
InN^  - InKj - p + a^/l)
= prob -<
ln(K,/N,) + -  aV2
a
where 0 (  ) denotes the standard normal distribution function
0(o))  = J <|)(v)dv ,
1 'Twith density (|)(w) =  e
v/5^
A.(17)
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The expected loss, conditional on the event of default, is as follows:
r / -  K i ]
= E.
L\
= 1 -  E
" ■ h " '
[K... , K,., ^ N,1
= 1 - 5
N.
e"E
K, ' K, K,
i^nK,,, -taK, I  ^ < lnN,-lnK,]
l^i-er^ /2 tiro, |  ^ +(, w, < ln(N,/K,)]
ln(K,/N,) + n
A.(18)
1 w. -< -
w ith  T] = p  -  0^ /2  ,
where A.(4) has been used. The expected value of 6**“* on the condition that
G)j -  ( ln ( K j /N j )  + T ] ) /o  can be calculated using standard algebra. Namely, it is
given as follows:
00,1  ln(Kj/Nj)+Ti
e  ' | w ,  -c ----------------------------
$
ln(K,/N,)+ n +0^ 2 ''
$
ln(K,/N,) + (I -aV2^
. A.(19)
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Thus,
and
a
L\ D
t+1
t+1 N.
( ln(K,/N,) + ^ + oV2'^
A.(20)
Pt=e"^
2,o\ln(K,/N,) + n - o V 2
-e*' — $  
N. V
ln(K,/N,) + (i + aV2'' A.(21)
which is contained in section 4.3.4 as equation (14).
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4.5.4 The premium surcharges data for 1993^ "^
Algeria 3.15 Equat. Guinea 0.37 Panama 2.35
Argentina 6.00 Ethiopia 2.10 Papua N.Guinea 1.05
Bangladesh 1.24 Fiji 1.60 Paraguay 1.24
Barbados 0.90 Gabon 1.60 Peru 1.42
Belize 0.37 Ghana 0.37 Philippines 1.24
Benin 1.24 Grenada 1.24 Poland 3.50
Bhutan 0.37 Guatemala 1.24 Romania 1.24
Bolivia 1.24 Honduras 2.55 Rwanda 0.37
Brazil 1.24 Hungary 1.05 Sao Tome 1.24
Burkina Faso 1.24 India 1.24 Senegal 1.24
Burundi 0.37 Indonesia 0.37 Seychelles 0.90
Cameroon 1.60 Jamaica 1.24 Solomon Isld. 0.37
Cape Verde 1.24 Kenya 0.90 Sri Lanka 1.60
Ctl- Africa 1.24 Lesotho 0.37 StKitts Nevis 1.05
Chad 1.24 Madagascar 1.60 St. Lucia 1.24
Chile 0.37 Malawi 1.24 St. Vincent 1.05
China 0.25 Malaysia 0.00 Swaziland 1.42
Colombia 0.37 Maldives 0.37 Tailand 0.37
Comoros 0.37 Mali 1.60 Togo 1.42
Congo 1.60 Malta 0.00 Tunisia 0.70
Costa Rica 1.24 Mauritania 1.24 Turkey 1.42
Côte d'Ivoire 1.60 Mauritius 0.37 Uruguay 0.37
Cyprus 0.00 Mexico 1.24 Vanuatu 0.37
Czechosl. 0.00 Nepal 0.37 Venezuela 1.24
Dominica 1.24 Niger 1.24 West.Samoa 0.37
Ecuador 1.24 Nigeria 3.15
Egypt 1.24 Pakistan 1.24
Source: Jardine Credit Insurance Ltd.
(a) Premium surcharges in per cent of amount insured.
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4.5.5 Scatter plots of selected variables
Scatter plot of debt-servîce ratio (DS), Its volatility (V), and premium surcharges (PS)
PS
0.170
0.114
0.058 V0.684
0.456
0.228
0.000DS
Scatter plot of reserves/im ports ratio (R), Its volatility (V), and prem. surcharges (PS)
PS
0.280
0.187
0.093 V0.99
0.66
0.33
0.00
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4.5.6 The insurance premium rate and the spread
This appendix is designed to show that the concept of the premium rate could be 
applied to the spread as well. The basic idea is that the interest rate spread and the 
insurance premium rate are both risk premia, which are analogous under specific 
circumstances. The idea is similar to the one which has been expressed by Galiani already 
in 1750. Namely, in his justification of the presence of an interest rate on credits, he 
presented the following argument. Since a credit is exposed to the danger of default, 
the interest rate associated with that credit represents a form of an insurance premium. As 
he puts it, the interest rate might be more properly called the price of insurance (prezzo 
delV assicurazione). It should be noted that Galiani referred to the total interest rate, i.e. 
he did not differentiate between a risk-free interest rate and the risk premium. By contrast, 
we distinguish between them and describe a situation where the latter is analogous to the 
price of the insurance of a debt instrument, that is the insurance premium. Thus,our 
approach and the one by Galiani would be identical only in situations where the risk-free 
interest rate is equal to zero.
The spread s^  can be defined, as explained in section 3.2, of chapter 3, as the 
differential between the yield of a defaultable debt instrument and the one of a 
(benchmark) default-free debt instrument. Let denote the nominal value of the former 
instrument by B, and the nominal value of the latter one by R, then the spread is given 
as St = bt - r, where bt is the nominal yield of the defaultable and r the yield of the 
default-free debt instrument.Now, consider the following two alternative investment 
strategies in a world where all arbitrage opportunities are exhausted:
1. The purchase of a default-free debt instrument at price R = e'\ This gives the safe 
return of one at the date of maturity of that debt instrument.
“ Galiani, Libro V - Del Frutto della Moneta (1750, pp. 249-259).
Again, it is assumed that all debt instruments are in die form of zero-coupon bonds with a maturity o f one period 
and a face value of one.
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2. The purchase of a portfolio consisting of a defaultable debt instrument at price B = e'"^  
and of a complete insurance of that debt instrument at price p,. This portfolio gives the 
safe return of one at the date of maturity of that debt instrument.
Since the returns of the two alternative investment strategies are identical, the 
absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that their prices are also identical. Thus the 
following must hold:
R = B, + p, . A.(22)
Dividing equation (22) by R and rearranging yields
e  ^ = (1 -  p^e') . A.(23)
Taking the logarithm of equation (23) and multiplying through by (-1), an
expression of the spread is obtained, i.e.
Sj = bj -  r = - ln ( l  -  pjC^) . A.(24)
Thus, it has been shown that, under specific circumstances, the spread s^  can be
expressed as a function of the premium rate p. The function is continuous and monotonie. 
In the following chapter the spread is analyzed, where use is made of a similar approach 
than the one explained in the present chapter.
152
Chapter 5: Seniority Rules and the Valuation of Public and Private Foreign Debt
5.1 Introduction
In general, the countries in transformation which have maintained access to the 
international capital markets, including Hungary and the Czech Republic, continue to use 
this source of external finance to a considerable extent. To date almost all such borrowing 
is done by public entities but not by private ones, the latter being discouraged by the 
prevalence of restrictive legal conditions.' This chapter describes aspects of a regime 
where both public and private entities from the same country issue debt on the 
international capital markets, and when debt owed by the public sector is serviced with 
priority over the debt owed by the private sector, i.e. official debt is senior to private 
debt.  ^ Thus, this chapter is designed to contribute to the understanding of the 
consequences resulting from a further liberalization of the foreign borrowing regime in 
these countries.^
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The following section 
provides an overview of the current practices of major debt rating agencies and their 
impact on the cost of debt finance. It also discusses the rating practices applied to 
sovereign debtors versus private debtors. A key feature is that the rating of sovereign debt
‘ At the time of writing, only two countries had liberalized their foreign borrowing regime considerably, namely 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Commercial banks in Hungary were allowed to enter into deferred payment 
arrangements on behalf of their clients without restrictions for up to one year, but for deferred payment over one year, 
permission &om the National Bank of Hungary was required. Czechoslovakian enterprises and entrepreneurs were 
allowed to freely obtain suppliers credits while buyers' credits could only be obtained with the approval of the countries' 
State Bank. Private enterprises or banks from the two countries were not allowed to issue bonds on the international 
capital markets. See IMF, Exchange Arrangements, 1993.
 ^The reader may be unfamiliar with this definition of seniority. The standard one refers to the ranking of claims 
of various debtors with respect to payments made by the debtor in the case that it does not meet all its debt obligations 
in full. See also next footnote.
 ^ This chapter provides a framework for a comparative static analysis of the valuation of debt and the costs of 
external finance associated with different borrowing regimes. There exists some related theoretical literature on that 
subject. Eaton (1987) investigates the behaviour of private capital in the debtor country when all foreign debt of that 
country is either public or publicly guaranteed. Other studies address explicitly aspects related to the seniority ranking 
between different types of foreign debt, i.e. debt owed to official and to private creditors (Bartolini and Dixit (1989)) 
or between public foreign and public domestic debt (Dooley and Stone (1992)).
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is the ceiling for the ratings of private debtors of the same country because sovereign debt 
is generally regarded as senior to private debt. Furthermore, it briefly analyses the spread 
in private and public bond issues from developing countries during the period from 1989 
to mid-1992. One important finding therefrom is that the weighted average spread of 
debtor countries' foreign bonds are lowest for those countries with exclusively official 
debt, i.e. with centralized government borrowing. In section 5.3, a model of spread 
determination is developed that is able to capture the effects of seniority and that agrees 
with the empirical observations explained in the section 5.2. The model is based on the 
widely used rescheduling model of Claessens /van Wijnbergen (1990) which is explained 
in section 4.3.3, of chapter 4. It yields closed-form expressions for the spreads on public 
and private foreign debt, where we assume that the former is senior to the latter. The 
major implications of the model are:
(i) Private (junior) debt is more expensive than public (senior) debt.
(ii) The costs of issuing private debt rise both with an increasing stock of private 
debt and an increasing stock of public debt. A key result of the model is that the 
external effect of public debt on the costs of private debt is considerably more 
significant than the effect of private debt on its own costs.
(iii) The average spread of external borrowing for a country is a non-monotonic 
function of the share of public borrowing. The minimum spread is obtained for 
either a 0 percent or 100 percent public share. Points between these extremes lead 
to higher spreads.
Section 5.4 considers an extension of the theoretical model to account for bankruptcy of 
private debtors and inefficiency of public debt. The modifications generate the following 
additional results:
(iv) The relation between the spread costs of external financing and the 
government debt share depends on the country's debt-servicing capacity. For 
example, for relatively low and intermediate values of debt-servicing capacity, the
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relation between the weighted average spread, on the one hand, and the share of 
public debt, on the other, resembles that of a "laffer curve"/ It has an absolute 
maximum and decreases monotonically from that point when the public debt share 
is either increased or decreased.
(v) The average value of a country's total external debt and its maximum 
disbursement obtained from issuing debt depend on the share of public debt in a 
non-monotonic way.
5.2 Debt rating and the costs of debt finance
The present chapter is concerned with the valuation of foreign debt when two types 
of debt exist, namely senior and junior debt. By senior and junior we mean that senior 
debt is serviced with priority over the junior debt in the case when the total debt-service 
demands cannot be met in full. Provided that the government has control over all foreign 
exchange transactions, it can exert discretion over debt-servicing flows and direct foreign 
exchange reserves, giving priority to the servicing of the public and publicly guaranteed 
debt over the servicing of private debt.
The view that there exists these two types of debt has been questioned in the 
theoretical literature. For example, in his analysis of public debt guarantees and private 
capital flight, Eaton (1987) assumes that all foreign debt of developing countries is public 
or publicly guaranteed debt. Even when there is no explicit public guarantee for the 
private debt, lenders will successfully hold governments accountable for the debts of that 
country's private borrowers so that the private debt is de facto publicly guaranteed. An
* The laffer carve was first used as an expository device that illustrates one aspect of how changes in taxation could 
affect behaviour. It is an inverted U and illustrates the proposition that any given amount of revenue can be obtained 
with a high tax rate on a small tax base or a low tax rate on a large tax base. Movement along the inverted U fiom left 
to right to the apex reaches the revenue-maximizing rate. Beyond that point, revenues fall off as rates rise. The origins 
of the laffer curve are unclear. It is often credited to Art Laffer who supposedly drew the curve on a napkin in a 
restaurant in Washington. EarUer in 1971, however, the Journal o f Political Economy (JPE 79, 1971, pp.l 105-1118) 
pubhshed an article by Boulakia about Ibn Khaldun, a 14th-century Arab who had stated the Laffer curve relationship.
155
example which provides support for this view is Chile in 1983/ In contrast to other 
developing countries borrowers, a large share of pre-1982 capital inflows to Chile went 
directly to private banks and companies. Even though the Chilean government explicitly 
rejected to guarantee foreign loans to the countries private debtors, foreign creditors did 
eventually not accept the separation of private and public debt. They demanded and 
received payment from the government when private banks became insolvent. This meant 
that effectively the private debt had an implicit government guarantee.
However, there is no evidence to believe that this is a common feature of private 
debt of developing countries or those in transformation. In practice it is almost taken as 
an axiom that public and publicly guaranteed debt is senior to private non guaranteed 
debt. This view is reflected in the debt rating system of the major rating agencies, such 
as Moody's and Standard and Poors (S&P). These regard a country's sovereign rating as 
the ceiling for the rating of companies from that country, except for stmctured issues such 
as securitized receivables which provide an independent debt-servicing capability outside 
that country.^ These ratings consist of the assignment of a debt instrument to one out of 
a number of categories, according to the perceived riskiness of that instrument. For 
example, as Moody's puts it, category Aaa includes bonds of which the "principal is 
secure and interest payment is protected by a large or exceptionally stable margin whereas 
category B includes those bonds which lack characteristics of the desirable investment."^
These ratings have a bearing on the access and the costs of borrowing of the 
(rated) debtor. For example, international institutional investors regularly set themselves 
minimum ratings below which they do not invest as illustrated in the graph below.
’ See Diaz-Alejandro (1985),
* This holds for foreign currency debt but not for debt denominated in local currency. However, recently smaller 
rating agencies such as Fitch have assigned some Latin American private borrowers a better rating than the sovereign 
one for their country.
 ^ See table 5.3 in the appendix for the definition of the categories of Moody's debt ratings.
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Figure 5.1: The minimum ratings of institutional investors
AA (48.5%)
AAA (0.3%)
BB (3.3%)
A (41.5%)
Source: Euromoney (September, 1991)
The above graph illustrates that 90% of institutional investors do not invest at all 
in bonds that have a rating below single A. Other investors, including retail investors, 
generally follow less restrictive investment strategies and consider the whole spectrum of 
rated bonds; however, they require, like institutional investors, lower rated bonds to offer 
higher yield spreads. Consequently, the costs of issuing debt are higher the lower the 
rating of the debt instrument. This is illustrated in the table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Estimated average yield spread on rated bonds 
(spreads over Aaa, in % per year)
Moody's rating S&F rating Average spread
Aa AA 0.25%
A A 0.45%
Baa BBB 2.00%
Ba BB 3.50%
B B 8.00%
Caa CGC n.a.
Source: Bond (1992)
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In sum, the major rating agencies regard a country's sovereign (or public) rating 
as the ceiling for the one which is assigned to the debt instruments issued by private 
entities from that country. Consequently, the latter is generally associated with higher 
costs than the former. The remainder of this section presents further findings from the 
analysis of developing countries' private and public bond issues on international capital 
markets between 1989 and mid-1992. During this period, 18 developing countries have 
raised finance from that source, seven of which through both public (and sovereign) and 
private issues and ten exclusively through public (and sovereign) issues. One country, i.e. 
Czechoslovakia, raised finance exclusively through public bonds in 1990 and 1991, but 
through private bonds as well in 1992. For 11 of the mentioned 18 countries, spread data 
is available (see table 5.4 in the appendix). The data show the following:
(i) The weighted annual average spread in private external bonds* is mostly, but 
not always,^ higher than the weighted annual average spread in public external 
bonds of the same country (see figure 5.2). In some cases the private spread is 
considerably higher than the public one (Mexico 1991 and 1992, Venezuela 1990 
and 1991, Brazil 1991).
(ii) In the cases when a country has no private external debt, its annual 
average spread is generally lower than in the cases when a country has 
both private and public foreign debt. For example, a country's weighted 
annual average spread, defined as the weighted average of its private and 
public issues during that year, ranges between 67 and 281 basis points in 
the former cases and between 190 and 814 basis points in the latter cases.
The mean value of the weighted annual average spread is 152 basis points 
in the former cases, and 362 basis points in the latter cases. Thus the mean 
spread of cases with exclusively public foreign borrowing is significantly
 ^External bonds include both foreign and international bonds; i.e. all bonds which are issued on other markets than 
the domestic one.
’ Exceptions include Argentina in 1992, Mexico in 1989, and Turkey in 1989, where the anniial average spread in 
private borrowing was shghtly lower than the one in pubhc issues.
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lower than the one of cases with a mixed regim e.Figure 5.3 shows the 
weighted annual average spreads.
(iii) For some of the countries with both private and public external 
borrowing, a decrease in the government share in the economy's total 
external debt was accompanied by a decrease in the average spread on 
external borrowing (Mexico and India); however, for other countries of that 
group there appeared to be no such relation (Turkey and Venezuela).
(iv) The ratio of public debt over GNP decreased in several countries 
during the observation period. In the cases of Mexico between 1989 and 
1992, Venezuela between 1990 and 1991, and Argentina between 1991 and 
1992, such a reduction was associated with a decrease in the annual 
average spread in private issues (see figure 5.4). By contrast, the case of 
Turkey between 1989 and 1992 is an example where such reduction was 
associated with an increase in this spread.
The following sections present a theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
observed relations.
A small-sample test was used which compares the means of two normal populations that posses equal variances 
(see Mendenhall et al. (1986, pp. 407-408)). It suggested that the means are different at the 1% level of significance. 
The test statistics obtained was 3.99, and thus greater than the critical value for the 1% level of significance, which is 
2.80 (i.e. for a total number of observations of 26).
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Figure 5.2: The spread on private and public bonds of countries with both private
and public external foreign borrowing
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Figure 5.3: The weighted average spread of countries with public external debt 
only and with both public and private external debt
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Figure 5.4: Plot of public debt over GNP against the spread in private bonds
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5.3 Seniority and the costs of external finance
5.3.1 The Costs of Private and Public External Finance
In this section, a model of spread determination is developed that is able to capture 
the effects of seniority and explain the observations discussed in the previous section.
Denote the stocks of official and private debt by and F,, respectively, and 
assume that all debt has the form of continuously compounded zero-coupon bonds with 
a maturity of one period and a face value of 1 foreign currency unit per bond. The sum 
F( + Gt then denotes the total stock of bonds issued by borrowers in the country as well 
as the country's total debt service due in period t + 1. Insolvency in period t + 1 occurs 
if the country's debt service due exceeds its (stochastic) debt-servicing capacity in that 
period,
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F, + G, > K,.i , (1)
the stochastic dynamics of being conventionally approximated by a Geometric 
Brownian motion.
The stylized rescheduling model of Claessens/van Wijnbergen (1990), which is 
introduced in the previous chapter, assumes that under insolvency a country receives debt 
relief in the amount of the difference between its debt service due and its debt-servicing 
capacity. The country's actual aggregate debt service payments are as follows:
-
F, + G, if F, + G, i  •
K i  if F. + G, > K,,, .
(2)
This pay-off schedule is depicted by the row of bars in the background in figures 
5.5a and 5.5b.
Consider that public bonds are senior to private bonds, meaning that the former 
are serviced with priority over the latter. The pay-off schedule of senior public bonds is 
then as follows:
A.° = <
G, if G,  ^ K,., . 
K i  if G, > K,.. .
(3)
Figure 5.5a shows that this pay-off schedule is qualitatively the same as (1) albeit 
reduced and shifted to the left by the amount of private bonds. The pay-off schedule of 
junior private bonds is more complicated:
F, if F, + G,  ^K,,, ,
K i  -  G, if G, ^ K.^, < F, + G, ,
0 ifK ,., ^ G , .
(4)
0,5
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Figure 5.5a: Actual debt service and the debt-servicing capacity 
(relative share of public foreign debt 50%)
Debt service
Debt service capacity  
I i Private Government Total
Figure 5.5b: Actual debt service and the debt-servicing capacity 
(relative share of public foreign debt 75%)
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The key differences between the pay-off schedules of junior private bonds and 
senior public bonds are as follows. If private bonds are serviced at all, either fully or 
partially, then public bonds are necessarily serviced fully. Conversely, if public bonds are 
not serviced in full, payment on private bonds has ceased completely.
How would risk-neutral investors value these two types of bonds? In answering 
this question first a univariate approach, as in Claessens and van Wijnbergen (1990), will 
be taken. Let r denote the risk-free interest rate. Then R = e " is the price of a risk-free 
bond with a maturity of one period and a face value of unity. Under risk neutrality, the 
value of a government bond is the discounted present value of its expected pay-off at 
maturity,
Z,° = RE,[a,?,] , (5)
where E,[-] is the expectations operator, and at+,° = I Q  denotes the pay-off per 
bond. With similar notation the valuation formula for a private bond is:
z," = RE,[a,!,] . (6)
Using the assumptions about the stochastic dynamics of K,, the explicit valuation 
formulae can then be calculated." For senior public bonds it is:
Z,° = R
K
*(ai) + -  ®(a, + o)]
(7)
ln(K,/G,) + p -  oV2 
with = ------  — -------------------
” These assumptions are explained in chapter 4. The notation used in the present chapter follows the one used in 
that chapter.
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For junior private bonds it is:
= R Gt K,-  —  [ 0 ( a i )  -  ^ ( a ^ ) ]  + e»* — [ 0 ( a ^  +  a )  -  (a ^  +  o ) ]
t
ln(K,/(F, 4- G,)) + p -  aV2 
w ith  a^ = --------  — ---------    .
(8)
The above valuation formulae show that the two types of bonds are priced 
differently. By assumption, the bonds (including the riskless alternative) are zero-coupon 
bonds, i.e.
Z," = e"'-’ , Z,° = e"''” , R = e-' ,
SO that their yields can be written as follows:
z,’’ = -InZ,*', Zt° = -lnZ,° . r = -InR . 0®)
Using equations (7) to (10) the following statement can be made. Since junior 
private bonds are priced lower than senior public bonds, the yield of the former is higher 
than the yield of the latter provided that G is positive:
> T.
5.3.2 The share of public and publicly guaranteed debt
This subsection is concerned with the implications for the country's costs of 
external finance of different allocations between private and public external borrowing, 
the model developed above being used as the theoretical basis.
To begin with, we look at the costs of private external finance. A key implication 
of the valuation formulae found above is that - at a constant stock of total debt (and other 
things equal) - the value of private debt falls as the relative share of government bonds 
increases. This is equivalent to saying that the disbursement obtained from issuing private 
bonds decreases with an increasing relative share of public foreign debt.
165
Proposition 1: The more external debt the government issues, the more expensive external 
finance becomes for private debtors.
Proof: Consider two alternative situations characterized by different shares of public 
external debt, and « h, with 0 d 1, all other things being identical. Now
consider the pay-off of a private bond in the two alternative situations. The pay-off 
function (4) implies that, in situations when w is equal to Wg, a private bonds' pay-off will 
be either equal to or smaller than its pay-off in situations when w is equal to Denoting 
the former by a^+/(wH) and the latter by at+i^ CcoJ, the formal representation of this 
inequality is as follows: a^+/(wH) :i at+/((i)L). The pay-offs are equal for values of 
which satisfy + G„ but smaller otherwise, i.e. if F, + G^ . Since is
lognormally distributed, the probability = prob{K  ^ F^  + G,} is strictly greater than 
zero. Thus the expected value of at+/(o)H) is strictly smaller than that of and the
price of a bond associated with the former expected pay-off, is strictly lower than
that of a bond associated with the latter expected pay-off, Z /(ù)J, i.e. Z, (^(i>h) ^ Z*^(ù)J.
The relationship between the relative share of public external debt and the value 
of a private bond is illustrated in figure 5.6. The graph illustrates that the value of private 
foreign bonds decreases with the relative share of public external debt.^  ^ This is 
equivalent to saying that the disbursement obtained from issuing one private foreign bond 
decreases with such share. For example, in the cases where the public share is greater than
0.8, the disbursement obtained from issuing private bonds goes to zero.
A different example for the same problem is provided by a situation where the 
government guarantees private debt which thus becomes senior to non-guaranteed private 
debt. Issuing non-guaranteed debt then becomes more expensive. However, the allocation 
of the country's foreign debt among its private and public sector does not affect its total 
disbursement obtained from issuing foreign debt in period t for a given level of 
contractual debt service in period t + 1,
The graph is drawn on the basis of the following numerical values: r = 0.05, p = 0.04, a  = 0.01, and the ratio 
of K, relative to D, ranging between 0.8 and 1.2.
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Figure 5.6: The relative share of public external debt 
and the costs of private external financing
'•‘■ V e
Proposition 2: The total disbursement obtained from issuing foreign debt,
, is independent from the ratio ¥JG^ •
The proof is straightforward. From (7) and (8) we have
G,Z° + F.Z,’’ = R[G,$(a^) + e % [l  -  $(a^ + a)]] +
R[F,<&(a^)-G,[0(a,)-$(a^)] +e"K,[0(a,+(,)- $(a^+a)]] (14) 
= R[(G, + P,)$(a^) + e"K,[l -  0(a^ + o)]].
From equation (8) we see that aj only contains the term G, + F„ i.e. the sum of F, and G^ . 
Thus the whole expression in (14) depends only on the sum of F, and Q  as well. This 
implies that the allocation of the economy's total outstanding debt into public and publicly
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guaranteed debt, on the one hand, and non guaranteed private debt, on the other, is 
irrelevant for the country's maximum disbursement. Equivalently, such allocation has no 
influence on the economy's total costs of external finance. This neutrality result is similar 
to the well-known Modigliani-Miller theorem which shows the irrelevance of aspects of 
a company's external financing policy in a world without taxes, transaction costs, or other 
market imperfections.
Corollary: I f  the total disbursement obtained from issuing debt is independent o f the mix 
ofprivate and public foreign debt, then the average price o f external bonds is independent 
o f that mix as well
The proof is similar to the one for proposition 2, i.e.
-  0 (a , + a)]]
Ft + Ft ^ ^
+ R[F^0 (a^ ) -  (a^ ) -  0  (a^ )] +e**K [^0(a^+o) -  Ofa^+o)]])
= Rf^Ca^) +  -----— [1 -  0(8^ + a)]] .
Ft +
However, the country's weighted average spread is not independent of the mix of 
private and public foreign debt. This is reflected in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The country's weighted average spread is minimal when the share o f  
public debt is either 0 or 1. Intermediate shares lead to higher spreads.
The proof draws on the above corollary. It will be explained in two steps.
First Step: Define a synthetic average bond (i.e. the weighted average of private and 
public bonds ) and denote its price by and its spread by Recall that +Q = D*, 
where D, is the given level of total external debt. Set F^  = Dj. The value of the average 
bond Zf""  ^ is then identical with the average value of private bonds Z^ because the share 
of public bonds is zero. Then set 0  ^= D,. The value of the average bond, is then
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identical with the average value of public bonds Z°. Comparing 7^  as in (8), evaluated 
at = D( (or G, = 0), with Z° as in (7), evaluated at G, = D, (or = 0) shows that
^ F ,P ,.D , ^  ^ 0 .0 , .D ,  ^  ^ A v g  _ (16)
which implies
- I n  Z , ' - " ' - " '  -  r  = - I n  -  r  = - I n  -  t  . d ? )
This can be rewritten as an expression in spreads:
 ^  ^ ^0.0,-D,  ^  ^ (18)
Thus, for relative shares of public debt of either 0 or 1, the spread of the (synthetical) 
average bond is identical to the average spread on external bonds.
Second step: It will be shown that, for intermediate shares of public foreign debt, the 
average spread is higher than the spread of a (synthetical) average bond, This follows 
directly from the convexity of the spread-transformation, i.e.
=  - I n  Z , - '’ * -  r  
=  - I n
F .+ G , F ,+ G ,
-  r
(19)
= a v e r a g e  s p r e a d  .
The characteristics of convex functions is that the functional value of the weighted 
average of arguments is lower than the similarly weighted average of the functional values 
of these arguments. Applying this idea to the spread, the following statement holds. The 
spread of a (synthetical) average bond is lower than the average spread of the two 
individual bonds.
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5.4 Public debt inefficiency and private debt default sunk costs
So far the valuation of official and private debt was based on the assumption that 
the risks associated with the two types of debt instruments are identical except for the 
seniority ranking. However, private debt, unlike public debt, is in general not only subject 
to a political but also commercial risk^^ i.e. the former is characterized by a different 
type of risk than the latter. Another important aspect that has been ignored so far is that 
the country's debt-servicing capacity may depend on the allocation of debt between the 
private and public sector. For example, it has been argued that public debt may be 
associated with some kind of efficiency loss so that a country's debt-servicing capacity 
would be reduced as a result of public debt. These two aspects have often been mentioned 
in discussions about the liberalization of the foreign debt regime. This section incorporates 
them into the present theoretical model.
5.4.1 The risk of bankruptcy of individual borrowers
To the extent that private debt is not publicly guaranteed, the two types of debt, 
i.e. private and public debt, are associated with different risks of default. An important 
difference is that the costs of default are likely to be higher in private than in public debt. 
There are various reasons for this, two of which are singled out for special attention. To 
the extent that there exist some fixed (transaction) costs of default, such costs may be 
higher if there are a number of (private) debtors involved than if there is just one single 
(public) debtor. Such transaction costs include the costs of communication, travelling, 
information gathering, etc.. They are likely to be particularly high for international debt 
because for such debt, unlike for domestic one, there exists no bankruptcy legislation. This 
may induce the creditors to use some of their resources to secure their claims against 
those of other creditors ("grab race"). Another argument has been brought forward by 
Winkler (1933, p.11) in his classical account of foreign bond lending: "Since time
" These categories of risks are distinguished in the practice of export credit insurance. See also section 6.2.1.
Another explanation of the differences in risks between these two types of debt refers to the willingness-to-pay 
aspect. Namely, international lenders may have no penalties at their disposal which deters an individual borrower 
because they have only penalties to invoke against a country as a whole, the effect of which potentially being negUgible 
at the level of that individual borrower. See Eaton (1987).
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immemorial the state appears to have been the most popular debtor. Its ability and 
capacity to meet payments were always regarded as superior to those of individuals or 
private corporations. The reason resides in all probability in the fact that corporate entities 
may disappear, in which case their obligations become valueless. The same is true of 
individuals. Governments, on the other hand, stay on forever." This does not mean that 
governments do not default, but that the probability that a country disappears is almost 
equal to zero, whereas the probability that a company disappears is significantly different 
from zero. In other words, the risk of a complete loss to the creditor is higher with private 
than with public debt.
A possible way to model this feature would be to follow an approach along the 
lines of Merton (1976). Let all debt be private non-guaranteed debt, the possibility of a 
complete ruin of debt could be modelled by specifying a stochastic process for the debt- 
servicing capacity which includes a "jump component" in the form of a Poisson process 
in addition to the standard Brownian motion. In particular, each time the Poisson event 
occurs, the value of the debt-servicing capacity goes immediately to zero (immediate 
ruin).’^  Merton (1976) has shown that under specific assumptions, i.e. the assumption of 
immediate complete ruin and that of risk neutrality, one could obtain a closed-form 
solution for the value of debt instruments and options written on them. For example, the 
value of a put option on such a debt instrument is almost identical with the value of the 
commonly analyzed put option, where the underlying asset follows the standard Brownian 
motion, except that the former would be characterized by a larger interest rate,
i.e. r = r + A as opposed to r for the latter, with X denoting the mean number of events 
(immediate ruins) per unit of time. This approach appears not to be helpful for the present 
problem because it would require us to specify two different debt-servicing capacities, i.e. 
one for private and another one for public debtors. This would not be compatible with our 
definition of the debt-servicing capacity and it would run against several conceptual 
problems, including the one of the interaction among the two. The analysis would become 
very complicated. Thus, the following alternative to represent the possibility of a complete 
and immediate ruin of private debt is suggested here.
" This particular assumption about the "jump" is necessary to obtain closed-form solutions. More generally, the 
direction and size of the "jump" would be a stochastic variable.
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Assume that in case of default on a private bond, the transaction costs of any 
renegotiation would be so high that effectively the value of the bond is identical to zero. 
In other words, default on a private bond is associated with default costs of 100%.*  ^
Thus, the pay-off schedules of a private bond changes to the following.
a ,!i = '
0 if F, + G, > K,,, .
The valuation of such a bond is straightforward; its discounted present value is 
given as the product of its face value and the probability that no default occurs:
Z," = R®(3j) . (21)
The value of the above private bond is lower than the one of a private bond 
without default sunk costs. The value of a public bond is unaffected. Thus the weighted 
average value of private and public foreign debt is lower with sunk costs than without 
them, provided private debt is positive. The implications of such default costs for the 
weighted average value of external debt are illustrated in figures 5.7 and 5.8. Figure 5.7 
shows the case where there are no default costs in private debt. It illustrates the point 
made in the corollary to proposition 2; namely, that in the absence of any default costs, 
the average price of debt is independent of the mix of private and public foreign debt. 
Figure 5.8 shows the case when there are such costs. It illustrates that the disbursement 
depends on w, the share of public debt in total external debt. The following proposition 
can be formulated.
Proposition 4: The presence o f 100% sunk default costs in private bonds implies that the 
country's disbursement is not independent o f the relative share o f public debt. The 
disbursement is maximal when this share is equal to 1.
This is assumed for analytical convenience. The qualitative results do not change if another percentage, i.e. lower 
than 100%, is assumed, as long as the default costs are strictly greater with private than with public debt.
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Proof: The benchmark situation is one where there are no private debt sunk default costs, 
so that the disbursement is independent of the relative share of public debt (as shown in 
the proof to proposition 2). Consider a situation in which such costs exist, and all other 
things are equal to the above benchmark situation. The value of a public bond Z,^  
remains unaffected, since the bonds' pay-off is the same as in the benchmark situation. 
By contrast, the pay-off from a private bond is either equal to, or, in the case of a default, 
smaller than in the benchmark situation. Since the probability of a default is positive, the 
price of a private bond in the presence of private bond sunk default costs, Z,^ ' ^  is 
strictly lower than the price of a private bond in the absence of such costs, Z/. Thus the 
total disbursement is strictly lower than in the benchmark situation, provided that F, is 
positive, i.e. F, Z j ' + GZ° -< F, Z/ + The additional costs are monotonically 
increasing in F, and are minimal when the relative share of private foreign debt is equal 
to zero, i.e. when o) = 1.
Figure 5.7: The average value of foreign debt without private debt default costs 
(debt-servicing capacity relative to contractual debt service)
FZ'^  + GZ^
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Figure 5.8: The average value of foreign debt with private debt default costs 
(debt-servicing capacity relative to contractual debt service)
FZ^  + GZ^
m
7C
5.4.2 Public debt inefficiency
It has been suggested in the literature that public debt is associated with some kind 
of efficiency loss. The existence of such losses has been justified by incentive effects. For 
example, consider the possibility that foreign public debt does not directly benefit private 
investors, because it is used for government consumption and that investors anticipate 
higher tax obligations from the government's need to raise the resources for its debt 
service. As a result they either reduce their domestic investment (Helpman (1989b)) or 
place their funds abroad (capital flight, Eaton (1987)). Both measures reduce the country's 
debt-servicing capacity - in the case of capital flight in the short-run and in the case of 
an investment reduction in the medium- or long-run.
This subsection introduces the assumption that public debt is associated with 
efficiency losses that reduce the debtor country's debt-servicing capacity. More
An alternative explanation for the reduction in the debt-servicing capacity due to pubhc debt could be that there 
are frictional costs involved in the process of tax collection and administration by the government.
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specifically, it is assumed that these losses are a monotonically increasing function of the 
share of public debt in total debt. Denote by C the proportional reduction of due to 
public debt inefficiency, then C = C (<*>) is a monotonically decreasing function of o) which 
maps the interval [0,1] onto itself. The pay-off schedule of senior bonds is
A,?, =< (22)
and that of junior bonds
A,!, = i
F, if P,+G,  ^ ((m)K,., .
((w)K,,, -G, if G, i  C(o)K,,i < F, + G, . 
0 if ((w)K,,, < G, .
(23)
The calculation of the valuation formulae for private and public debt is 
straightforward. They are identical to (7) and (8) except that ((w) replaces K,. To the 
extent that w > 0 and C (<*>) ^ 1, the country's disbursement obtained from issuing bonds 
is lower in the presence of the described costs than in their absence. The average value 
of foreign debt is maximal and the spread minimal when the relative public share is equal 
to zero. This is illustrated in the figures 5.9 and 5.10/*
" The figures were drawn on the basis of a cost function of the form f(<i>) = (1 - 0.2<i>)®’. The basic results 
concerning the value of foreign debt do not change when other cost functions are considered, as long as the costs are 
related to the government debt share as described before.
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Figure 5.9: The average spread with public debt inefficiency 
(debt-servicing capacity relative to contractual debt service)
average spread
'" 'It,, ••
Figure 5.10: The average value of foreign debt with public debt inefficiency 
(debt-servicing capacity relative to contractual debt service)
FZ^  + GZ"
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0.6
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5.4.3 Private debt default costs and public debt inefficiency
This subsection combines the two aspects of public debt which were dealt with 
separately in the previous two subsections. Considering both private debt default costs and 
public debt inefficiency, the pay-off schedules of senior bonds and junior bonds, 
respectively, are as follows:
G.
C(«)K,„ if G, > C(<o)K,„ ,
“  I 0 if F, + G. > C(o))K,.i .
Thus, the value of senior public bonds and junior private bonds, respectively, are 
as follows:
Z,° = R
(26)
ln(C(o>)K,/G,) + n - a V 2
with a^  = ------------ — ---------------  ;
o
Z," = R$(a^ .
ln(C(o))K,/(P,+G,)) + n - o V 2  
with a^  = -------------— -—  ---------------
(27)
The behaviour of the weighted average spread with respect to w and is 
illustrated in the figures 5.11a and 5.1 lb, the surfaces of the two graphs being identical, 
but viewed trom two different perspectives. The relation between the relative share of 
public debt and the spread resembles a laffer curve. Namely, the spread attains an absolute 
maximum at a point between the lowest and the highest value of w. Any increase or 
decrease of the public debt share fiom that value is associated with a reduction in the 
weighted average spread. The figures also illustrate that there exists no unique share of
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government debt that achieves a minimum spread for any K^ , the spread-minimizing 
allocation of foreign debt depending on the actual realization of as well. For high 
values of K^ , a minimum obtains for o) = 0, and for low values of K^ , it obtains for o) = 1. 
The following intuitive explanation for this behaviour of the spread is suggested here. If 
the debt-servicing capacity is high and thus the default probability very low, the private 
debt sunk costs in default are of little concern to the creditors. More important is that the 
public debt inefficiency raises the probability of default by reducing the debt-servicing 
capacity. Under these circumstances the spread can be minimized by reducing the public 
share to zero. Conversely, when the debt-servicing capacity is very low and thus private 
debt default likely, the costs associated with it become a primary concern of foreign 
creditors. To minimize the risk premium that they charge for the presence of these sunk 
costs, all foreign debt has to be public.
We will turn to the weighted average value of foreign debt. It is given as follows.
G ^°+F^'=R [G ,® (a3)+F,® (a^ei‘ { (« )K ,[l-* (a , + o)]] . (2»)
The following proposition can be formulated:
Proposition 5: In the presence o f sunk default costs in private debt and public debt 
inefficiency, the total disbursement from issuing debt depends on the allocation offoreign 
debt between the private and public sector in a non-monotonic way.
Thus, the proposition 2 which stated a Modigliani-Miller-like result, i.e. that the 
maximum disbursement (or average value of debt) is independent from the mix between 
private and public debt, is not longer valid. The relation between the two variables o) and 
Kj, on the one hand, and the average value of debt, on the other hand, is illustrated in 
figures 5.12a and 5.12b.’^  Figure 5.12a shows that the share of public foreign debt w, 
that is maximizing the average value of the country's external debt, varies with its debt- 
servicing capacity. The functional relation between this capacity and the value-maximizing
The two graphs differ in that the latter is drawn on the basis of a higher or, the volatility of the rate of changes 
in Kf. The surface of the latter is smoother. This reflects a phenomenon mentioned in the previous chuter, i.e. that in 
the presence of a high ct, the differences between a country with a currently high debt-servicing capacity and one with 
a currently low capacity becomes blurred.
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share of public debt is non-monotonic and discontinuous. This is illustrated in table 5.2, 
which shows the average value of foreign debt as a function of K, and o . The value 
maxima in each column are shown in boldface. If we read the table from the rightmost 
column to the left, we can trace the evolution of the value-maximizing share of 
government debt as a function of the debt-servicing capacity. The results can be 
summarized as follows.
If the debt-servicing capacity is clearly in the solvency range, i.e. higher than 1 in 
the context of the table, the value maximizing share of government debt is zero, 
indicating that the advantages of government debt do not outweigh the efficiency 
losses from its financing. The reason for this is that insolvency is a fairly 
improbable event in this range so that the expected high costs of private defaults 
are given only a small probability weighting; on the other hand, the efficiency 
losses from the financing of government debt occur immediately and are positive 
even at the margin.
As the debt-servicing capacity drops to 1, which means that it is at the edge of the 
insolvency range, the value-maximizing government share exhibits a discontinuous 
jump to a fairly high value (0.8 or 80% in the example). This reflects the fact that 
an increase in the government's debt share reduces the expected default costs of 
the economy which - at this low level of debt-servicing capacity - have become 
a factor to reckon with.
As the debt-servicing capacity drops further the value-maximizing share of 
government falls slowly. This reflects the fact that, at a low level of debt-servicing 
capacity, it is less useful to reduce such capacity further through the efficiency 
losses from financing government debt.
Another approach to the data in table 5.2 is as follows. For sufficiently high values 
of the debt-servicing capacity there are two local maxima for the share of government 
debt, namely «  = 0 and a value of w close to 1. The "non-govemment-intervention" value 
of 0 ) = 0 is the global maximum as long as K, is in the solvency range. But as drops
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to 1, the situation is reversed. The value of debt with w = 0 drops quickly to zero and the 
global optimum is now found at the other value of g ), i.e. close to 1. The reason for the 
discontinuous switch away from "non-govemment-intervention" to a positive level of 
intervention is that the advantages of "non-intervention" disappear rapidly as the debt- 
servicing capacity gets close to the insolvency range - and this in turn is due to the high 
costs of private defaults.
One should bear in mind that the numerical values, that are referred to above, are 
the result of our specific assumptions about the functional form of the inefficiency losses 
and the values of the parameters, such as a, etc.. Changing these assumptions implies 
different values for the debt-maximizing share of public debt. The purpose of the 
estimates presented here is to illustrate that the relation between the mix of public and 
private debt, on the one hand, and the average value of foreign debt (or the maximal 
disbursement obtained from issuing bonds), on the other, may be non-monotonic.
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Figure 5.11a: Average spread with private debt default costs and public debt
inefficiency (standard  perspective)
average spread
Figure 5.11b: Average spread with private debt default costs and public debt 
inefficiency (graph rotated by 90 degrees)
average spread
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Figure 5.12a: Average value of foreign debt with private debt default costs and 
public debt inefficiency (for m oderate values o f  the debt-serv icing  capacity)
VTI +
Figure 5.12b: Average value of foreign debt with private debt default costs and 
public debt inefficiency (for high values o f  the debt-servicing capacity)
FZ*' +
CO
Table 5.2: Estimates of the weighted average value of external debt***
K.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.029 0.228 0.605 0.859 0.936 0.949
0.1 0.091 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.107 0.229 0.538 0.815 0.924 0.947
0.2 0.093 0.180 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.194 0.261 0.490 0.763 0.905 0.944
0.3 0.090 0.180 0.265 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.286 0.318 0.469 0.711 0.878 0.937
0.4 0.087 0.174 0.261 0.344 0.378 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.394 0.481 0.671 0.845 0.925
0.5 0.084 0.168 0.252 0.336 0.418 0.467 0.475 0.475 0.480 0.523 0.653 0.812 0.909
0.6 0.081 0.162 0.243 0.324 0.405 0.485 0.546 0.567 0.571 0.590 0.665 0.789 0.889
0.7 0.078 0.156 0.234 0.312 0.391 0.469 0.546 0.615 0.653 0.670 0.707 0.787 0.874
0.8 0.075 0.150 0.225 0.300 0.376 0.451 0.526 0.601 0.672 0.727 0.766 0.813 0.873
0.9 0.072 0.144 0.216 0.289 0.361 0.433 0.505 0.578 0.650 0.721 0.787 0.842 0.888
1 0.069 0.138 0.207 0.277 0.346 0.415 0.485 0.554 0.623 0.693 0.719 0.827 0.883
OO
K >
(a) The numbers are estimates of the value of debt with a nominal value of one. They are based on the assumptions about functions and 
parameters as described in section 5.4. The numbers in boldface indicate the maximum value of each column.
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5.5 Concluding remarks
The previous sections have shown that the three indicators related to the costs of 
external financing for a country, i.e. its average spread costs, the average value of its debt, 
and the maximum disbursement obtained from issuing debt may depend in a complex way 
on a number of factors. These factors include the country's debt-servicing capacity relative 
to the amount of debt outstanding, the share of public debt in its total external debt, the 
extent of the bankruptcy costs on private debt, and the efficiency losses associated with 
public debt and public debt guarantees.
Which of the above mentioned indicators should be focused on? Two of them are 
almost equivalent, i.e. the average value of external debt and the disbursement obtained 
from issuing external debt. The latter is obtained as the product of the former and the 
number of debt instruments issued, thus, they are linearly related to each other. By 
contrast, the average spread is a non-linear function of the value of a country's debt 
instruments. As has been shown, this explains why the relation between the average 
spread and the share of public debt in a country's total external debt can be similar to a 
laffer curve. One should, however, be careful not to dismiss this as a pure "technical" 
phenomenon. This is only true if spreads are purely technical indicators without economic 
meaning. If, on the other hand, a country's average spread carries economic meaning; for 
example, as an information variable affecting creditors' risk assessment of the country, 
then the laffer curve may be an important economic relationship.
Another indicator is the average value of debt. The option pricing theory which 
underlies the present economic concept is concerned with prices. Applying this idea to the 
issue of the costs of external financing for a country, such costs could be interpreted as 
the difference between the value of the debt instrument issued and the repayment 
associated with it. Similarly, the additional costs of external financing could be interpreted 
as the difference between the value of its debt instruments and the value of the same 
number of default-free debt instruments. A strategy aimed at reducing such additional 
costs is therefore equivalent to one aimed at maximizing the weighted average value of 
external debt or the disbursement obtained from issuing external bonds.
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As illustrated in the previous section, the value of a country's debt instruments 
(and the disbursement obtained from issuing debt) can be complex functions of several 
variables. These variables include but are not restricted to the country's debt-servicing 
capacity, the volatility of its rate of change, and the mix between private and public 
external debt. Given the specific assumptions made here, it appears to be a quite robust 
result that all debt should be private as long as the country's debt-servicing capacity is 
high, compared to its contractual debt service, i.e. as long as the country is characterized 
by a relatively low probability of default. The optimal, i.e. debt value-maximizing share 
of public debt, may be relatively high when the country's debt-servicing capacity is 
relatively low, and therefore the default costs are a factor to reckon with. Thus, if one 
wants to make a policy conclusion, it could be the following one.^° Prior to the 
discussion of the decentralization of the foreign borrowing regime of a country, one has 
to assess the factors bearing on its external financial situation, i.e. its debt-servicing 
capacity, the volatility of the rate of change of that capacity, etc.. As long as the debt- 
servicing capacity is high and the volatility low, there may be some theoretical support 
for the hypothesis that external borrowing should be private rather than public.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the seniority mles as described above have 
recently been modified in some countries. Private issuers of bonds have provided offshore 
collateral to back their bond issues, such issues being commonly referred to as "enhanced" 
bond issues. '^ This "enhanced" private debt ceases to be "junior" to public debt in the 
sense defined above. This kind of enhancements have enabled the issuers of such bonds 
to obtain a higher rating than the rating of their governments. This may change the 
implications for the debt value-maximizing share of public debt.
“ This statement is derived from the present comparative-static analysis, and it may have to be qualified if  dynamic 
aspects are considered.
The collateralization is either based on existing assets (such as real estate, gold, etc.) or on the assignment of 
future income streams.
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5.6 Appendix
Table 5.3: Moody's bond ratings
Aaa Bonds which are rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality. Interest
payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable margin and 
principal is secure. While the various protective elements are likely to 
change, such changes as can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the 
fundamentally strong position of such issues.
Aa Bonds which are rated Aa are judged to be of high quality. They are rated
lower than the best bonds because margins of protection may not be as 
large as in Aaa securities, or fluctuation of protective elements may be of 
greater amplitude, or there may be other elements present which make the 
long-term risk appear somewhat larger than the Aaa securities.
A Bonds which are rated A posses many favourable investment attributes and
are considered as upper-medium-grade obligations. Factors giving security 
to principal and interest are considered adequate, but elements may be 
present which suggest a susceptibility to impairment some time in the 
future.
Baa Bonds which are rated Baa are considered as medium-grade obligations 
(i.e. they are neither highly protected nor poorly secured). Interest 
payments and principal security appear adequate for the present but certain 
protective elements may be lacking over any great length of time. Such 
bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics and in fact have 
speculative characteristics as well.
Ba Bonds which are rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements; their 
future cannot be considered as well-assured. Often the protection of interest
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and principal payments may be very moderate, and thereby not well safe­
guarded during both good and bad times over the future. Uncertainty of 
position characterizes bond in this class.
B Bonds which are rated B generally lack characteristics of the desirable
investment. Assurance of interest and principal payments, or of 
maintenance of other terms of the contract over any long period of time 
may be small.
Caa Bonds which are rated Caa are of poor standing. Such issues may be in
default or there may be present elements of danger with respect to 
principal or interest.
Ca Bonds which are rated Ca represent obligations which are speculative in
a high degree. Such issues are often in default or have other marked 
shortcomings.
C Bonds which are rated C are the lowest rated class of bonds, and issues so
rated can be regarded as having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining 
any real investment standing.
Source: Bond (1992).
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Table 5.4: The spread data^ *^
Spread in
private
issues
Spread in public and 
sovereign bonds
Weighted average 
spread in external 
bond issues  ^^
Public and nrivate foreiun debt
Argentina 1990 730 730
Argentina 1991 447 456 453
Argentina 1992 430 430
Brazil 1991 655 523 540
Brazil 1992 480 401 448
Chile 1991 210 210
Czechoslovakia 1992^ "^^ 300 300
Mexico 1989 800 820 814
Mexico 1990 555 366 455
Mexico 1991 566 251 357
Mexico 1992^ *"^ 442 195 282
Turkey 1989 160 192 190
Turkey 1992 250 221 224
Venezuela 1990 496 260 382
Venezuela 1991 362 250 265
Public foreign debt only
Bulgaria 1989 160 160
China 1991 67 67
China 1992(") 98 98
Czechoslovakia 1990 96 96
Czechoslovakia 1991 281 281
Hungary 1989 116 116
Hungary 1990 176 176
Hungary 1991 250 250
Hungary 1992^ *"^ 209 209
India 1989 101 101
India 1990 127 127
India 1991 - 140 140
Source: IMF, Private Market Financing (Dec. 1992), World Bank, Financial Flows (April
1993), own calculations.
(a) Yield spread measured as the difference between the bond yield at issue and the prevailing yield for
industrial counUy government bonds in the same currency ana of comparable maturity. A ll are weighted 
averages. Public bonds include public sector bonds and sovereign bonds.
(b) The average spread is the weighted average spread of private and pubhc issues, the weights being die
amounts issued, as recorded in IMF (see above).
(c) First half o f 1992.
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Chapter 6: A Brief Note on Officially Supported Export Credit 
Guarantee Agencies and Subsidized ECI
6.1 Introduction
All major developed countries have export credit guarantee agencies (EGAs) which 
provide insurance or guarantee for export credits. Traditionally, the major agencies are 
official institutions or they act on behalf of the government. Private competition is almost 
absent, in particular in political risk insurance. It has been suggested in the literature on 
export credit insurance that, to the extent that the government is providing a service that 
private markets are not supplying, at least some element of subsidy is involved.' It is not 
necessarily the case that private insurers are unwilling to provide similar services. The 
absence of such competition points to the presence of some element of subsidy and 
therefore it has been suggested by Eaton (1989) that the presence of official or officially 
supported EGAs "is very likely to have discouraged the establishment of private 
institutions providing similar services."^
It is necessary to clarify what the aims of such institutions are. For example, as 
the International Union o f Credit and Investment Insurers (Beme Union), of which all 
major official agencies are members, puts it in their report of activities: "After the First 
World War the perceived need of many European countries to protect and expand their 
external reserves and to stimulate employment through the promotion of export activity 
added a new dimension to the conception of export credit insurance...From that time to 
the present day a steadily increasing number of countries in both the developed and 
developing world have seen in the establishment and development of an export credit 
insurance scheme an important tool for promoting their export trade, increasing 
employment opportunities, and improving the credit side of their balance of payments."
‘ Abraham (1990), Boyd (1982), Eaton (1989) and Mehtz and Messerlin (1987). 
 ^ See Eaton (1989, p. 116).
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This description reflects the two major objectives of such agencies, that of 
providing insurance and that of promoting exports. One means to fulfil these goals might 
be the subsidization of export credit insurance policies. In addition these subsidies might 
benefit the importing, i.e. borrowing country. For example, as has been illustrated in the 
present study, the trade financing costs are particularly high for countries with external 
financial difficulties. Subsidizing the financing of exports to these countries might be a 
means to reduce their trade financing costs - according to the view that "borrowers (i.e. 
importers) cannot lose from accepting export credit subsidies."^ Under these 
circumstances, subsidized export credit insurance could be a form of development aid. 
Although controversial this argument is sometimes brought forward by politicians and by 
representatives of EGAs, and it is therefore considered here as a (potential) third goal.
This chapter asks whether official EGAs are the appropriate means to achieve these 
three goals - the provision of insurance, the promotion of exports and development aid 
(through subsidized insurance).^ In an attempt to answer these questions, the present 
chapter interprets the literatures on the economics of insurance and on trade under 
imperfect competition in the specific context of export credit insurance. The following 
tentative answers are suggested. As for any insurance there is some theoretical support for 
public provision of export credit insurance (EGI). For example, in the presence of 
aggregate risk, the perfect pooling of risks within a given period is impossible. Thus the 
absence of well functioning options and future markets might justify public EGI - but not 
subsidized EGI. The inherently individual insurance problems such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection provide only limited theoretical support for public provision of EGI 
because in general public institutions are not in a better position to cope with the typical 
insurance problems faced by private insurers. Again, there is no support for subsidized 
EGI.
 ^ See Fleisig and Hill (1983, p.3). In fact, this holds under perfectly competitive conditions.
* The author is not aware of any studies which have treated these aspects together in a detailed or rigorous way. 
It is important to note that this is not to claim that in practice all EGAs are pursuing these three goals together but that 
they pursue either one or more of these goals. The present discussion adopts the perspective o f one government, i.e. 
one country. World welfare questions are ignored.
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As to the second goal, there are two theoretical lines of argument in favour of 
export subsidies. However, they rely on rather specific assumptions (discussed in section 
4) which do not appear to be appropriate for the practice of ECI. Moreover, it appears that 
the EGAs are not the appropriate means to provide such subsidies because they only reach 
a small proportion of exports and might induce allocative distortions. As to the third goal, 
some recent articles on trade under imperfect competition (Carmichael (1987) and 
Gmenspecht (1988)) point to the hypothesis that subsidization through EGAs is more 
likely to harm rather than benefit the importing countries. The intuitive explanation for 
this hypothesis is that the subsidization of the exporters of one country may relax the 
price competition between them and exporters from other countries. This means that the 
two goals of export promotion and development aid would be in fact conflicting.
This chapter also contains an attempt to define and - using two different methods - 
to measure the extent of the subsidies provided through EGAs in 16 countries during the 
period from 1981 to 1990. The first method was developed by Abraham (1990) and the 
second one is proposed here. Both methods are based on the same idea; namely, that the 
subsidy in any year can be defined as the difference between expected net claims - the 
difference between claims and recoveries - and the premium income. Ideally, one should 
apply these concepts to individual transactions and compare the premium paid, the claims, 
and the ultimate recovery (or ultimate loss) for the same transaction to obtain estimates 
of transaction specific losses.  ^ This is not feasible because the relevant data are not 
published by the EGAs. The estimation results obtained here show considerable 
differences across the agencies considered. Several of them provide large subsidy rates - 
defined as the subsidy per value of exports insured - while others seem to tax their 
exports. Examples for the former are SAGE of Italy, GIEK of Norway, GEGSE of Spain, 
and ERG of Switzerland, and examples for the latter are EDG of Ganada and EXGO of 
New Zealand. All major agencies, except for the latter two and EFIG of Australia, 0KB 
of Austria, and Eximbank of the United States, provide notable subsidies.
' One should mention that in individual transactions, the premium payment, claims, and ultimate recoveries could 
be spread over a time period of several years.
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 provides a description of 
the common institutional aspects of ECI. There might be some repetition of aspects 
mentioned in previous chapters; however, it is useful because it facilitates the 
understanding of the empirical relevance of the theoretical discussion that follows. In 
sections 6.3 and 6.4, the theoretical literature on insurance and the one on export 
promotion, respectively, are reviewed and interpreted in the specific context of ECI. In 
section 6.5, the interaction of the different goals of ECAs are discussed. Section 6.6 
contains estimates of the effective subsidies.
6.2 The practice of export credit insurance
6.2.1 The risks covered
This subsection explains what types of risks are covered by ECI contracts.^ The 
fundamental risk involved in export credits is that of non-payment by the buyer resulting 
in a loss on the part of the creditor. The event causing such a loss can either be of a 
commercial or of a political nature. It is called commercial if the loss arises through the 
inability of the buyer to make the contractual repayment because of his insolvency or 
bankruptcy. It is called political if an event in the buyer's country prevents him from 
meeting his contractual obligation. These events include the whole spectrum from civil 
war to the non-availability of foreign exchange because of government policy intervention.
In practice, several agencies distinguish between the commercial and the political 
risks and offer separate insurance policies for them.  ^ However, it is true that these risks
* ECI is given in fonn of an insurance or a guarantee. They differ &om each other widi respect to the contractual 
relations involved but they are economically equivalent in that the EGA provides the creditor with an insurance in 
exchange for the payment of a premium where the insurance is contingent on the event o f default.
’ Some other insurance schemes are in operation, including for example pre-credit cover and exchange rate 
fluctuation insurance. Pre-credit cover is a conditional indemnification of the insurer for losses arising between the date 
of actual dispatch of the goods, such losses being the costs and other expenses incurred by the insured when its contract 
is finstrated. It is available only as an addition to credit risk cover. Exchange risks arise when the exporter performs 
a contract that is denominated in a currency which is different fiom that of its inputs. It appears to be less relevant in 
practice.
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are to some extent interrelated. For example, the business cycle in a country influences 
the financial and economic situation of each individual firm in that country and thus the 
risk associated with lending to those firms.
Another classification of risks is considered in section 6.3 because it is more 
appropriate for the presentation of results of the theoretical insurance literature; namely, 
the terms firm specific risk, country specific risk, and aggregate risk. The firm specific 
risk is the risk that is characteristic of a particular firm and differs between firms located 
in the same country. The country specific risk is the one which is characteristic of a 
particular country and differs between countries of the same region or political group, etc.. 
The aggregate risk is the risk that is neither firm nor country specific and which the 
insurer cannot eliminate through diversifying his portfolio among firms or countries.
6.2.2 The insurance contract and the information structure
ECI contracts can take on various forms. However, a general pattern is common 
to all contracts; namely, the insurer provides the insured creditor with a loss insurance in 
exchange for the payment of a premium, where the insurance is contingent on the event 
of default by the debtor and on the compliance of the insured with his obligations arising 
from the insurance contract. Therefore, such insurance is referred to as a "conditional 
indemnification".
In general, an ECI policy involves a special relationship between underwriter and 
the insured which has two central aspects. First, each part owes a duty of utmost good 
faith* to the other which includes in particular the full disclosure by the insured of all the 
facts material to the risk covered. Secondly, the insurer relies on the insured to practice 
effective credit control.^ In general, it might reasonably be expected that the exporter has 
an intimate knowledge of the buyer's economic and financial situation, in particular if
' For example, as a practitioner's handbook on credit insurance puts it, "a credit insurance is a long-term risk sharing 
partnership between underwriter and insured. The underwriter relies on the insured to act in their best mutual interest 
at all times". Briggs and Edwards (1988).
’ Credit control includes the forecasting and reporting of receivables, assessments o f customer risk, meeting with 
customers, checking daily orders and shipments, the monitoring of accounts, etc..
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exporter and buyer have a long-term trading relationship. Despite his obligations, the 
insured might sometimes be able and have an incentive to misreport or hide some of this 
information.’® This is referred to as the problem of asymmetric information. Section 6.3.2 
discusses how this problem is dealt with optimally.
The form of the insurance is global or specific or, most commonly some hybrid 
of the two. Under a global (comprehensive or turn-over) policy, the exporter nominates 
all his export orders for cover, within the parameters set in his insurance policy, and pays 
a premium on the amount of claims outstanding. A specific policy is designed to cover 
a particular export contract. Because of the higher transaction costs associated with such 
specific contract, it is in general only used when the size of the contract is large, the order 
unique, or the credit period substantial. Clearly, under a global policy, the insurer does 
not know at the beginning of the insurance period the exact composition of risks, but can 
only estimate them from the exporter's previous exporting activity. Some constraints are 
built into such global insurance contracts to limit the extent of the possible total risk 
involved including the distribution of risks. Global as well as specific policies may cover 
short-term or medium- and long-term credits under one policy, or under separate ones.” 
In practice, all medium-term policies are specific.
6.2.3 Institutional aspects of export credit insurance
No two national export credit systems are identical. However, one similarity is the 
involvement of the government in credit insurance.’^  Such an involvement is particularly
There are legal instruments designed to ensure that the exporter meets its obligations. Namely, if  the exporter fails 
to do so, the insurer might be entitled to avoid the insurance contract, that is to refuse to pay indemnification and repay 
the premium to the insured. For example, in Enghsh law, this principle has been codified in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 which the English case authorities have considered equally appropriate for the non-marine insurance field.
" A widely-agreed definition of short- term export credit insurance is the cover of tq> to 24 months credit risks 
including 12 months pre-credit risks.
In general, four different types of institutions providing export credit insurance can be distinguished. This 
includes the state owned corporation (e.g. COFACE in France) which has exclusive access to government support for 
its activities; namley, the privately-owned corporation underwriting poUtical risk on behalf of the government (NCM 
in the Netherlands and Hermes of Germany), the government department as a direct provider (ECGD o f the UK, 
confined to long-term activity) and the privately-owned corporations who takes export credit risks including political 
risks for their own account (Trade Indemnity in the UK). Reports o f the Commission of the European Communities 
have demonstrated that, in all the then-12 member countries, the pubhc insurers (first three types of institutions) receive
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evident in the sector of medium- and long-term credit insurance. By contrast, short-term 
credit insurance is generally provided not only by official agencies but also by private 
ones. However, even then the political risk is reinsured by the government in some 
countries. It appears that private insurers usually charge premia that are well above those 
that official agencies charge for similar risks.
The role of the government with regard to ECI in general and short-term insurance 
cover in particular is currently reviewed within the Commission of the European Union, 
focusing specially on the competition between private and official insurers. There appears 
to be a general consensus that private insurers are at a comparative disadvantage as 
opposed to official ones as a result of the financial support and guarantee backing of the 
latter by the government.
Most official ECAs have been incurring significant losses since the 1980s. Figure
6.1 shows the net cash flows of selected agencies - defined as the premium income plus 
recoveries less payments of claims - which is a commonly used indicator of an ECA s 
profit. The figure demonstrates that several major ECAs have experienced a continuing 
worsening in their cash flow balances. The net cash flows of ECAs show two other 
interesting developments. First, a few agencies were exempt from the general trend of 
continuously worsening performances and managed to break even or make a profit. 
Examples are the Eximbank of the United States (as shown in the figure) and the ECAs 
of Austria, Canada and New Zealand (not shown in the figure). Secondly, the only 
agency which continued to apply a flat premium until the beginning of the 1990s, the 
German Hermes, performed significantly worse than the average of the ECAs between 
1987 and 1990. This points to the hypothesis that the losses reflect the cover policy in
certain types of backing from their governments.
" This indicator needs to be interpreted with considerable caution for a number of reasons. First, a cash flow deficit 
does not necessarily imply that the EGA operates at a loss, as claims payments made under insurance policies may 
subsequently be recovered in full. Second, comparisons among agencies are hampered by differences in the accounting 
treatment of arrears and restructured debts. Third, intertemporal comparisons of the performance o f an individual EGA 
might be hampered by the developments in their accounting practices that have taken place during recent years at 
several o f them. For example, some agencies have begun to make direct payments to the original lender when 
guaranteed debt was restructured and have taken the restructured asset on their balance sheet instead of recording a 
contingent habUity as before. This has tended to increase agencies' cash flow deficits.
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general and the policy of premium determination in particular.
Recently, there have been discussions within EU and GATT about whether the 
observed losses, i.e. the negative cash flows might reflect subsidies provided to exporters 
to promote national exports. While other types of subsidies have been deemed to be 
unfair exporting measures for a long time, this type of subsidy has not been an issue in 
international fora until recently. The reason for this might be that it has not been fully 
recognized as such or not addressed because of the apparent problems associated with its 
definition and measurement, or because it is considered as forming part of the industrial 
policy which falls under the sole responsibility of national authorities.
Figure 6.1: Cash flows of selected ECAs (in billion US dollars)
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Source: Trade Finance, various issues between 1985 and 1992.
However, it has been recognized in the GATT. For example, the agreement which 
followed the Tokyo Round included the specification that signatories should refrain from 
granting export subsidies and in addition a list containing material of what can be 
interpreted as "export subsidies". This includes under section (j).
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The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) 
of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee 
programmes against increases in the costs of exported products or of exchange 
risk programmes, at premium rates, which are manifestly inadequate to cover the 
long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes)^
So far, however, there have been very few legal cases with respect to such 
subsidization. It appears that this is due not only to the problems associated with its 
measurement’^  but also to a general insensitivity among export insurers, politicians and 
the public about the problems associated with subsidization. In the following section the 
issue of ECI is discussed from a theoretical perspective. To the author's knowledge there 
exists no rigorous or formal literature of export credit insurance. Therefore, the general 
insurance literature is referred to in the next section. Section 6.5 includes an estimation 
of the effective subsidies associated with the observed profit/loss performances.
63 The insurance goal: some lessons from insurance theory
As described in the introduction, the main goal of most ECAs is to offer insurance 
against export risks associated with the economic and political situation of foreign trading 
partners. In this section, the insurance goal is considered separately from the export 
promotion and the development assistance goals.’® First, some of the relevant theoretical 
literature is reviewed in the search for economic justifications of government intervention 
in the market for ECI. More specifically, the main findings of insurance theory on the 
following questions are reviewed: (i) Is the market likely to fail in offering ECI 
efficiently? (ii) Would the government be able to improve on the market outcome?’^  (iii) 
Which would be the best policy for the government? After this brief literature review, we
Annex {Illustrative List o f Export Subsidies) to the Agreement on Interpretation and Application o f Articles VI, 
XVI and XXIII o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, Geneva 1979.
" Section 6.6 contains two proposals for the measurement of such subsidies.
'* Section 6.4 looks at the export promotion goal and section 6.5 considers the interaction o f different goals.
Throughout this chapter, it is assumed that the government is benevolent and seeks to implement a Pareto-efficient 
allocation. This assumption is not made for reahsm but is a standard and convenient benchmark.
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evaluate the relevance of the general theoretical results of that literature for the specific 
situation in ECI. Throughout most of the theoretical considerations, attention is restricted 
to the case of specific insurance policies in the sense described in the introduction.
In general, insurance is valuable to exporting firms because it allows them to 
reduce their risk and the associated costs of administration, financing, legal procedures, 
and other adjustments. Therefore exporters can be seen as risk averse investors who prefer 
a sure return to a risky return with the same expected value; this is the reason why they 
are willing to pay for insurance. To the extent that the risks of different exporters are 
uncorrelated, they can be pooled by an insurer, i.e. good and bad realizations will average 
out and the aggregate return will be a certain amount equal to the sum of the individual 
expected values. An insurer can then offer to a large number of exporters a riskless 
revenue in return for their risky assets. If the insurance contracts are 'actuarially fair', the 
revenue guaranteed to the exporter will be equal to the expected value of the returns 
(minus, in practice, a fee to cover the insurer's administrative cost). Therefore, as long as 
there is a large number of exporters who are prepared to pay premia which cover the 
administrative costs, there will be scope for an insurance market to develop and all 
exporters to benefit from this. Under ideal conditions, the free market will work 
efficiently; namely, profit maximizing insurance companies, that are competing with each 
other, will offer actuarially fair insurance contracts, and there will be no need for any 
government intervention or a public ECA. However, at least two problems can appear. 
Firstly, there is the problem of aggregate risk, and secondly, that of asymmetric 
information.
6.3.1 Symmetric information and the problem of aggregate risk
Some importers may have a good reputation on the credit market, i.e. are expected 
to fulfil the contract with a high probability. To the extent that there is information 
available about a particular importer, the insurer can take this firm specific risk into 
account when calculating the insurance premium. The knowledge about the political and 
economic situation in the importer's country leads the insurer to assign a country specific 
component to any particular loan to a firm in that country. Even if a particular importer
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has a very good reputation, the fact that he is based in a country with a bad reputation 
will have an effect on the estimate of his default probability. In other words, it is 
generally believed that there are country specific factors that affect the risk. By definition, 
these factors are uncorrelated across countries. There may exist other factors that are 
expected to affect all firms and countries in the same way. To the extent that they are not 
known in advance, they represent aggregate risk.
When insuring an individual case, the insurer - whether it is a private or a public 
one - will consider all available information, in order to estimate the default probability 
on the basis of its knowledge of that specific importer, and of the industry and country 
in which the latter operates, and the world economic situation. One theoretical benchmark 
is the case where, at any point in time, exporters and insurers have the same information 
about the risk, i.e. the parties involved in the insurance contract have symmetric 
information before and after the contract is signed. Under symmetric information and in 
the absence of aggregate risk, one can expect a competitive insurance market to develop, 
covering all firm and country specific risks at the lowest possible cost. In this case, there 
is no obvious role for any government intervention in ECI.
In the presence of aggregate risk, the perfect pooling of risks within any given 
period is impossible, i.e. aggregate risks cannot be insured within one period. In this case, 
well functioning future markets would be needed to achieve efficiency. Their absence 
might justify a public ECA, but not the provision of subsidized insurance. The absence 
of such markets is indeed often cited as a major justification for EGAs in developing 
countries;^* however, the same argument does not appear to be valid for developed 
countries where future markets are more complete. And wherever some of these futures 
markets did not develop, it might be precisely because of the subsidies provided by the 
government (e.g. through officially supported EGAs).
“ See UNCTAD, 1991a,b.
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6.3.2 Asymmetric information
In practice, exporters often know more about the risk and may even be able to 
affect the amount and the probability of repayment. For example, the exporter may know 
more about the economic situation of his trading partners and will therefore be able to 
estimate the probability of default more accurately than the insurer. Also, the exporter 
may have the possibility to reduce the risk of default by maintaining a claim recoveries 
section or by threatening to seek legal or economic sanctions, all these actions being often 
unobservable to the insurer. The first example is one of adverse selection, whereby the 
asymmetry of information is already present at the time when the contract is signed. The 
second example is one of moral hazard, where the asymmetry of information arises after 
the contract has been signed.
The adverse selection problem arises in the case where an exporter (before signing 
the contract) knows more than the insurer about the risk to be covered by the insurance 
contract. The exporter may have an incentive to hide or misreport some information in 
order to get a more advantageous contract. The insurer is likely to know only the overall 
distribution of default risks but not the default risk of each specific contract. He is 
therefore not able to immediately offer each exporter the actuarially fair premium because, 
in order to calculate that premium, the insurer would have to know the default probability 
on each specific export agreement.
The problem of moral hazard arises if the exporter can take some measures to 
reduce the probability of default, and these measures are unobservable to the insurer. In 
this case, the insurance contract must be designed to provide the exporter with the 
incentive to exert the optimal risk-reducing effort. In general, a thus designed contract will 
not cover the entire risk, i.e. the contract will specify a deductible amount so that the 
exporters will have to bear part of the risk themselves.
In principle, asymmetric information represents a problem for a government 
precisely in the same way as it does for a private insurer, and neither of them will achieve 
full efficiency. The relevant question is, therefore, whether the free market would create
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more inefficiencies than those which are unavoidable in the presence of the information 
asymmetry. In other words, the question is whether a competitive ECI market can achieve 
a second-best (or constrained efficient) outcome for any given distribution of risks in the 
population of exporters. In the next two subsections, the problems of adverse selection and 
of moral hazard are reviewed, and then, in the third subsection, the relevance of these 
problems are discussed with respect to specific example of the ECI market.
6.3.2.1 Adverse selection
This subsection is based on Henriet and Rochet (1988) and Wilson (1977), where 
the interested reader can turn to for more details and formal demonstrations of the results. 
Given the risk distribution in the population (of exporters), the realised allocation of 
contracts is determined by the set of contracts that are offered in the market. Each single 
contract from this set specifies a loss amount to be covered (or, equivalently, the 
deductible to be borne by the insured) and a premium to be charged. Given that each 
individual is free to sign any contract from this set, it will sign that contract which gives 
it the highest expected utility. A set of individuals facing the same loss probability is often 
called a 'risk type'. Different risk types will have different preferences over combinations 
of cover and premium.’^  A first-best (or fully efficient) outcome would consist of full 
insurance cover for all risk types at premia that ensure that the insurance sector breaks 
even. However, in general, such an outcome is not feasible because the insurers do not 
know the risk types of individuals. Thus the constrained efficient (or second-best) 
outcomes have to be considered.
It can be shown that a second-best allocation requires full insurance for the worst 
risk type (call it type 1, the next better risk type 2, etc.). All other types should not 
receive full insurance cover. Each type i (with i = 1, 2, etc.) will have to accept 
deductibles which are designed so that they just deter type i - 1 from signing the same 
contract as type i. These deductibles represent a welfare loss which is unavoidable. It is
For example, bad risk types will tend to have a higher marginal rate of substitution between cover and premium 
(i.e. flatter indifference curves in the cover/premium-space) than good risk types, meaning that they are prepared to pay 
a relatively higher premium than good risk types to obtain additional coverage.
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the result of the asymmetry of information. An equilibrium can be obtained by offering 
all types their fair premium and by determining subsequently the corresponding 
deductibles according to the above mentioned principle. This equilibrium is characterized 
by a so-called cross-subsidy-ffee set of contracts. However, it is not always efficient. To 
see why, take the example of just two risk types, good risk types and bad ones, with a 
very small proportion of the latter types in the population. An optimal cross-subsidy-ffee 
set of contracts specifies the fair premium for both types and a deductible for cover of the 
good risk type which is designed so that it just deters the bad risk type from choosing the 
same contract. This deductible represents a welfare loss which might be avoided. Namely, 
if the proportion of bad risk types in the total population is sufficiently small, then a 
pooling of all types by offering just one type of contract with full cover and the premium 
slightly above the fair premium for good risk types allows the insurer to break even. This 
pooling results in a higher welfare for both risk types than the cross-subsidy-ffee set of 
contracts.
This explains why, under some circumstances, efficiency requires the premium for 
the high risk types to be subsidized by the low risk types. Competitive market forces, 
however, will tend to eliminate these cross-subsidies. To see this, consider a welfare 
optimum with cross-subsidies. In such a situation, an insurer may offer better contracts 
just for the good risk types; namely, ones without cross-subsidies but with small 
deductibles, the latter being designed to prevent bad risk types ffom choosing those 
contracts. This would allow that insurer to make profits. It would force other insurers to 
increase their premium because they would be left with only the bad risk types, i.e. an 
"adverse selection" of the population. This illustrates that under adverse selection a 
competitive market may well fail, i.e. lead to more than just the unavoidable inefficiencies 
implied by the asymmetry of information. Before turning to the implications of this result 
for the regulation of ECI, the case of moral hazard is considered.
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6J.2.2 Moral hazard
This section is based on Shavell (1979) and Amott and Stiglitz (1986) which are 
standard references on insurance theory under moral hazard. As already mentioned, moral 
hazard makes it necessary for the insured to bear part of the risk himself, i.e. full 
insurance cover is not optimal. As in the case of adverse selection, the asymmetry of 
information leads to an unavoidable welfare loss. Wether an unregulated market leads to 
additional losses depends crucially on the prevalence of exclusivity. The following 
situations can be distinguished:
(i) If each insured deals with one insurer exclusively (i.e. exclusivity prevails), then 
this insurer - either a private or a public one - is in the position to offer him an optimal 
(i.e. second-best) contract. To the extent that the government faces the same information 
problem as private insurers, no government policy can improve on the competitive market 
outcome.
(ii) If there is the possibility for individuals to insure completely against loss (i.e. 
exclusivity does not hold), e.g. by signing contracts with several insurers, they will do so. 
Nothing prevents individuals from insuring themselves completely against loss.^° Clearly, 
if individuals are completely insured, they will not undertake any risk-reducing effort.^’ 
Consequently, insurance premia will increase substantially. This outcome is clearly Pareto- 
dominated by the one where exclusivity prevails. If competitive market conditions lead 
to the elimination of exclusivity, and therefore to full insurance, the government can 
improve on the market outcome by enforcing exclusivity through a monopolistic insurance 
agency.
“ If an insurer does not offer them full insurance (i.e. specifies a deductible), then they will buy insurance for the 
excess amount elsewhere. Therefore the insurer will presumably offer them full insurance in the first place. Even in 
situations where no other insurance company is available to insure the exporter, he may be able to 'self-insure' against 
the equivalent of the deductibles by diversifying his portfolio, or by sharing the risk with his employees or his 
shareholders or his creditors.
Amott and Stightz (1986) argue that this no-effort-fuU-insurance outcome is the nonnal outcome in the absence 
of exclusivity. But they also discuss other possibUities. Namely, the insurance market may either break down 
completely, or it may lead to rationing.
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6.3.2.3 Implications of asymmetric information for the regulation of ECI
The previous two subsections have concluded that, under both moral hazard and 
adverse selection, there may exist circumstances under which competitive insurance 
markets will fail to result in a second-best allocation. What can be the role of the 
government in ECI? If the government wants to assure efficiency, it can establish a 
monopolistic ECA and directly implement a second-best set of contracts. As long as the 
government is not assumed to be intrinsically inefficient, it can do at least as well as the 
market. Moreover, there are reasons why it might be able to improve on the (second-best) 
market outcome. For example, the government may have better access to information 
about political risks and other aggregate figures. The government may receive information 
ffom its controls at the borders or through its administration of international payments, 
and therefore, it may be more difficult for exporters to hide relevant information ffom a 
monopolised public agency than ffom a private insurer. Furthermore, a monopolistic ECA 
will be able to sanction false reports ffom exporters more effectively when it discovers 
them.
On the other hand, there are several arguments suggesting that the problems of 
asymmetric information are not particularly relevant to ECI. One might argue that the 
problem of adverse selection is negligible in the case of ECI since the exporter does not 
have a significant information advantage compared to the insurer. The insurer normally 
knows to which country and industry the credit is given. And there may be only little 
reason to believe that exporters know more about country or industry-specific risks. The 
exporters may, of course, have an information advantage with respect to firm specific risk, 
but it could be argued that this is small compared to the total risk. As to the case of moral 
hazard the following can be said. If exporters find ways of self-insuring for the 
deductibles, then even a monopolistic ECA can not do better than the competitive market. 
However, it has to be emphasized that the possibility of exporters insuring their 
deductibles elsewhere is not perceived as a problem in the practice of ECI. There appear 
to be two main reasons for this, apart ffom the lack of recognition of the problem. First, 
in most countries, there is not a ffee market operating anyway. When ECI is practically
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monopolized, then it is clearly difficult to find another insurer to cover the remaining risk. 
Second, provided optimizing behaviour in the presence of moral hazard, the fact that 
deductibles are indeed observed points to the hypothesis that exclusivity holds. If it would 
not hold, it would not be rational for an insurer to offer a contract with deductibles in the 
first place. This suggests that the problem of moral hazard, like that of adverse selection, 
does not offer a clear-cut justification for public EGAs.
A more convincing argument for public EGAs might be found on the basis of the 
government's political relations with the debtors. If the government can use its political 
relations to reduce the risk, and if it can do this more effectively when representing a 
large number of creditors, then this would provide another justification for a public EGA, 
independent of the arguments discussed in this section. Thus, the government could 
improve on the market, even where the latter does not fail (i.e. where it achieves a 
constrained efficient outcome). Again it is very difficult to judge the practical relevance 
of this argument, but it seems that there is a potential for governments to coordinate the 
interest of all the creditors ffom their country, possibly through an EGA. At the same 
time, it is important to emphasize that all this does not justify any subsidies to the EGA 
nor to the exporters.
6.4 The export promotion goal
The second main goal of public EGAs is to promote national exports. There are 
basically two ways in which they can achieve this goal. The first one coincides with the 
insurance goal discussed in the previous section. To the extent that a public EGA is more 
efficient than a private one, it can provide cheaper EGI to domestic exporters, and thus 
may enhance their competitiveness on the world markets. The second way consists of 
offering EGI at subsidized premium rates. This can also increase the competitiveness of 
its exporters relative to foreign competitors, and - under certain conditions - national 
welfare will also be enhanced. This second case is the main focus of the present section.
205
In a couple of recent articles, export subsidization has been justified in the context 
of trade under imperfect competition. As soon as one departs ffom the framework of 
perfectly competitive markets, many different assumptions can be adopted and the 
theoretical implications turn out to depend heavily on the particular assumptions made 
about the type of competition (in prices or in quantities), the timing of the intervention 
(ex post or ex ante), the type of the subsidies (on quantities or on prices), the number of 
firms in the market, the type of barriers to entry (large or small, endogenous or 
exogenous), foreign governments' reactions, etc.^  ^ There are two special constellations 
which can generate the result that (optimally set) export subsidies will increase social 
welfare in the exporting country compared to the ffee trade outcome. They are reviewed 
in the next two subsections.
6.4.1 £x ante subsidization and quantity competition
This subsection presents the standard justification for export subsidies as 
formalized elegantly by Brander and Spencer (1985).^  ^ It is based on two key 
assumptions about the timing of the subsidization and the strategic interaction between 
exporters. First, the exporters take the subsidy rates as given when they compete on the 
market. Second, their strategic variable is the quantity of goods they choose to export.
Consider two profit-maximizing exporters ffom different countries who compete 
on a third market for a homogenous good. Each firm chooses the quantity of goods it 
wants to export, taking as given the competitor's quantity and the government's subsidy 
scheme. The price is determined in the market by the demand side. The Nash equilibrium 
is defined as a quantity of exports for each competitor which ensures that no exporter can 
individually deviate ffom the equilibrium in a profitable way. The subsidy affects the 
equilibrium price, the market shares, and the profits. The subsidizing government
“ For a review of the literature on trade policy under imperfect competition, see e.g. Dixit (1984) or Neary (1988). 
Most o f the hterature on strategic trade pohcy concludes that, if  any deviations from free trade is beneficial, then the 
optimal pohcy required the imposition of an import tariff rather then the provision of an export subsidy. It should be 
emphasised here that here all models are ignored which do not justify export subsidies. Thus the focus is on the "best
possible constellation" for a justification of subsidized ECI.
“ A related model, but with differentiated export goods, is Dixit (1988). Dixit's model is more complex and leads
essentially to similar conclusions. It is used by Abraham (1990) in the context o f EGAs.
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anticipates that its subsidy gives a competitive advantage to its firm. It chooses the 
subsidy so that national welfare is maximized, trading off the additional profits for 
exporters with the costs of financing the subsidy. The equilibrium is explained below. For 
expositional purposes, first the case without foreign government reaction and second the 
case with strategic interactions between domestic and foreign government are discussed.
Consider the case where only one government provides a subsidy. The subsidy 
increases the market share and the profits of the subsidized firm while lowering the price 
of the good and the profits of the competitor. The export expansion of the subsidized firm 
more than compensates for the other firm's export contraction, so that the price fall is 
associated with an increase in the total sales. Social welfare in the subsidizing country - 
i.e. home profits net of the subsidy expenses - is increased. This occurs despite the fact 
that the contribution of the subsidy to the domestic exporter's profit exactly offsets the 
cost of the subsidy to the government. Intuitively this can be explained as follows. The 
subsidy deters foreign companies ffom competing on a larger scale for lucrative markets 
because they recognize that the domestic company has a cost advantage due to the 
subsidy. The foreign competitor is forced to restrict his output and leave a larger market 
share for the subsidized firm. This is the essence of the profit-shifting argument for export 
subsidization.
Clearly, such a situation will induce the foreign government to retaliate by setting 
up its own subsidy scheme. This leads to a situation of strategic trade policy where each 
government chooses its optimal subsidy, taking as given the other government's subsidy 
scheme and correctly anticipating the effect of policies on the market equilibrium. The 
resulting non-cooperative policy equilibrium is characterized by positive export subsidies 
in both countries. The crucial feature of this equilibrium is that the subsidies are too high, 
i.e. both countries would benefit ffom a bilateral reduction in subsidy levels. Policy 
cooperation (i.e. joint welfare maximization), as opposed to individually optimal policies, 
would call for substantially lower subsidies.^ "^
^ In fact, when the subsidized good is not consumed in the producer countries, then joint welfare maximisation 
entails taxation o f exports.
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6.4.2 Ex post subsidization and price competition
The argument outlined in the previous subsection has recently been challenged by 
Carmichael (1987). He argued that the practice of the United States' Eximbank and other 
EGAs is to decide on the subsidy only after the export contracts are signed. Moreover, the 
subsidy is not given in form of a production (or output) subsidy but rather as a price 
subsidy. This means that the assumptions discussed in the previous subsection may not 
be the appropriate ones, but would have to be modified. As will be explained in the 
following paragraphs, which are based in part on articles by Carmichael (1987), 
Gruenspecht (1988), and Neaiy (1989), these modifications change the conclusions fix>m 
the previous subsection completely.
Consider the case where firms ffom two countries export differentiated products 
and engage in price competition, i.e. they set their prices optimally, and the quantities are 
determined by the demand side in the market of the third country. Suppose that the 
governments choose optimal price subsidies after all export contracts have been signed.^  ^
Each government is assumed to maximize its national welfare which is equal to its 
exporters' total profits minus the cost of the subsidies. Denote by 6 the opportunity cost 
of public funds and note that the home exporters' profits are increasing in the subsidy. 
With a positive 5, the optimal subsidy will not be arbitrarily high since subsidization is 
costly for the government.
Rational firms will anticipate the governments' policies. The subsidy scheme gives 
the subsidized firms an incentive to charge higher prices in order to benefit ffom a higher 
subsidy. This effectively relaxes price competition between the firms ffom the two 
countries. As long as demand is sufficiently inelastic, this will lead to higher prices and 
higher profits in both exporting countries. Thus, the subsidy scheme implemented in one 
country increases profits and welfare at home and in the competing country. Profits of 
firms in both exporting countries are increased at the expense of the consumers in the 
importing country.
Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown that if the government moves first (ex ante policy), its optimal export 
subsidy is negative, i.e. the optimal pohcy is to tax exports.
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The subsidy scheme has two effects. On the one hand, as in the Brander-Spencer 
model, it shifts oligopoly rents to the subsidized firm. On the other, it weakens price 
competition, instead of intensifying quantity competition, as in the Brander-Spencer 
model. The optimal subsidy depends on two factors, the opportunity cost of public funds 
6 and the elasticity of demand. For expositional purposes, the special case of perfectly 
inelastic demand (i.e. of pure market share rivalry) is considered. In this case, home 
welfare is increasing in the level of 6.^  ^ For example, for very low values of 6, the 
subsidy scheme lowers home welfare because the firms can use their first mover 
advantage to "exploit" their government by charging excessively high prices. The 
government is then forced to pay a high subsidy in order to maximize national welfare, 
given such excessively high prices. For moderate (and according to Gruenspecht, more 
realistic) values of 6, the subsidy program increases both home profits and welfare. In 
such a situation, home firms can extract less subsidy ffom their government because the 
latter values the costs of these subsidies higher. This leads to more moderate, i.e. lower 
price markups and subsidies than in cases where Ô is low.^ ^
Thus, this model leads to conclusions which are diametrically opposed to the 
standard view on export subsidization expressed in the previous subsection. A subsidy 
scheme in one exporting country increases profits and welfare in the other exporting 
country. This is in sharp contrast to the widespread view of subsidies, according to which 
the subsidy provided by one government hurts the other government and provokes 
retaliation in form of a subsidy. Here, each country benefits ffom the other country's 
subsidies. The precise strategic situation between the two governments depends on the 
shadow costs of public funds in both countries.
For example, given moderate opportunity costs of public funds in both countries, 
each government prefers the other country to run a subsidy scheme so that it can ffee-ride
^ Clearly, with elastic demand the result is weakened. The subsidy will tend to have a smaller effect on equilibriinn 
prices.
^ For very large values of 5, the government will find it optimal to tax exports because they represent an efficient 
tax base.
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on Each government has an incentive to start a subsidy scheme when there is none, 
but it prefers the other government to do it. If one government runs a subsidy scheme, the 
other one does not have an incentive to introduce such a scheme. The situation is different 
if there are relatively high Ô in both countries. There will be an incentive for both 
governments to run a subsidy scheme irrespective of what the other one does. The 
intuition is that, due to its high 6, the foreign government tends to choose a relatively low 
level of subsidies. Knowing this, the home government will realize that, by providing 
itself a low subsidy, it can increase home welfare. The fact that it has a high Ô itself 
assures it that it will not have to pay excessively high subsidies. Therefore, for relatively 
large shadow costs of public funds in both countries, the model predicts that both 
governments will set up a subsidy scheme and reach a higher welfare than under ffee 
trade, i.e. without any subsidization. Table 6.1 summarizes the predictions of the model 
for different constellations of Ô in both countries.
Table 6.1: Noncooperative policy equilibria in a model with export subsidization
and price competition
low foreign Ô moderate foreign ô high foreign 5
low home § no subsidy 
program
foreign subsidy foreign subsidy
moderate home 5 home subsidy home subsidy or 
foreign subsidy 
("Chicken Game")
foreign subsidy
high home 6 home subsidy home subsidy home subsidy and 
foreign subsidy
Source: Gruenspecht (1988).
Explanation; home subsidy = home country government establishes subsidy scheme, 
foreign subsidy = foreign country government establishes subsidy scheme, 
Ô = opportunity cost of public funds.
“ In terms of the literature of game theory, the strategic pohcy described here can be viewed as a 'chicken game' 
while the one described by Brander and Spencer can be viewed as a 'prisoner's dilemma game'. An introduction to the 
prisoners' dilemma game and the chicken game can be found in Rasmussen (1989).
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The conclusions from this section could be summarized as follows. The Brander- 
Spencer model captures the most widespread view on export subsidies. It predicts that 
subsidization increases profits and welfare in the subsidizing countries, although 
competing governments are induced to choose too high levels of subsidies. Importing 
countries do benefit from those subsidies. All governments of exporting countries have 
a common interest to agree on multilateral subsidy reductions. This view is challenged by 
the Carmichael-Gruenspecht model. It is based on more realistic assumptions about export 
subsidization through EGAs; namely, that the subsidy level is set after export contracts 
have been signed and that firms use the price as a strategic variable when competing for 
export contracts. The model predicts that subsidization would increase profits and welfare 
in the exporting countries. In situations where the governments in several exporting 
countries have established subsidy schemes, none of them would benefit from multilateral 
subsidy reductions. However, the importing countries may benefit from such reductions; 
namely, if they suffer from the existence of these subsidy schemes.
6.5 The interaction of goals
The two previous sections discussed separately the two roles of EGAs in offering 
insurance and promoting exports, respectively. This section discusses how these goals 
interact, i.e. whether they are complementary or conflicting when pursued simultaneously. 
As mentioned earlier, this question is very important for evaluating the involvement of 
EGAs in export promotion, since the arguments discussed in section 6.4 - while giving 
some justification for export subsidies - do not imply that these subsidies should be 
provided through the insurance contracts. The third goal mentioned in the introduction, 
i.e. development assistance, is considered as well.
6.5.1 Insurance and export promotion
Insurance against the risk of default enables some exporters to make export deals 
which they could not make without the insurance because of the costs associated with the
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risk. This aspect, reflecting the efficiency gain from insurance, is of course very 
important. However, as noted in section 6.3, the private sector may achieve a similar 
outcome as public ECI, even in the presence of asymmetric information.
Moreover, although the models on export promotion reviewed in section 6.4 do 
provide a justification of general export subsidization in some specific circumstances, they 
do not imply the necessity to subsidize particularly through an ECA. A general export 
subsidy may be a more appropriate means than subsidization through ECI. The problem 
of the latter form of subsidization is that only those exporters benefit from it which buy 
insurance contracts. Given that most ECAs insure less than 25% of the exports from their 
country, it seems ineffective to promote only such a small subgroup of exporters. 
Moreover, this might result in allocative distortions.
Thus, in order to justify export subsidization specifically through an ECA, one has 
to show that export subsidies can be used to offset other distortions inherent in ECI. The 
cases of moral hazard and adverse selection discussed in section 6.3 are examples of such 
distortions. The question therefore is whether export subsidies can improve efficiency by 
relaxing the incentive compatibility constraints on the insurance contracts offered by the 
ECA. As it turns out, this is not possible. In two recent papers, Dixit (1987 and 1989) 
shows that free trade is optimal for a small open economy even in the presence of moral 
hazard or adverse selection in the export sector. This means that, as long as the world 
markets are competitive, the problems of asymmetric information in export credit 
insurance do not constitute a justification for any export subsidies.
Dixit's analysis implies that, if export promotion is to provide a reason for 
subsidizing ECAs, this has to be as a third-best argument, i.e. the intervention in the ECI 
market has to alleviate some distortions other than those created by the asymmetry of 
information. Such a case could be constructed using one of the models discussed in 
section 6,4, where the additional distortion is due to the oligopolistic structure of the 
export market. The question then is, whether, in the presence of asymmetric information 
in ECI, the optimal subsidies derived from these models should be provided through the 
insurance contract and not directly on the export contract. The following argument in
212
favour of subsidization through the insurance contract could be developed: The incidence 
of direct subsidies on each export contract will be uniform across all exporters while 
subsidization through an ECA allows the government to differentiate among them. A 
differentiated subsidization could allow it to set better incentives, i.e. by rewarding risk- 
reducing efforts under moral hazard and easing self-selection under adverse selection.
6.5.2 Export promotion and development assistance
Probably the most controversial goal of ECAs is that of development aid for the 
importing countries. There are basically two ways in which benefits may arise in the 
importer's country. First, it is clear that importers, in general, will also share some of the 
efficiency gains ffom insurance. But again this holds independently of any subsidization. 
Second, it is often argued that the export subsidy is - at least to some extent - passed on 
to consumers in the importing country in the form of lower prices. This effect is much 
less clear than the first one. As already discussed in the previous section, it is not 
necessarily the case that a subsidy scheme will lead to lower prices.
It is very important to note that the effect of a subsidy on prices depends 
particularly on the elasticity of demand and the form of competition, i.e. price or quantity 
competition and the timing of the subsidy provision. For example, the Brander-Spencer 
model supports the view that subsidies lead to price reductions and therefore to benefits 
for the consumers in the importing country, which in many cases is a developing one.^^  
However, as mentioned before, for the description of export credit insurance the 
Carmichael-Gruenspecht model appears to be more appropriate. It suggests the opposite 
of the Brander-Spencer model; namely, that subsidies may induce prices to go up and that 
consumers in the importing countries may suffer ffom the subsidy schemes set up by the 
exporting countries. Thus there may exist a logical conflict between the goals of export 
promotion and development aid. Under these circumstances, no government could 
rationally claim to pursue both goals simultaneously through a subsidized ECA. It could 
either claim to promote exports, implying a Carmichael-Gruenspecht-type scenario, in
Again, this does not justify the subsidy provision particularly through an ECA.
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which case the importing countries will be harmed; or it could claim to provide 
development assistance, implying a Brander-Spencer-type scenario.
6.6 An estimation of the effective subsidies
6.6.1 An adaptive expectations method
The discussion in the previous sections showed that there is no general theoretical 
justification for export subsidization through an ECA. This section is concerned with an 
estimation of the actual export credit subsidies provided by selected official ECAs. Two 
different methods are used, both relying on the assumption of symmetric information. The 
first was developed by Abraham (1990) and assumes that ECAs form adaptive 
expectations about the occurrence of claims. He estimates the effective subsidy for a 
sample of ECAs ffom four countries during the period between 1973 and 1987. The 
present study applies his method to data containing a sample of ECAs ffom 16 countries 
during the period between 1984 and 1990. Furthermore, another estimation method is 
developed here which yields estimates ffom 1981 to 1990. The data used here include 
claims, recoveries, premium income, and exports insured for 16 ECAs during the period 
ffom 1981 to 1990. They are collected ffom various issues of Euromoney's "Guide to 
Export Finance" and Trade Finance,
In general, when the insurer provides subsidized ECI, the cost saving to the 
exporter (or his bank extending the export credit) amounts to the difference between the 
actual insurance contributions and the insurance premium income that would allow the 
insurer to break even. This income should be generated by an actuarially fair premium 
rate °^ - which is the one that guarantees that the premium income exactly covers the 
expected losses ffom an insurance contract - corrected by a markup compensating for the 
expenses associated with the insurer's operations. Since data about such operational 
expenses are difficult to collect, this study follows Abraham and uses just the fair
“ A distinction is made here between the premium rates, i.e. the charges expressed in terms o f a percentage of the 
credit value insured, and the premiums or premium income which corresponds to the amount paid by the insured.
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premium rate (i.e. excluding operational expenses) for the estimation of the subsidies. 
Consequently, the figures underestimate the zero-profit premium rate and thus 
underestimate the true subsidies.^’ In any year t, the actuarially fair premium rate p* 
could be defined as
p, ■ «>
where represents the total claims, denotes the recoveries, and % the insured volume, 
all in year t. However, this definition poses several problems for the estimates. The main 
problem arises ffom the fact that due to aggregate risk, at the time the insurance contracts 
are signed and premia are paid, the future total claims are not known but can only be 
estimated. Thus a short-term mismatch between claims and premia might not be the result 
of a subsidization policy, but of expectational errors due to an unanticipated shock. By 
contrast, the accumulation over a long period of sustained losses can be interpreted as an 
indicator of subsidization. Thus the estimation of subsidies requires that the expectation 
formation of the insurer is taken into account, so that a distinction can be made between 
expected losses (= effective subsidies) and unexpected losses. Following Abraham, the 
actuarially fair premium rate p"^  in any period t is estimated as follows:
P t^  ^
^  1 ^  ^ t - 2  ^ - 2  ^  3 ^  3
Vt-I V,_3
/  3 , (2)
with Ct_i denoting the actual claims in year t - i, R^ .; the actual recoveries in year t - i, and 
Vt_i the value of the outstanding insurance contracts in year t - i, for i = 1,2,3. This 
estimate of a fair premium, which is based on information about past claims and insurance 
contracts, embodies the concept of adaptive expectations. The fair premium in any 
particular year is computed as the average of the net claims - the difference between 
claims and recoveries - of the last three years, as a percentage of insured contracts. Note 
that the concept of adaptive expectations implies that any new information which is not 
reflected in historical data is ignored. For example, an ECA with such an expectation 
formation mechanism would fully account for the effects of a shock such as the outbreak
The operational expenses (or administrative costs) are normally said to account for 15 to 30% of tiie insurer's 
premium income.
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of the debt crisis only after three years. A "subsidy-equivalent amount", s^, is then 
obtained as follows. The fair premium rate, is multiplied by the value of the newly 
insured contracts of a particular year, %, to obtain expected future net claims. The 
observed premium income, P*, is subtracted from this.^  ^ Formally,
s.'" = p y ,  -  p,
The "subsidy-equivalent rate", s ,^ is defined as the subsidy-equivalent amount 
divided by the insured value, i.e.
= pf - PJV ,  . (4)
Table 6.2 lists the estimates of the subsidy-equivalent rates for the 16 countries of 
our sample. The following observations are singled out for special attention. First, the 
subsidy-equivalent is notable for almost all ECAs with the exceptions of Austria's 0KB, 
Canada's EDC, and New Zealand's EXGO.” These latter seem to slightly tax their 
exports. Second, there is an increase in the subsidy-equivalent during the second half of 
the 1980s for most agencies considered. The simple arithmetic average of subsidy- 
equivalent rates of all agencies considered rose from 1.4% in 1984 to 3.7% in 1990.^ ^^  
This finding is remarkable because the outbreak of the debt crisis can be dated back to 
1982. Thus, the results of the estimation give some support to the hypothesis that the 
ECAs did not adopt the appropriate restrictive policies as a response to the increased risk 
but tolerated higher losses. Even more, the results seem to point to an increase of the 
importance of such expected losses during the 1980's. Thus, the results confirm the 
findings of Abraham who used data for the ECAs of Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom, covering a period from 1973 until 1987.
It is important to note that the subsidy-equivalent that is estimated for an ECA can exceed the actual negative 
cash-flow of that ECA in the same year.
The results are qualitatively equivalent if only premium income and claims (and not recoveries) are used. Clearly 
the estimated subsidy-equivalents increase.
^ In fact, the subsicfy-eqmvalent increased for all of the large ECAs. Consequently, the average subsidy equivalent 
would be even higher if it was weighted by the amounts insured.
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Table 6.2: Estimates of subsidy-equivalent rates of selected ECAs, 1984 - 1990
(adaptive expectations method)^ *^
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 0  84-90
EFIC, Australia -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 0.3 1.9 1.9 0.3
0KB, Austria -0.8 0.2 -2.2 -0.8 -1.2 1.7 -0.3 - 0.5
OND, Belgium 1.3 1.7 2.2 1.8 2.2 2.5 3.7 2.2
EDC, Canada -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 - 0.4
FGB, Finland 1.6 1.9 1.8 3.0 3.1 2.0 1.1 2.1
COFACE, France 0.0 0.4 -0.7 0.7 2.5 4.3 4.3 1.7
Hermes, Germany 0.9 1.8 2.9 3.3 3.9 4.9 5.7 3.3
SACE, Italy 1.8 5.3 7.2 9.0 12.1 15.6 13.5 9.2
NCM, Netherlands 0.4 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.1 0.8 0.9 1.5
EXGO, New Zealand -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 - 0.2
GIEK, Norway 10.2 12.4 9.4 7.9 7.2 8.5 6.5 8.9
CESCE, Spain 0.2 1.9 3.7 7.1 11.4 13.7 12.7 7.2
EKN, Sweden 1.9 2.9 2.4 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.2
ERG, Switzerland 4.8 6.2 5.5 6.8 10.5 10.0 9.3 7.6
ECGD, Utd. Kingdom 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.1
EXIM, United States 0.4 1.6 1.6 1.2 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.7
Source; own calculations based on data from Euromoney and Trade Finance.
(a) As a percentage of total exposure.
An important assumption which underlies this method must be mentioned. 
Premium payments, claims, and recoveries are assumed to materialise in the same period. 
In reality, claims on individual medium- and long-term insurance contracts might 
materialise only some years after the premium payments, and recoveries only some years 
after the payment of claims.^  ^ However, this problem is not too serious because the time 
pattern of premium payments, claims, and recoveries appears to be relatively stable, and
In addition, claims are generally paid only after the so-called claims-waiting period, which is the period between 
the actual materializing of losses and the payments of claims by the ECA.
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because most insurance contracts are short-term, anyway/^ In addition, the literature on 
export credit insurance suggests that insurance companies normally do not attempt to 
match premia and claims on an individual contract basis and that official ECAs in 
particular focus on annual aggregate amounts of claims, premium income, etc..
6.6.2 An interagency comparison method
ECAs systematically collect data concerning economic, political, and legal factors, 
both from public sources and from their own experience. This subsection describes an 
alternative approach of estimating subsidy-equivalent rates, which is based on the 
hypothesis that all agencies derive their forecasts of the risk, making the best use of all 
information available to them. In other words, they do not make any "avoidable" or 
systematic errors, they form rational expectations. To calculate the fair premium rates, one 
should ideally use the same information as the agencies. Since this detailed information 
is not available, the following indirect approach is taken here. It is assumed that ECAs 
are symmetric in the sense they have (i) the same abilities and resources for the 
forecasting of default on the export credits insured by them and (ii) sufficiently diversified 
portfolios, so that, in each year, they face only the aggregate risk, which is the same for 
all. These assumptions imply that, in any given year, if some agencies manage to avoid 
losses, then all other agencies could have done the same. Additional losses must then be 
interpreted as intentional. Thus one can define the subsidy-equivalent of any agency as 
the excess losses compared to those incurred by the best performing ECAs. Consequently, 
the subsidy-equivalent rate s® for agency i (i = 1,...,16) is calculated as follows:
gB  ^ .5 _ -  1  E S  ~ ~ . (5)
whereby Australia's EFIC, Austria's 0KB, Canada's EDC, and New Zealand's EXGO are 
chosen as reference group (j = 1,..,4). The results of these estimations are shown in 
table 6.3.
“ For example, Abraham (1990, p.30) reports that 75 to 90% of all transactions during the 1980's on account of 
the Belgian official ECA were short-term.
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The main findings are the following ones. There are some agencies with a 
systematically higher loss rate than the agencies of the reference group. Examples are 
COFACE of France, SACE of Italy, GIEK of Norway, and ERG of Switzerland. Hermes 
of Germany, CESCE of Spain, and ECGD of the United Kingdom are also characterized 
by significant subsidy-equivalent rates in most years. By contrast, the results for EFIC of 
Australia, 0KB of Austria, EDC of Canada, EXGO of New Zealand, and Eximbank of 
the United States seem to suggest that losses are the result of expectational errors, rather 
than intentional.
The agencies which are relatively large in terms of the proportion of exports 
insured are characterized by substantial subsidy-equivalent rates. The relative importance 
for their countries of the subsidies provided by ECAs could be measured as follows. By 
multiplying the share of insured exports in total exports of a country with the subsidy- 
equivalent rate for its ECA, one obtains a measure of the subsidy-equivalent in relation 
to total exports. According to this measure, the subsidies are relatively important for Spain 
(0.60%), France (0.51%), the United Kingdom, and Italy (both 0.43%) but less for 
Germany (0.19%). Thus, while the estimates for the subsidy-equivalent rates for Hermes 
of Germany are comparatively high (as shown in table 6.3), the relative importance of 
subsidies for German total exports appears to be relatively low because only a fairly small 
portion of these exports are insured by Hermes. This is illustrated in table 6.4.
The subsidy-equivalent rates are minimal only for those agencies which are 
relatively small in terms of exports insured.^  ^ The following tentative interpretations are 
suggested here. If an agency insures only a small portion of its country's exports, it is 
unlikely to become an effective tool of trade policy anyway. Another related explanation 
could be that those agencies which are used by their governments as tools for trade policy 
have attracted more exporters and thus became larger, precisely because their rates are 
subsidized. Since the present study does not have access to the detailed information 
available to the agencies, any further interpretation of the obtained estimation results 
would be highly speculative and is therefore omitted here.
This includes the Eximbank of the United States which insures only an equivalent of 10 to 15% of the amount 
insured by COFACE of France.
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6.6.3 The two methods revisited
This subsection briefly compares the two methods in the light of their estimation 
results. Comparing tables 6.2 and 6.3, one can see that the results of the two methods are 
broadly similar, i.e. the overall picture of the relative importance of subsidies among 
agencies, is similar according to both methods. The estimates of the averages of the 
subsidy-equivalent rates per agency during the period from 1984 to 1990 (last column in 
table 6.2 and second-last in table 6.3) are similar.^*
The interagency comparison method appears to be particularly attractive because 
it allows to use the complete time series of data, unlike the adaptive expectations method 
which "looses" some observations at the beginning of the time series. This is an important 
advantage of the former method, since the number of available observations is limited 
anyway. The estimates obtained using the latter method show that the average subsidy- 
equivalent rate for most agencies are sensitive to the time period considered. The 
estimates of average subsidy-equivalent rates obtained for the period from 1981 to 1990 
are higher for most agencies than the ones obtained for the period from 1984 to 1990. 
This difference is more significant than the one between the estimates according to the 
two alternative methods for the same time period. In sum, the results obtained from any 
one of the two methods are similar; both point to the hypothesis that the major officially 
supported ECAs provide their insured exporters with notable subsidies.
The Pearsonian correlation coefficient is 0.99.
Table 6 J :  Estimates of subsidy-equivalent rates of selected ECAs, 1981 - 1990 (interagency performance comparison/*^
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average
1984-90
Average
1981-90
EFIC, Australia^^ 0.3 - 0.8 - 0.7 - 0.5 1.3 - 2.3 3.8 3.8 - 0.1 - 2.0 0.3 0.6
OKB, Austria^^ - 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 - 1.6 4.1 -4 .6 - 1.8 - 0.4 1.6 - 0.1 - 0.3
OND, Belgium 0.7 0.7 2.1 2.2 3.3 - 0.2 4.9 2.1 4.2 1.2 2.1 2.5
EDC, Canada^> 0.4 - 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 1.2 - 2.7 1.2 - 2.7 0.7 - 1.2 - 0.4 - 0.6
FGB, Finland 1.2 0.7 1.9 2.1 4.5 4.1 4.5 - 0.7 6.6 - 3.0 2.2 2.6
COFACE, France 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.6 5.2 3.5 4.4 3.3 2.0 2.6
Hermes, Germany 1.0 - 0.7 2.4 4.1 4.4 1.5 7.0 3.1 7.5 8.2 3.9 5.1
SACE, Italy 0.8 0.8 6.8 6.7 12.1 8.4 16.4 16.7 5.8 1.0 7.6 9.6
NCM, Netherlands 0.0 - 0.4 1.6 3.0 4.0 - 0.5 2.9 - 1.0 2.3 - 0.2 1.2 1.5
EXGO, New Zealand^^ 0.5 - 0.4 - 0.3 0.0 1.7 - 2.3 1.6 - 2.4 0.7 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.2
GIEK, Norway 0.2 11.0 15.5 8.0 5.2 8.5 8.8 6.1 5.0 5.5 7.4 6.7
CESCE, Spain -0 .3 - 1.1 1.1 5.4 5.5 7.6 21.9 8.9 8.6 4.9 6.3 9.0
EKN, Sweden 3.5 3.5 2.7 2.0 3.5 -0 .5 4.9 - 0.4 4.1 4.8 2.8 2.6
ERG, Switzerland 2.6 6.1 4.4 2.6 9.5 4.5 18.2 4.4 6.9 3.6 6.3 7.1
ECGD, Utd. Kingd. 0.5 0.4 1.8 2.1 3.9 0.1 5.2 0.0 3.4 1.0 1.8 2.2
EXIM, United States 0.5 -0 .2 1.2 3.6 2.5 - 2.6 2.4 -2 .6 1.7 - 2.3 0.4 0.4
wK>O
Source: own calculations based on data from Euromoney and Trade Finance.
(a) As a percentage o f total exposure (b) Agencies representing the reference group.
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Table 6.4: The relative importance of the estimated subsidy rates using the
example of France and Germany
(in per cent)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
France
Sp 0 .6 0 .8 1 .0 0 .1 1 .0 0 .6 5.2 3.5 4.4 3.3
ip 32 33 34 24 25 23 2 2 23 24 25
mp 0 .2 0 0.26 0.34 0 .0 2 0.25 0.13 1.17 0.80 1.06 0.84
Germany
Sg 1*0 -0.7 2.4 4.1 4.4 1.5 7.0 3.1 7.5 8 .2
iG 9 9 8 7 6 5 5 5 4 4
m e  0 .1 0 -0.07 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.07 0.32 0.14 0.32 0.32
Source: own calculations based on data fixim Trade Finance.
Explanation: Sp and Sg denote the subsidy rates o f COFACE of France and Hermes o f Germany,
Xp and Iq denote the share of insured exports as of total exports in France and Germany, 
respectively,
mp and nig denote the subsidy rate in terms of total French and German exports.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
The analysis finds support for the hypothesis that unfavourable external financial 
indicators and deteriorating creditworthiness of debtor countries tend to saddle their 
imports with increased transaction costs, as greater use is made of more expensive 
financing and payment arrangements. The rise in transaction costs appears to be 
particularly evident in the increases in the interest rate spreads in debt instruments issued 
by borrowers ffom such countries in international capital markets. However, the price at 
which insurance cover was available for export credits to those countries, i.e. the premium 
rates for export credit insurance, ffom officially supported export credit agencies seemed 
to have varied only very little. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of these premium rates 
was not feasible because of the lack of data.
We analyzed in greater detail the determination of the export credit insurance 
premium rates for a cross-section of developing countries by a private export credit 
insurer, which appeared not to have received any significant official support. The 
empirical results are in line with some of the implications of our theoretical premium 
determination concept. For example, the empirical results provide support for the 
hypothesis that the solvency and the liquidity indicators of a debtor country determine the 
premium rates applying to it. The less favourable these indicators, the higher are such 
premium rates. This is reflected in the results of regression analyses; specifically, the 
premium rates applying to debtor countries are significantly positively related to the debt- 
service ratio (included as a solvency indicator) and significantly negatively related to the 
reserves-over-imports ratio (included as a liquidity indicator) of those countries. There is 
some support for the hypothesis that the liquidity indicator is more important than the 
solvency one; the coefficients estimated for the former are greater, and significant at 
higher levels, than those for the latter ratio.
There is also evidence for the hypothesis that the volatility of the rate of change 
of the liquidity and solvency positions of debtor countries determines the premium rates 
for export credit insurance applying to them. This implies that the more volatile such rates
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of change, the higher are the premium rates. This is reflected in positive and significant 
estimates of the coefficients for the (historical) volatility of the rates of change of these 
external financial ratios in the regressions for premium rates. The volatility of the rate of 
change of the liquidity indicator appears to be relatively more important than that of the 
solvency indicator, the estimated point elasticity with respect to the former being higher 
than that with respect to the latter.
If one wants to draw a policy implication from our empirical results, it is that if 
a country is concerned about minimizing its costs of external financing, it should aim at 
a smooth development of its external financial ratios. But the conceptual analysis reported 
in this thesis does not allow us to make suggestions about ways to achieve such 
smoothing, since the development of the debt-servicing capacity is taken as exogenous.
The distinction between private debt and public (and publicly guaranteed) debt is 
relevant when the government of a debtor country does not extend guarantees for parts 
of the private external debt and gives priority to the servicing of the public or publicly 
guaranteed debt over the private debt if the total external debt service obligations of the 
country cannot be met in full. Provided that the government has control over all foreign 
exchange transactions, it can exert discretion over debt-servicing flows and direct foreign 
exchange reserves, giving priority to the servicing of the public and publicly guaranteed 
debt over the servicing of private debt. Under these circumstances private debt is more 
expensive than public debt. The costs of issuing private debt rise both with an increasing 
stock of private debt and with an increasing stock of public debt, but those of issuing 
public debt rise only with an increasing stock of public debt. If additional assumptions are 
introduced in the form of inefficiency losses on public debt, meaning that public activity 
reduces the country's debt-servicing capacity, and in the form of the higher default costs 
generally associated with private debt than with public debt, the costs of a country's 
external financing may be a non-monotonic and discontinuous function of the share of 
public debt in total external debt. For example, as long as the debtor country's debt- 
servicing capacity is high compared to its contractual debt service, the minimum of the 
external financing costs may be obtained when all external debt is private. The reason is 
that default is fairly unlikely in this situation, so that the expected high costs associated
224
with private debt defaults are given only a small probability weighting by the country's 
creditors; on the other hand, the efficiency losses from the financing of government debt 
occur immediately and are positive even at the margin. If the debt-servicing capacity is 
relatively low, the cost-minimizing share of public debt in total external debt may well 
be much higher, since raising the government's debt share reduces the expected default 
costs associated with the private debt of the country which - at a low level of debt- 
servicing capacity - is a factor to reckon with.
The conceptual analysis of export credit insurance is based on the idea that the 
premium rates should match the present discounted value of the expected loss associated 
with the transaction, i.e. the concept is based on the idea of the "fair" premium rate. This 
concept may be used by an ECA which wants to calculate risk-based credit insurance 
benchmark premium rates. It can be applied to each individual country destination on a 
consistent basis, and the actual premia calculation can be done on a routine basis using 
standard software packages such as SAS. The concept can be extended further. It may 
take into account the differences in the probability of return and the recoveries in default 
between private debt, on the one hand, and public and publicly guaranteed debt, on the 
other.
However, in the practice of the major officially supported export credit guarantee 
agencies such expected losses appear not to determine the premium rates that are actually 
applied. There is evidence for the hypothesis that the premium rates are often lower than 
the discounted expected net losses associated with the insurance, i.e. that their export 
credit insurances are provided at subsidized rates. For example, as Daniel Bond, the vice- 
president and chief economist of the United States Eximbank puts it in his report about 
the estimation of the subsidy element in Eximbank's insurance activity, "until recently no 
attempt was made to explicitly estimate the potential magnitude of such losses for each 
transaction. Rather the fee structure was designed so that Eximbank fees would be highly 
competitive with the fees charged by other export credit agencies" (Bond (1992, p.2)). 
While other types of subsidies in international trade and trade financing have been deemed 
to be unfair measures of export promotion for a long time, this type of subsidy has not 
been an issue in international fora until recently. The reason may be a failure of
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recognition or the apparent problems associated with the subsidy's measurement. In his 
above mentioned report, Daniel Bond explains one approach to the measurement of the 
subsidy element in export credit insurance. It is based on the idea of using as reference 
rates the risk premia that can be observed on the markets for other debt instruments, such 
as the spreads in international bond issues. The underlying hypothesis is that these spreads 
reflect the perception of the risk associated with the bond-issuing country.^ However, 
there are several limitations to this concept, of which we would like to single out for 
special attention that it cannot be applied to all debtor countries on a consistent basis. A 
large number of countries for which exporters seek an export credit insurance have not 
issued any bonds.
Our concept of fair premium rates provides another approach to measuring the 
subsidy element in any individual insurance contract. If the country-specific (risk-based) 
benchmark premia were subtracted from the premia that are actually applied by any 
officially supported ECA to those countries, it would be possible to obtain estimates of 
the subsidy elements in the transactions with each of these countries. Unfortunately, data 
on the premium rates that were actually applied by the different EGAs to individual 
country destinations and on the debtor country-specific losses, exports insured, etc. were 
not available. Therefore, the subsidies provided by these agencies were estimated on the 
basis of their annual net cash-flow results. Two methods were used, one by Abraham 
(1990) and our own method, and the results obtained from them were broadly similar. 
They seem to justify the hypothesis that most of the major officially supported EGAs 
provide their exporters with considerable subsidies.
One specific justification for the provision of subsidies in export credit insurance 
is that they reduce the costs of import financing by debtor countries in adverse external 
financial situations - in accordance with the view that importers cannot lose from 
accepting export credit subsidies (Fleisig and Hill (1983)). This argument indeed holds 
under perfect, but not under, imperfect competition. In the latter case, and if account is
’ It should be noted that this concept is vahd only if markets are information-efficient. Furthermore, it requires that 
the risks associated with export credits and Eurobonds are sim ilar because otherwise the two types of risk premia would 
not be comparable.
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taken of the institutional circumstances under which export credit insurance cover is 
provided, such subsidization may harm rather than benefit the importing country. The 
reason is that the subsidization of exporters, from one or from many exporting countries, 
may relax the price competition between exporters on the market of the importing country 
(Carmichael (1987), Gruenspecht (1988)).
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List of symbols 
Chapter 2:
B, = price in period t of defaultable bond with face value one
b. = interest rate on defaultable bonds in period t
c, = consumption in period t
D. = stock of debt in period t
D,’‘ = exceptional financing in period t
D syx, = debt-service ratio in period t
I, = foreign exchange spending on imports in period t
F, = number of default-free foreign securities purchased in period
KB, = balance of capital transactions in period t
LBj = current account balance in period t
= number of bonds issued abroad in period t
NT, = net transfer in period t
R = price of foreign securities
r = interest rate on default-free foreign securities
X, foreign exchange earnings from exports in period t
Chapter 3:
b = nominal yield of defaultable debt instruments
P = social preference rate
Q = consumption in period t
D = total nominal value of debt instruments issued
= debt ceiling
Y = default penalty parameter
I = investment
= investment ceiling
I = rate of return on investment
K = probability of default (in period t + 1 ,  viewed from period t)
r = interest rate on default-free debt instrument
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r = stochastic return on a debt instrument
U(‘) = utility from consumption
X, = endowment of transferable resources in period t
X = stochastic resource endowment
Chapter 4:
At
B , =
b,
D . =
E,
N, =
r =
R
Wt
Kt =
71^
o '
O(-) =
actual debt service in period t
price (value) of risky (i.e. defaultable) claim in period t 
interest rate of risky (i.e. defaultable) claim in period t 
contractual debt service in period t
expectational operator, i.e. expectation conditional on the information 
available in period t
price (value) of insurance of one risky claim in period t
price (value) of insurance of risky outstanding debt in period t
number of claims issued at time t
interest rate of risk-less claim
price (value) of risk-less claim
Wiener process
debt-servicing capacity in period t 
trend growth rate of
probability of default in period t + 1 ,  viewed from period t 
volatility of rate of changes in 
standard normal distribution function
Chapter 5:
A,
A', =
A°, =
actual debt-service (payments) in period t 
actual debt-service (payments) on public bonds in period t 
actual debt-service (payments) on private bonds in period t 
pay-off per public external bond in period t 
pay-off per private external bond in period t
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F, = stock of private external debt (zero-coupon bonds with face value one) in
period t
G( = stock of public external debt (zero-coupon bonds with face value one) in
period t
R = price of risk-less bond
“ spread of a (synthetical) average bond in period t
s^ t = spread of a private external bond in period t
s° = spread of a public external bond in period t
-  average value (price) of external bonds in period t
Z^ t = value (price) of a private external bond in period t
Z° = value (price) of a public external bond in period t
z^ t = nominal yield of private external bonds in period t
z° = nominal yield of public external bonds in period t
C = public debt inefficiency parameter
= debt-servicing capacity in period t
[I = trend growth rate of
= volatility of rate of changes in
0  (•) = standard normal distribution function
0 ) = share of public in total external debt
Chapter 6:
Ct = total claims in period t
Pt actuarially fair premium in period t
Pt estimated actuarially fair premium in period t
Rt = recoveries in period t
S, estimated subsidy-equivalent rate
Vt = insured volume in period t
s = opportunity costs of public funds
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Page 73: Replace in the paragraph (i) 'were always' by 'was almost always'.
Page 95: Replace in the last paragraph the text after '...appeared to be a problem of
multicollinearity,' by the following text.
..., among some regressors, particularly among those of the countries without rescheduling 
history. The multicollinearity among some of them is largely due to the specific way they 
were generated. They were obtained as the product of the original data vector and a dummy 
vector, so that the zero elements were identical among the regressors of each group of 
countries. To eliminate this effect, the full data set was divided into two subsets, one 
containing 25 observations for countries with a rescheduling record and the other one 
containing 27 observations for those without such a record. Thus, collinearity among pairs 
of regressors did not appear to be a serious problem, the adjusted R^  in regressions of one 
explanatory variable on another being usually well below 15%, except for the debt-service 
ratio and the reserves-over-IMF quota of countries without a rescheduling history, where 
it was close to 50%. OLS regressions were applied to each group separately, in which the 
two mentioned variables were not jointly included. The estimated coefficients for the 
regressors in each group were very similar to those shown in equation 2b of table 3.4 and 
the coefficients were relatively robust among different specifications.
The presence of collinearity may have been the result of the specification of the 
regressors as ratios. Thus it may be eliminated if we decompose the ratios into their 
numerators and denominators and include them as separate regressors. However, the 
variables that we are particularly interested in, such as the reserves, the debt-service, and 
the exports are highly correlated in both groups of countries, the simple correlation 
coefficient among some of them amounting to almost 0.80. Thus, when being jointly 
included, most variables were insignificant. The reserves were always negatively significant. 
We do not further discuss the statistical analysis of these variables, because we did not 
obtain any satisfactory results and, more importantly, because we believe that the ratios are 
more important determinants of the spreads than these absolute variables anyway. This is 
suggested in particular by our analysis in the second chapter.
Ill
The standard suggestion for overcoming the problem of collinearity is to try to 
increase the information content of the data by obtaining additional observations. This is 
not a helpful approach because we cannot obtain additional observations that are compatible 
with those included in our data set. Although the multicollinearity problem did not appear 
to be very serious, the results must be treated with some caution. Since the effect of 
multicollinearity is to increase the probability of type II error compared with the case in 
which the regressors are not correlated, its presence may have prevented the identification 
of some determinants of the spread.
The conceptual approach to the spread suggested that the country-specific 
macroeconomic variables are exogenous. However, some empirical variables may not be 
completely exogenous. Therefore, we estimate the determinants of the spread for each group 
of countries in an interdependent system with two-stage least squares. The instruments we 
used were the two-period lagged openness, the London interbank offered rate, the two- 
period lagged ratio of reserves-over-imports, the two-period lagged debt-service ratio and 
the time dummies. The results were similar to the ones obtained from OLS regressions. In 
particular, the openness was significant positively and the reserves-over-IMF quota 
significant negatively related to the spreads of countries with a rescheduling record, while 
the openness of countries without such a record was significant negatively related to their 
spreads. The simultaneity problem, if it exists, does not seem to be serious.
Page 215; Add the following after the last paragraph:
We divided the countries into two groups, one group containing the countries with 
no substantial subsidy-equivalent rate estimates (Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand 
and the United States) and those with such estimates (all other countries). We then analysed 
whether there are different patterns among the two groups as regards the underlying 
developments in net claims (claims net of recoveries), premium incomes, and amounts 
insured. The data on these variables are listed in table 6.5 (pages ix to xi of this 
addendum). A graphical analysis of them does not reveal any considerable differences 
between the patterns for the two groups of countries, except that the instances in which an 
agency's annual net claims exceed its premium income are particularly concentrated among
IV
those countries for which we have estimated substantial subsidy-equivalent rates. The 
identification of differences in the patterns is difficult because the data on net claims, 
premium incomes, and amounts insured fluctuate considerably during the observation period 
for most agencies of both groups. However, an analysis of the average rates of change in 
these variables during the observation period reveals the following. Both groups 
experienced on average a similar upward trend in premium incomes, though there were 
considerable differences among the individual countries of each group. The average upward 
trend in the premium income for the countries with substantial subsidy-equivalent rates was 
slightly smaller than the average upward trend in their net claims. The latter in turn was 
slightly higher than the upward trend in the claims for countries without substantial 
subsidy-equivalent rates. For most agencies, the upward movement in the premium income 
reflected both an upward trend in their activities, i.e. a positive rate of change in the 
volumes insured, and an improvement of the ratio of premium income to amounts insured. 
When focusing on the countries with substantial subsidy-equivalent rates, the former effect 
was more important than the latter. If the focus is on those without substantial subsidy- 
equivalent rate estimates, the latter was more important than the former. The improvement 
in the ratio of premium income to amounts insured was on average higher for the countries 
without substantial subsidy-equivalent rates than for those with such estimates. This 
suggests the hypothesis that the premium policy was an important factor possibly 
contributing to low subsidy-equivalent rate estimates. The Eximbank of the United States 
is a case in point. Its premium income was characterized by a positive trend while its total 
activity was characterised by a negative one. We found no evidence for the hypothesis that 
increases in activity were a dominant factor explaining the low subsidy-equivalent rate 
estimates for one group of agencies. This is supported by the finding that the Pearsonian 
correlation coefficient between the average rates of change of business activity and the 
average subsidy-equivalent rates is not significant.
Page 218: Replace the last two paragraphs by the following two;
The relative importance for a country of the subsidy-equivalent rates provided by 
its EGA could be measured as follows. By multiplying the shares of insured exports in total 
exports of a country with the subsidy-equivalent rate of its EGA, a measure of the subsidy-
equivalent in relation to total exports is obtained. Table 6.4 (pages vii to viii of this 
addendum) shows the subsidy-equivalent rates, the share of insured exports as of total 
exports and the measure of the relative importance of the subsidy-equivalent rates, i.e. the 
product of these two variables, for each agency and each year of the observation period. 
As can be seen from that table, the amount of exports being insured as a percentage of a 
country's total exports varies for the countries and years considered between 1.9% and 
45%; thus, the relative importance of the subsidy-equivalent rates differ from the absolute 
subsidy-equivalent rates. According to the former measure, the subsidy-equivalents are 
particularly important for Spain, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom, the average of the 
annual measures during the observation period (not shown in table 6.4) being 0.83%, 
0.56%, 0.53%, and 0.47%, respectively. They are less important for Switzerland (0.33%), 
Germany (0.24%), Netherlands (0.14%), Finland (0.13%), Sweden (0.12%), and Belgium 
(0.11%), and only marginally important for Australia (0.03%), and the United States , 
(0.01%), while they are negative for Austria, Canada, and New Zealand. In general, the 
higher the subsidy-equivalent rates, the higher tend to be the relative importance of the 
subsidy-equivalents. The correlation between the two measures is highly significant positive, 
the simple Pearsonian correlation coefficient being equal to 0.80. It is not perfect, though. 
Thus, while the estimates of the subsidy-equivalent rates may be comparatively high for an 
agency - such as for Hermes of Germany - the relative importance of subsidies for that 
country may be relatively low, because only a small portion of its exports are insured by 
that agency.
The subsidy-equivalent rates are minimal only for those agencies which are 
relatively small in terms of exports insured. The following tentative interpretations are 
suggested here. If an agency insures only a small amount of exports, it is unlikely to 
become an effective tool of trade policy anyway. Another related explanation could be that 
those agencies which are used by their governments as tools for trade policy have attracted 
more exporters, and thus become larger, precisely because their rates are subsidised. 
However, our data do not allow us to establish clear-cut evidence supporting this 
hypothesis. For almost no country with notable subsidy-equivalent rates, except for Spain, 
does a significantly positive relationship (measured by the Pearsonian correlation 
coefficient) exist between the share of its exports insured and the current or one-year lagged
VI
subsidy-equivalent rates of its ECA. Similarly, the subsidy-equivalent rates did not seem 
to 'Granger-cause' the share of exports insured. Since the present study did neither have 
a sufficient number of observations to justify a further statistical analysis nor the access to 
the detailed information available to the agencies, any further interpretation of the relation 
between these variables would be highly speculative and is therefore omitted here.
Page 221: Replace table 6.4 in the text by the one shown on the pages vii to viii of this 
addendum. After this table add the new table 6.5 which is shown on pages ix to xi of this 
addendum.
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Table 6.4: The relative importance of the estimated subsidy rates
(in per cent)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Australia s 0.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 1.3 -2.3 3.8 3.8 -0.1 -2
I 13 11.6 12.2 8.7 11.2 11.9 12 13 10 8.9
m 0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 0.14 -0.27 0.46 0.49 -0.01 -0.18
Austria s -0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 -1.6 4.1 -4.6 -1.8 -0.4 1.6
I 45 40 30 30 27 23 21 22 23 23
m -0.13 0.24 0.19 0.21 -0.44 0.95 -0.97 -0.39 -0.08 0.38
Belgium s 0.7 0.7 2.1 2.2 3.3 -0.2 4.9 2.1 4.2 1.2
I 7.3 7.4 5.5 5.1 5.1 4.6 4.7 4.8 3.3 4.1
m 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.17 -0.01 0.23 0.10 0.14 0.05
Canada s 0.4 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 1.2 -2.7 1.2 -2.7 0.7 -1.2
t 3.1 2.2 1.9 2 2 2.1 2.8 3 4.1 3.3
m 0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.04
Finland s 1.2 0.7 1.9 2.1 4.5 4.1 4.5 -0.7 6.6 -3
I 7.6 8.7 7 6 4.2 4 4.8 4 6 6.7
m 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.21 -0.19 0.40 -0.20
France s 0.6 0.8 1 0.1 1 0.6 5.2 3.5 4.4 3.3
t 32 33 34 24 25 23 22 23 24 25
m 0.20 0.26 0.34 0.02 0.25 0.13 1.17 0.80 1.06 0.84
Germany s 1 -0.7 2.4 4.1 4.4 1.5 7 3.1 7.5 8.2
I 9 9 8 7 6 5 5 5 4 4
m 0.10 -0.07 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.07 0.32 0.14 0.30 0.34
Italy s 0.8 0.8 6.8 6.7 12.1 8.4 16.4 16.7 5.8 1
I 14.3 12.3 7.7 7.8 6.7 4.2 2.4 5.7 7.2 8.4
m 0.11 0.09 0.52 0.52 0.81 0.35 0.39 0.95 0.42 0.08
Netherlands s 0 -0.4 1.6 3 4 -0.5 2.9 -1 2.3 -0.2
I 10.3 11.8 12 10.8 9.8 11.4 12.2 12.7 12.9 14.2
m 0 -0.04 0.19 0.32 0.39 -0.05 0.35 -0.13 0.30 -0.03
New s 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0 1.7 -2.3 1.6 -2.4 0.7 -0.4
Zealand I 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.9 10.4 9.3 8.5 7.5 7.2 7
m 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0 0.17 -0.21 0.14 -0.18 0.05 -0.03
(For source and explanation see end o f the table)
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Table 6.4: The relative importance of the estimated subsidy rates
(in per cent)
(concluded)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Norway s 0.2 11 15.5 8 5.2 8.5 8.8 6.1 5 5.5
I 3.7 3.2 3.5 2.4 5.5 5 5 5 3.6 3.6
m 0.01 0.35 0.54 0.19 0.29 0.43 0.44 0.30 0.18 0.20
Spain s -0.3 -1.1 1.1 5.4 5.5 7.6 21.9 8.9 8.6 4.9
I 22.6 24 13 11.8 12 11.4 9.2 9.5 8.9 11.1
m -0.07 -0.27 0.14 0.64 0.63 0.70 2.08 0.85 0.77 0.55
Sweden s 3.5 3.5 2.7 2 3.5 -0.5 4.9 -0.4 4.1 4.8
I 7.4 6.1 4.4 3.1 3.5 5 3.3 4 3.5 2
m 0.26 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.02 0.14 0.10
Switzerland s 2.6 6.1 4.4 2.6 9.5 4.5 18.2 4.4 6.9 3.6
I l U 6.4 10.4 6.2 4.7 3.5 2 2.3 2.5 2.6
m 0.29 0.39 0.46 0.39 0.45 0.16 0.36 0.10 0.17 0.09
United s 0.5 0.4 1.8 2.1 3.9 0.1 5.2 0 3.4 1
Kingdom I 36.2 33.9 29.6 25.3 23.3 19.6 20.4 20 18.7 26
m 0.20 0.15 0.54 0.52 0.91 0.03 1.05 0 0.63 0.27
United s 0.5 -0.2 1.2 3.6 2.5 -2.6 2.4 -2.6 1.7 -2.3
States I 3.5 3 3.7 3.1 3.3 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
m 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.08 -0.05 0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.06
Source: own calculations based on data from Trade Finance.
Explanatioii: s denotes the estimated subsidy rates;
I denotes the share of insured exports as of total exports; 
m denotes the estimated subsidy rates in terms of total exports.
Table 6.5: Data on net daims, premium income, and amount of insured contracts, 1981-1990
(in millions of US dollars)
Net claims (claims net of recoveries)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Australia 5 0 5.8 2.5 0 8.9 87.4 301.8 -0.4 10.3
Austria 0.9 125.7 99.7 96.7 -29.6 313 -43.3 161.6 93.5 395.5
Belgium 56.5 67.8 90.5 75.6 81.9 99.9 187.5 219.5 196 164.2
Canada 5.8 5.7 21.8 4.5 -0.6 0.6 3.5 -4 3 19.9
Finland 19.9 21.5 28.7 22.5 19.7 48.6 47.6 -5.6 104.7 11.3
France 336.1 705.4 792.5 384.2 198.2 1249.2 1652.8 2240.9 1880.1 2291.9
Germany 315.2 225.2 570.2 585 559.1 727.8 1135.7 1039.2 1494.4 2989.4
Italy 152.4 234.2 451 393.7 716.7 545.1 966.9 1046.7 769.8 512.1
Nethlds. 33.8 67.4 210.8 272 218 227.3 244.6 198 370.3 419.7
New Zeal. 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.6 0.2 0.9 2.3 0.1 -0.7 5.5
Norway 29.9 77.3 108.6 43.9 24.7 64.1 51 53.8 37.2 57
Spain 39.3 80.3 99.4 178.1 180.2 367.8 745.7 476.7 339.7 391.4
Sweden 105.1 102.3 77.1 54 57.6 74.5 104.9 84.6 100.2 124.1
Switzerl, 132.4 163.1 166.3 131.6 124 133.9 219.1 95.4 128.3 122.9
Utd.Kingd. 449.4 840.1 810 735.4 711.4 833.2 1177 484.7 950.4 970.6
Utd States 14.9 27.3 123.7 262.1 65.2 -3.7 66.4 -1.9 49.2 -34.8
(For source see end of the table)
Table 6.5: Data on net claims, premium income, and amount of insured contracts, 1981-1990
(in millions of US dollars)
(continued)
Premium income
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Australia 12.9 11.3 10.1 11.1 15 15.03 15.6 32.6 57.2 44.5
Austria 64.4 81.9 72.9 77.1 106.5 123.7 187.1 151.3 219.1 147.8
Belgium 53.9 32.8 29.7 23 35 31.4 44.9 42.1 68 47.2
Canada 12.3 12.7 17.9 15.5 11.8 12.6 15.2 19.7 22 22.8
Finland 13.6 11 10.6 6 4.6 8.7 17.3 17.6 25.8 38.8
France 331.9 336.2 360.5 376.2 448.1 569.5 530.7 381.7 534.5 469.8
Germany 247.4 299.2 222.8 172.6 248.9 261.4 310.9 282.9 336.7 496.7
Italy 133.4 142.6 111.2 111.4 105.5 120 141 108.41 196.1 189.1
Nethlds. 79.6 76.2 69.7 65.3 74.4 81.5 90.9 62.1 190.8 222.9
New Zeal. 2.3 2.4 2.4 2 1.4 2 2.5 2.2 2.19 1.8
Norway 15.4 13.7 10.7 7.5 6.5 6.3 4.6 4.9 7.9 5.6
Spain 81.8 123.1 56.2 41.16 63.35 50.47 29.63 49.13 43.3 66.2
Sweden 43.8 41.6 41.5 35.9 39 51 48.6 57.6 . 54 49.4
Switzerl. 69.8 59.6 42.6 32.5 25.5 36.5 25.5 22.5 33.6 39.6
Utd.Kingd. 475.3 608.7 259.6 240.1 252 283 248.9 191.1 370.7 341.2
Utd. States 25 26.3 17.6 21.6 23.2 22.2 20.3 28.5 26.4 22.8
(For source see end of the table)
Table 6.5: Data on net claims, premium income, and amount of insured contracts, 1981-1990
(in millions of US dollars)
(concluded)
Amount of insured contracts
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Australia 2362 2250 2301 2073 2499 2684 3285 4649 4363 4046
Austria 7049 5175 3166 2930 3886 3054 3668 3812 8093 8844
Belgium 4037 3874 2599 2399 3245 3613 4378 4332 4286 5022
Canada 2661 1853 3142 2024 1810 1967 2710 3402 4286 5021
Finland 1066 1138 873 794 576 647 1074 877 1446 1531
France 39400 35100 35310 22377 28364 25838 31273 33818 41665 40444
Germany 16106 16152 13043 10200 12346 12983 15428 14664 18456 26700
Italy 10818 9017 4872 4251 5975 4065 5583 5012 12412 15065
Nethlds. 7078 7824 7869 7066 6682 9158 12697 12979 16137 21034
New Zeal. 642 577 556 453 563 533 664 584 562 496
Norway 668 564 624 458 542 547 647 604 778 770
Spain 4631 4998 3250 2570 3209 3283 3543 3904 3977 5341
Sweden 2113 1639 1213 917 1182 1528 1713 1666 1600 1257
Switzerl. 3208 1626 2668 1599 1293 1477 1170 1139 1669 1759
Utd.Kingd. 35100 33400 26930 24484 22564 24984 26505 14575 26500 28598
Utd. States 8221 6841 7523 6825 7061 4430 6400 5165 4366 4881
Source: Trade Finance,
